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Preface
This study was inspired by the philosophy of Henri Bergson – not so much by
the enormous success of his books, nor by the unmerited decline in the
popularity of his doctrine, which began so soon after he had been a major figure
in both French and world philosophy. Rather, the present study draws its
inspiration from the philosophical truth contained in Bergson’s works, and more
precisely, from the difficult challenge of communicating that truth to others.
Numerous theoretical questions arise in the course of such an enterprise, to
which I hope to give at least partial answers. 
Bergson treats the question of philosophic truth in a way that allowed me to
frame my research in terms of contemporary semiotic and hermeneutic
discourses. In his famous essay “Philosophical Intuition” (CM1: 107–129), he
defines this kind of truth as “something simple, infinitely simple, so
extraordinarily simple that the philosopher has never succeeded in saying it”
(109). This dialectic between intuition and its “saying” is examined in terms of
the hermeneutic dialectic between understanding and interpretation. 
At the same time, this study has the programmatic aim of sparking renewed
interpretations of Bergson’s philosophy, and especially his notion of Intellectual
Effort. I see this notion not only as central to Bergson’s philosophy, but also as
constitutive for the sign-character of our being and for the very possibility our
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persisting in the world. For me this hypothesis is so true and obvious that I
would compare it with truths such as “the Earth revolves around the Sun” and
“man must keep his dignity”. The problem comes, of course, when I have to
defend this view. Contrary to the two truths just mentioned, mine is not
susceptible to deductive proofs. There are no logical positions or experimental
facts on which to base the credibility of this study. For this reason, it was
necessary to provide the brief introduction which follows, entitled “On the
Method of This Study”. There I try to justify the viability of an entire doctoral
dissertation that discusses philosophical questions in a hermeneutic and
interpretative way.
After the comments on methodology, the study unfolds in two main parts.
Part One is dedicated to the philosophy of Bergson and, specifically, to his
notion of Intellectual Effort. In Part Two, I read some central semiotic and
hermeneutic problems from the point of view of Bergson’s “theory” of
Intellectual Effort. 
In Part One: Chapter I, my aim is to describe both the intellectual context in
which Bergson’s philosophy appeared, and its interesting interpretative fate
thereafter. I pay particular attention to those authors whom I call “advocates” of
Bergson, and, in the course of taking their side, I further clarify my own
interpretative method. I also examine the problem of philosophical authority and
its relation to the concept of intellectual effort, to the extent that philosophy is a
mode of “authorizing” concepts by putting them into play as discourse.
Part One: Chapter II presents an analysis of Bergson’s philosophy and
reveals the fundamental role that the concept of intellectual effort plays in it,
despite the limited number of pages he explicitly dedicates to this topic. Of great
interest are Bergson’s earliest public speeches, which submitted to analysis
demonstrate a well-developed ethics of intellectual effort. In this chapter I also
consider Bergson’s many-sided concept of language and how intellectual effort
determines its creative use. Most importantly, this chapter systematically
presents what I call the “theory of intellectual effort”. Here I try to develop the
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full phenomenological and hermeneutic potential of Bergson’s concept of
temporal “duration” (durée) as constituted by the memory (especially in his
work Matter and Memory). My interpretation includes a discussion of how
language participates in this phenomenological process.
In Part Two: Chapter I, I relate the theory of intellectual effort to Italian
philosopher Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s attempts to establish a homology between
material work (labor) and linguistic work. In Chapter II of Part Two, I discuss
the mostly ignored, yet rich parallels between Bergson and the father of
semiotics, Charles Peirce. I attach considerable importance to the parallels
between Bergson’s duration of consciousness and Peircian semiosis, and
between the former’s “immediate data of consciousness” and the latter’s
“iconism”. These parallels allow me to propose a new version of the famous
semiotic triangle; my version includes the role of intellectual effort in semiosis.
Chapter III of Part Two develops a hermeneutics of intellectual effort that is
based on the distinction between Strong and Weak hermeneutics made by
Nicholas Smith (1997). Here I defend my position on the pertinence of a
hermeneutics of intellectual effort and on its contribution to the “strong” branch
of that discourse. I do this by enlisting human intelligence on the side of
“strong” hermeneutics. Chapter IV ends the book with some speculations
concerning the status of intellectual effort in today’s “consumer” society. With
these speculations, I hope to turn what might be considered only a theoretical
and philosophical truth – intellectual effort – to the useful practice of
understanding the world in which we now live.
                18
A few words on the 
method of this study
For the non-Kantian philosophers,
there are no persistent problems 
save perhaps the existence 
of the Kantians. 
– Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 93
Any study of someone’s intellectual efforts that are expressed in words, if that
study is to meet certain academic standards, itself becomes an intellectual effort
expressed in words. This “circular” fact makes the present study its own closest
referent. Such a situation is no novelty in the fields of semiotics and philosophy
of language, which is precisely where our interest lies. A similar situation to our
own is the case of a famous author. He stands out from other authors crucial to
this study, in that he poses a problem relevant to our own, in his analysis of how
a dissertation should be constructed. We are speaking of Umberto Eco, and his
well-known book, How to Make a Graduate Thesis (Eco 1977). Readers well-
acquainted with Eco’s writings might object that the book mentioned does not
speak of semiotics at all, and thus that my analogy fails. Yet it is exactly this
objection that is worth focusing on, because our response to it contains our
interpretation of Eco’s text and, correspondingly, the positioning of our method
in relation to the one prescribed in his book. 
Eco’s directions for making a dissertation are imbued with the spirit of
encyclopaedism, in the sense that the basic part of the scholar’s work consists in
getting to know what scholars before him have said on a given issue. Eco’s book
thus speaks of preparing a comprehensive bibliography that omits none of the
published works on a given problem. Eco offers valuable advice on how to
orient oneself in various kinds of libraries, and how to use their resources to
one’s best advantage. He also provides a detailed description of the ways to cite
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references, so that the sources can be followed easily by anyone interested in the
subject.
In the same spirit, Eco goes on to define the scientific character of a thesis,
which can be attained if one follows these four rules: “1) The study should have
an easily recognizable and well-defined subject so that it is distinguishable by
others, as well; 2) the study should say things about this subject which have not
been said yet, or review things already said, but from a different perspective; 3)
the study should be useful for others; 4) the study should offer all elements
needed to check and confute the proposed hypotheses, as well as the elements
necessary for development of these by others” (Eco 1977: 37–41; his italics). 
As stated earlier, these criteria for preparing a dissertation seem to be
dominated by the ideal of the encyclopaedia, which is the leading one in all
Eco’s works after Trattato di semiotica generale (A Theory of Semiotics; Eco
1974). I deal at length with the encyclopaedia model in Chapter III. Here let us
observe that, according Eco’s scheme, the fundamental prerequisite for
successful interpretation of a text, is the overlapping of the encyclopaedic
competencies of author and reader. This overlap results in the collaboration or
cooperation among the two. Though How to Make a Graduate Thesis is not
about semiotics, it nevertheless provides effective rules for attaining the textual
cooperation just mentioned, and guarantees the student optimal efficiency in
communication. Eco’s book presupposes a model Student whose success is
related to his zeal for new knowledge. As a whole, the book is dominated by a
spirit of erudition which distinguishes Umberto Eco not only as a semiotician,
but also as a philosopher and writer. 
On the basis of the foregoing observations, I can now say why a study of
theoretical-philosophical problems can hardly meet Eco’s requirements for a
dissertation. If all the rules proposed by Eco are aimed at minimizing the risk of
underevaluation of the student’s work, then in dealing with theoretical-
philosophical problems this risk probably cannot be reduced to nor fall below
certain levels. Eco seems to propose that the bulk of the dissertation be
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historiographical, and that the innovative, theoretical contribution come last, in
a single chapter or as a conclusion (Eco 1977: 25). This advice perfectly suits
the overall logic of his book. I summarize this logic as follows: the scholar’s
main task is to acquire comprehensive knowledge of a given problem and then
to present that knowledge in a way that contributes to everyone’s improved
understanding of the problem. With reference to some theoretical-philosophical
problems, and without questioning the general validity of Eco’s model, it is my
view that the balance between acquiring a comprehensive knowledge and
offering innovative ideas should be reconsidered. It is, of course, rather difficult
to determine precise criteria for measuring the ratio between the acquisition of
knowledge and the production of innovative ideas – two aspects that
characterize every serious study. Still, we can try to formulate our idea from the
viewpoint of the scholar’s predisposition, as determined by his tendencies to
encyclopaedism and creativity. A study of theoretical-philosophical issues
would “make sense” if it did nothing other than give a new interpretation of a
given problem. The historiographical approach, however, requires that each new
interpretation assign definitions according to the encyclopaedic background of
a given issue. By contrast, in the theoretical approach – at least in philosophy –
each new interpretation has a creative and risk-taking character. To “risk”
implicitly suggests that we engage another fundamental methodological problem
of the present study – the problem of Truth. That means asking, To what extent
does this study lead to the truth of the matter that we are investigating? 
Eco is careful not to use the word “truth”, which would be an easy target for
certain critical views of his method. And yet, he does not openly state that the
truth of a matter cannot be attained. To make such a statement would cause
doubt or hesitation among many Ph.D. students who are not pursuing
philosophical disciplines. For most people will devote themselves to prolonged
inquiry only if they have the sense of being in contact with the truth of the
subject which they have chosen to study. On the common-sense view (which is
not obligatory for considering philosophical problems), it is quite normal that
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one should strive to find out something true about a given subject, and be ready
to defend the contents of his study as true. This inclination is rooted in the
scientific concept of a world for which truth exists, a truth which we have to
discover. A good stimulus for such an inclination in the young scholar is the
requirement for scientificity that Eco gives in 4), above: the study should lay out
everything necessary for one to check and confute its hypotheses. This is the
main reason that Eco places such great importance on bibliography. The scholar
finds the texts that are important to his subject, just as the scholar finds the truth
of a given phenomenon. Eco sees a dissertation as a certain task (problem)
having a correct solution. The scholar should find this solution in his
bibliography. Eco follows this dictum in his own work, as it appears in the
paragraph titled “Scientific Humility” (Eco 1977: 156–157). We can see, from
the following quote, the great importance Eco places on finding the correct
solution: “[...] (if there was ever something original in my graduation thesis, it
was precisely the question [that it posed] and its corresponding answer, which
had to come from somewhere)” (157; author’s parentheses). Eco discovers the
answer to this rather important question almost by accident, in the work of a
second-rate author from the end of the last century. And this is precisely the
answer that none of the distinguished authors could help him find. The moral of
this story is that we should never be so haughty as to ignore any work pertaining
to our problem. Everything must be read; otherwise, we might overlook keys to
the correct interpretation, and the result of our work would be unsatisfactory.
Such a formulation of the problem of truth demands a more precise
description in its relation to our method. This description comes further on,
since this study is profoundly influenced by philosophical hermeneutics, for
which the problem of truth is crucial. One of the most important aims of these
methodological specifications is to affirm the pertinence of the study. At the
same time, we seek to avoid the paradoxical situation in which the interpretive
essence of the world we live in – and of which this very statement is a part – is
claimed to be beyond doubt. In this line of thought, a guiding notion of the
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present study is that of intellectual effort, a concept introduced by the French
philosopher Henri Bergson. This concept holds importance even today, for
every type of philosophical attitude based on the idea that the essence of being
is linguistic (Fr. “langager”, not “linguistique”).
After some specifications concerning truth, the focus of this study shifts to
the limits of interpretation. How far may we rightfully go in drawing inferences
from texts that do not directly state the inferred things? Eco’s answer to this
question is very clear: the study should contain all elements that allow for the
verification or confutation of the presented theses. This explains Eco’s emphasis
on historiography (which is based on verifiable textual sources) over theory. 
Emphasizing the hermeneutic character of philosophical discourse, we must
once again allow ourselves a certain leeway. More specifically, while we accept
unconditionally the position that every rigorous study should be based on a
diligent exploration of existing sources, and that such activity forms the better
part of the work to be done, we shall, in a study such as this, unavoidably
consider interpretations whose objective verification is hardly possible, and thus
shall be personally responsible for them. Naturally, such a justification can be
very dangerous and serve as an alibi to say (write) anything. Eco is right to
remind us that a dissertation is in fact a test of the professional abilities of the
candidate in his field, and that the doctoral committee can hardly be expected to
evaluate “outbursts of genius”, which are almost impossible to quantify, while
overlooking established, well-defined academic standards. In our view, a study
containing a reasonable amount of such interpretative “outbursts” can be
subjected to valid judgement; however, the criteria of judging should also
include the pertinence of the interpretations, which in turn establishes their
validity. As pertinent to this mode of research we consider Richard Rorty’s
reflections on “Philosophy in America Today” (Rorty 1982: 211–230).
According to the American philosopher, the current situation forces philosophy
to “move away from an image of itself as a science which achieves results and
toward an image in which it is simply a free – and, one might almost say,
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‘speculative’ – exercise of argumentative skill” (223; italics mine). Thus the
limits of interpretation should not be located solely in that which can be
claimed, but also in the philosopher’s abilities at argumentation. This
argumentation, however, has become more and more freed of the necessity to
use verifiable sources, in favor of a kind of philosophical-interpretative
performance. In this very sense, the philosopher takes personal responsibility for
the interpretations he offers but, at the same time, nothing prevents his criteria
for judging his own professional background from covering this aspect of his
work. In fact, this is what happens. The defense of a graduation thesis is
precisely a performance of this kind, but, at least according to Eco’s criteria, this
performance should be made with the protection of bibliographical guarantees
for the truthfulness of the thesis. The difference between Eco’s and Rorty’s
student is this: in the graduation thesis of the former, the “official” solution to a
problem should be found in a pre-existing text; by contrast, the latter kind of
student finds a solution whose validity depends on his ability to defend it
convincingly and to integrate it within the general pertinence of his work. 
Obviously, we are inclined, methodologically, to follow the second type of
research competency – all the more so because it is precisely the above-
mentioned “argumentational ability” that draws us near to the central problem
of the study, namely, intellectual effort. Thus, with a certain degree of precision,
we can establish the desired ratio, mentioned above, between intellectual effort
and philosophical research. And its simplest formulation is as follows: those
elements of a philosophical work that prevent it from attaining methodological
perfection (Eco’s criteria for scientific character) can be made up for by
interpretative intellectual effort.
This short formulation, to be taken seriously, demands more specific
elaboration. Thus, bearing in mind that the present study resists easy
comparisons, let us view from the position of the above-stated dictum the fate of
one famous Ph.D. thesis – that of Henri Bergson, published as Time and Free
Will (Bergson 1960 [1889]). We can immediately say that Bergson’s thesis
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meets almost none of the criteria for scientific character. Its subject is an
obscure intuition which Bergson describes to his friend William James in the
following way: “When analyzing the notion of time, the way it is to be found in
mechanics and physics, an overturn of all ideas of mine occurred. I was rather
surprised to find out that the time of science is a non-enduring one.... Thus, in
Time and Free Will I summarized these considerations on scientific time, which
determined my philosophical orientation and on which all my further reflections
are focused” (Mélanges: 766). What would that “non-enduring time” mean? It
is certainly not a subject that is “well-defined”, as Eco would have it. On the
contrary, it remains obscure throughout the author’s entire presentation.
Bergson’s strategy consists in formulating his study as dedicated to the problem
of freedom (a topic which Eco would in no way recommend), but that problem
remains almost completely in the background in the interpretative fate of the
book. The difficulty in understanding this (non-)enduring time is evident from
Bergson’s constant remarks that his thought is interpreted incorrectly. In his
most famous statement of this kind, made in a letter to Höffding, Bergson
expresses this view directly, when he declares “the intuition of duration” to be
the “core” of his doctrine (op cit.: 1148).
In 1915 Bergson is at the pinnacle of his fame, and Höffding is a philosopher
of some distinction who dedicates a monograph to Bergson; but this does not
mean that he has grasped the core of the doctrine. One of Bergson’s most
devoted followers, the poet Charles Péguy, writes in 1914 that the former’s
philosophy “is equally misunderstood by both his opponents and partisans”
(Péguy 1914: 84). As for Eco’s fourth rule, it can be claimed that Bergson’s
dissertation contains nothing to help anybody check the verifiability or
refutability of the theses that he presents. His bibliography is extremely modest
– he quotes no more than 20 titles, among which are articles and studies. These
sources belong mainly to the field of psychology, but the conclusions Bergson
draws from them are more philosophical than psychological. Yet in spite of
                25
these evident methodological disadvantages, Bergson’s dissertation marks a
significant stage in the development of philosophical thought. 
In many philosophy textbooks, Bergson’s contribution is identified with the
several notions he deals with in this work. In saying “notions”, we arrive at the
linguistic aspect of our study. From this point of view, we can say that each
theoretical study contains one (or more) unsolved linguistic problem(s). And
Bergson’s great problem was that he did not have the vocabulary needed to
express his very simple intuition in not more than a few words. He expressed his
insight with the existing vocabulary, and immediately a whole work originated
from it. This work is the philosopher’s intellectual effort, which is necessary to
compensate for the initial shortage of notions. At the same time as he is being
criticized for his notion of time, Bergson draws criticism from the point of view
of the existing language, whose proponents soon label him as an “enemy of
language in general”. Thus, he becomes the target of choice for critics of
“modern thought” (who are united by the idea of the linguistic essence of
being). In reality, however, Bergson’s philosophy is a constant struggle with
inadequate philosophical vocabulary that is unable to express new necessities of
thought (a large part of Chapter 1, below, deals with this problem). Bergson has
definitely chosen the harder way – one that calls for the philosopher’s creative
effort, formulation of a new doctrine, and many other challenging demands.
How much easier it would have been, if Bergson had looked for the solution of
the initial conceptual (terminological) problem in the works of other authors.
With a perfect study from a methodological point of view, he would have
managed to get better positioned in his problem and would have had more
things to say. Yet by doing so he would have disposed of a richer vocabulary,
for every author is said to employ new notions and to draw new shades of
meaning from pre-existing ones. From a purely pragmatic point of view,
Bergson would have had fewer problems with his dissertation if he had gone the
established route, since he would have had to take much fewer interpretative
risks. Through rigorous exploration, his bibliography would have revealed to
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him the solutions to conceptual problems. On the other hand, many of the
solutions he arrived at, by making his own way, would have turned out to be
inappropriate. To draw a moral from this example, we can think of the various
types of effort needed in both cases. In a historiographical study, the scholar
takes recourse in the writings of other authors in order to find the solutions to
the issues he raises. The desired result is a new configuration of pre-existing
notions (Rorty’s “vocabulary” and Eco’s “encyclopaedia”), whose novelty
should contribute to a better understanding of the subject by everyone. In a
theoretical study (I speak always of philosophy), at certain key points the effort
is aimed at offering new notions or metaphors (images in Bergson) that should
contribute to the configuration of a new system and to the opening of a new way
of thinking about a subject or problem, rather than just to a better understanding
of it. (Here arise some analogies with Kuhn [1962, 1970], although I refer to
something smaller than “scientific revolutions”.)
To complete our methodological specifications, we should ask to what
extent the contemporary situation of Philosophy predisposes us to one or the
other kind of intellectual effort. Right away, without profound analysis, we can
say that the time has passed for revolutions in thinking. They are impossible not
only because no one would dare undertake such a thing nowadays, but because
the very idea of revolution has been devalued. This century has witnessed so
many revolutions, mainly in the field of arts and aesthetics, that subsequent ones
are no news at all. In philosophy, the most significant activities of today are the
criticism and deconstruction of the great ontologies of the past; there is hardly
room for creating new, revolutionary ones. It is as though a merciless logic of
programmed innovation, determined by consumerism, homogenizes all human
practices in the name of a global market. Marketing is a universal system for the
exchange of ideas, goods and services. The researcher gradually turns into
aprofessional consumer of information, and the “task” of the market is to answer
his needs. In recent years, access to all types of information has grown
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exponentially. A personal computer enables one to consult a 30-volume
encyclopaedia in 10 minutes and take from it everything one might be interested
in; one can subscribe to innumerable periodicals that are received by e-mail on
the very day they come out; one can “visit” in a single afternoon all the national
and world congresses in one’s field, download dissertations on one’s subject
from every university in the world, and ask whatever one wants in the countless
on-line discussion groups. Nowadays the scholar has little difficulty in finding
the solution to any conceptual problem. Moreover, with this oversaturation of
information, and the vast quantity of data that are instantly available on any
topic, one can never be sure that one qualifies as an expert on anything – except,
perhaps, those who choose to major on subjects like “the Chapel of St. Mary at
the castle of Alessandria” (Eco 1977: 31). Paradoxically, the inexhaustible
supply of information on the Internet – the vast communication system to which
we all subscribe – makes it impossible for one to stay informed about all that is
said or written on a given topic.
Against this background, we can reconsider the criteria for an adequate
study. We have already observed that a competent dissertation of today is
expected both to manifest innovative ideas concerning the topic of study, and to
cite and summarize everything that has been written it. At the same time, we
have indicated the impossibility of meeting such an expectation, given the
current state of Philosophy. As a way around this seeming impasse, I consider
it a reasonable solution for the scholar to work on certain authors with which he
or she is familiar. This strategy grants the writer the freedom to combine the
ideas of different authors so as to “reveal” the (perhaps hidden) connections
between those ideas and authors, and thereby to cast new light on a given
subject, or even produce a new subject altogether. Moreover, such interpretive
combinations do not require legitimation by reference to authorities.
The combining of ideas in new or unusual ways has its parallel in the ways
one combines seemingly unrelated words so as to form metaphors. Thus, the
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following comments by Aristotle concerning metaphor might further illuminate
our own project:
“It’s a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also of
compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of
metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also sign of
genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars.” (On Poetics, 1459a, 4–11; italics mine)
“Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to
the original thing, and yet not obviously so related, just as in philosophy also an
acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart” (Rhetoric, 1414a,
8–13; italics mine) 
On the significance of the above postulates for philosophical discourse, I
refer below to authors such as Ivor Richards (1936) and Paul Ricoeur (1979). It
is not hard to link this interpretation of metaphoricity with the idea of the
linguistic essence of Being. The great ontologies of the past can be viewed
precisely as such innovative arrangements of things – arrangements that are not
obvious from the position of the acquired worldview. “The being is said (says
itself) in many ways”, says Eco, interpreting Aristotle (Eco 1997: 10–42). Our
present-day situation of “information overload” leaves no room for such
activity. Nevertheless, we can say that a good philosophical study is based on
interpretative work concerning hypothetical similarities between seemingly
dissimilar authors, with which similarities the scholar becomes personally
involved and whose reasonableness he defends with the pertinence and the
argumentation of his own work. The philosopher is not obliged to “justify” the
discovered similarities, just as the poet is not obliged to defend his metaphor as
true. Despite the differences between these genres, in terms of key-aspects the
general validity of the work should in both cases sanction “outbursts of
creativity”. In the first case, it is a matter of skill at argumentation; in the
second, it is a question of artistic gift.
From this perspective, the problem of truth acquires its peculiar
characteristics, too. Indeed, the scholar works not with facts but with
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interpretations, which are the core of his method; but this does not mean that
nihilism remains the only possible (anti)method. Rather, we subscribe here to an
all-embracing understanding of truth that frees it from the hegemony of the
scientific method, namely, Gadamer’s philosophical-hermeneutical
interpretation (Gadamer 1979). This issue will be discussed in detail further on,
but even now I anticipate that the key-moments of “observing” unobvious
similarities between authors are moments of truth. The truth, whose model is
our experience with art, appears in the very act of understanding, of grasping
that which, like the beautiful, “makes itself immediately apparent in its being”
(Gadamer 1979: 438). Mere skill in argumentation, in our view, cannot be
exercised effectively without the drawing of pertinence from such an authentic
act of understanding and truth. The need to study anything at all amounts to the
need to say something true. This is the situation with both scientific and
interpretative methods, the difference between them being that the former
believes in the discovery of truth, while the latter takes it as an epiphany in the
linguistic environment in which we persist and which makes our interpretations
possible. 
This concept of truth allows for reflection on another reality of philosophical
study. I am referring to the choice that always must be made in order for
philosophical discourse to be possible. This choice comes prior to the
interpretation of similarities between different authors – it is the choice of the
which authors to compare. The selection of authors is of primary importance,
for it predetermines the overall strategy of truthfulness of the discourse to
follow. If we examine contemporary thinkers, we find hardly any of them that
do not ground their own discourse in that of some great authority from the past.
To express this idea, Eco uses a very appropriate aphorism, a metaphor: “We are
dwarfs on the shoulders of giants” (Eco 1979: 49; 1977: 26). The giant on
whose shoulders Eco stands is obviously Peirce. But what was the criterion for
Eco’s choice of giant? Is this criterion compatible with the requirements for the
scientific character of a dissertation? Has Eco discovered the Truth in what
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Peirce has said? But if this is the Truth, then why didn’t Greimas also discover
it there? At the crucial moment when we choose a giant on whose shoulders we
are to stand, truth obviously acts more as an epiphany than as a discovery.
Mention of epiphany brings to mind another great philosopher, Emanuel
Lévinas, for whom such a moment of realization is the face of the Other, the
face that transcends the knowledge of this world. The truth, the beautiful, and
the face – all of these appear in a way that exceeds rationality and verification,
but that is decisive for the scholar’s choice and that predetermines the whole
interpretative course of his study. The truth, the beautiful, the face, or
“intellectual sympathy”, as Bergson puts it – all these, paradoxically enough,
seem to offer the last source of rationality in an age of total deconstruction,
decentralization, and fragmentation.
PART ONE
INTELLECTUAL
EFFORT IN BERGSON’S
PHILOSOPHY
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I. The Interpretative Character
of Bergson’s Philosophy and
the Role of Intellectual Effort
I.1. Psychology or Philosophy?
The first thing that strikes us about the notion of “intellectual effort” is how old-
fashioned that expression sounds today. Though this locution seems to be out of
its proper time, the very title of my study foretells its concern with certain
matters of history. As proposed in the methodological introduction, and instead
of the conventional “pre-interpretation”, my interest also lies in the theoretical
implications of this notion in the field of Philosophy, which today is the same as
philosophy of language (according to Eco [1984], the latter fits neatly within the
framework of General Semiotics). Before looking at those implications, we first
need to consider the origin of the notion of “intellectual effort”, and its role in
Bergson’s philosophical doctrine, in terms of both its ideational value and also
its “empirical” relationship with the genesis of philosophical discourse itself. 
Not only does the notion of “intellectual effort” strike us as outdated, but it
is also difficult to identify the domain or discourse to which it belongs. This
difficulty is not an abstract matter of semantics, but a direct observation related
to the origin of my own project. “Intellectual effort” is most often associated
with psychology, inasmuch as it refers to mental activity. The term is
inappropriately fuzzy, however, to find a place in experimental psychology – a
field whose scientific character and methodological exactness surround it on all
sides with signs that read “No Admittance!” 
There is another category of texts that relate to my topic in a purely
metonymic way, and that we can roughly define as contemporary instructions
for the effective use of mental resources. Typical titles in this genre are
“Intellectual Teamwork”, “Tools of the Mind: Techniques and Methods for
Intellectual Work”, “Brainstorming” and so on (Galegher & Co 1990; Stibi…
1982). These kinds of text may provide entertaining reading, but they are in no
way related to Bergsonian “intellectual effort”! Furthermore, among the
hundreds of articles, monographs, and other documents listed in the
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bibliographies of the two publications cited above, one finds not a single
philosophical work.
The notion of “intellectual effort” in fact originates from an intermediate
zone between psychology and philosophy (metaphysics) that gave birth to the
philosophical school of Spiritualism. (The question of whether Spiritualists took
it from other sources is beyond the scope of this study.) Whatever its origin, it
is certain that, before Bergson, this notion was not applied directly to the usage
of language (which from now on I shall identify as “linguistic work”). Bergson
himself attributes the introduction of the notion of “intellectual effort” to Main
de Biran, calling him “the most metaphysical among the psychologists of the
last [i.e., nineteenth] century” (Mélanges: 688) and the source of the idea of “a
sort of mutual penetration between facts and being, between psychology and
metaphysics” (op. cit.: 408). Bergson notes also that “this immanent-to-
consciousness effort” occupies a “privileged place in the philosophy of Maine
de Biran” (op. cit.: 667). Maine de Biran’s influence on Bergson is a rather
complex issue that we can refer to only in passing (for specialized studies on
this influence, see Serini 1923; Janicaud 1969; Soulez 1997: 39–57).
Nonetheless, it brings us closer to the question of philosophers’ “labels”, which
is an issue of primary importance to us because it is a kind of interpretative
process.
What does it mean to label a philosopher? Mainly it facilitates the work of
historiographers, humanists and philosophers, when they have to render an
account of the labeled author. On the one hand, such labeling is a positive
phenomenon since it is a form of sanction (in the Greimassian sense), by which
the author acquires an official status. Thus, the labeling of young Bergson as a
follower of the tradition of French Spiritualism proved to be an important
moment in his career as a philosopher. But on the other hand, a label narrows
interpretation by calling attention to aspects of thought related only to a certain
tradition, while other traditions, correspondingly, are rendered obscure.
In Bergson’s case, the game of labeling undergoes various phases, almost all
of them of negative effect. The situation is aggravated by the change of
centuries which, together with the label of “representative of spiritualism”
(Soulez 1997: 74), fixes Bergson squarely among nineteenth-century
philosophers, although his most famous works were written after 1900
(Introduction to Metaphysics, Creative Evolution, Laughter, The Two Sources
of Morality and Religion).
The Interpretative Character of the Philosophy of Bergson
                34
I.2. “Bergsonism”
Bergson is sometimes regarded as a “spiritualist” – mostly by positivist
philosophers, whose typical representative is Bertrand Russell (cf. Russell
1912). And most histories of philosophy present him as a “nineteenth-century”
thinker. Yet both of these labels are much less misleading or erroneous than the
expression “Bergsonism”. This latter rubric is the ultimate sanction of an
internationally recognized philosophy. By bearing the surname of its author, one
would expect it to compensate for the inconveniences that an “anonymous”
philosophical school might call forth. But that is not the situation at all.
“Bergsonism” is in fact a vulgarization of the philosopher’s doctrine, and
unfortunately the term by which it has become accessible to the “general
public”. By the 1920s, the Bergson phenomenon has attained the faddishness of
a fashion trend. According to some statistics from that period, Bergson’s
popularity ranks “second after the actor Maurice Chevalier and just a step above
the fighter Carpentier” (Mathieu 1971: 389). It is then that talk begins of the
Nobel Prize, which Bergson is awarded in 1928. In such conditions, as can be
expected, he becomes an institution in the circles of French academic
philosophy (from 1914 onward Bergson is a member of the French Academy).
In philosophy such institutionalization quickly summons much negative
criticism, which, of course, centers on the superficial and easily refutable
aspects of the doctrine in question. This is more or less the situation that
Merleau-Ponty has in mind, when in a famous essay he says that “established
Bergsonism deforms Bergson” (Merleau-Ponty 1960: 239). Interestingly, in the
initial phase of his career Merleau-Ponty himself is one of the main protagonists
in the dethronement of Bergson’s philosophy. Thus, another particularity of
Bergsonism comes forth, one that consistently accompanies labeling. The Italian
philosopher Vittorio Mathieu quite aptly calls this phenomenon “polarisation”.
By this he means that all interpretations of Bergson’s philosophy tend to take
some side, be it positive or negative. According to him, a neutral attitude toward
this doctrine is impossible, from the very moment of its appearance (Mathieu
1971: 387). Thus, the relationship of the doctrine to today’s philosophical
schools is to a great extent predetermined. Existentialist phenomenology openly
declares war on Bergson. Structuralism and its branches ignore him a priori as
a mentalist and vitalist. Analytical philosophy takes a negative attitude toward
Bergson’s work from the very beginning, and pragmatism after William James
simply remains silent on the subject.
I.3. The Polarisation of Interpretations
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In the introduction to this study, I mentioned sympathy as a criterion of truth.
From this point of view, the fate of Bergson’s philosophy is particularly
illustrative. The idea of polarisation introduces one of our fundamental
problems: Why bother with our research if we cannot count on objective
results? And yet, in order to remain in the realm of common logic, I shall again
have to resort to noting the hermeneutic background, this time, however, not
only that of my study but also of the seeming polarisation-paradox. The
polarisation effect in Bergson is marked also by the fact that his philosophy left
behind no school and no official followers. Yet despite this lack of a center of
“tradition” by which to evaluate and legitimate various interpretations,
remarkable books have been written on Bergson’s philosophy, their
interpretative bias notwithstanding. 
A particularly eloquent example is the essay by a young Marxist, Georges
Politzer, called “La fin d’une parade philosophique: le bergsonisme”, and
published in 1929. Ronchi’s monograph, “Bergson filosofo dell’interpretazione”
(Ronchi 1990: 9–21), offers a remarkably precise analysis of the qualities and
theoretical validity of Politzer’s reading of Bergson. Ronchi’s main prediction
is that “Politzer’s critical thesis will be rediscovered and reconfirmed every time
the future existential phenomenology (from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty and
Taminiaux if we are to mention only the most important authors) comes to
Bergson” (op. cit.: 13).
The significance of this prediction can be fully appreciated when we recall
that existentialist phenomenology’s own fight for recognition (a fight engaged
in by each new philosophy) is aimed at the “demolition” of institutional
academic philosophy, represented, as already mentioned, by Bergson. Thus, in
an essay of such a theoretical, and even prophetic character, we come across
expressions describing Bergson as a “worm of official philosophy” who has dug
himself a hole in “the cheese of idealism”; that he was a “tamed circus dog”, a
“lackey”, an “agent provocateur and traitor” and also a “servant of the
bourgeoisie”, and even a prostitute “of taste and necessity”! (Politzer, cited in
Ronchi 1990: 34). This vitriolic, to put it mildly, reading of Bergson might
make us think that, at least from a materialistic point of view, many “objective”
reasons exist to impose a lasting negative label on the doctrine and, thus, to limit
interpretative freedom, even if it is from a single perspective.
Countering such an attitude, however, we find a no-less-significant
interpretation of Bergson by one of the most influential Marxist philosophers of
communist Russia of the time, V. Plechanov. In the Savremenna burjoazna
filosofia anthology (AA VV 1972: 181) we read that, according to Plechanov,
the true essence of Bergson’s philosophy is dialectical materialism! On this
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reading, Bergson has helped draw attention to the fundamental role of the
practical, material activity of man. Unfortunately, he was misled and diverged
from this “true” direction, thus failing to reach his natural philosophical essence;
namely, dialectical materialism. This interpretation can hardly be regarded as
unimportant, as a momentary diversion of the Soviet Marxists. For there is
scarcely another language in which Bergson’s philosophy has been so
comprehensively translated and published. 
The interpretative polarisation of Bergson’s philosophy that supports my
hermeneutic attitude towards this discourse is quite evident in another case. This
instance involves two authors whose historical friendship, as well as their
belonging to the same philosophical school (despite various terminological
misunderstandings), would hardly suggest that they would so radically differ in
their interpretations of the philosophy of their contemporaries. Yet precisely
such a radical difference appears in the attitudes of William James and Charles
S. Peirce toward the French philosopher. Plenty has been written on the mutual
influence of Bergson and James, and it can scarcely be summarized into a single
aspect. But one thing is for sure: the positive sign is present everywhere, in spite
of the usual disputes over who has influenced whom and how. Since the contrast
with Peirce points to what I shall deal with in Chapter III, here I limit the
exposition of attitudes among this philosophical triangle to the citation of two
letters, for the only evidence of Peirce’s attitude towards Bergson is epistolary.
One finds a rich choice of passages in the correspondence between Bergson and
James, but most appropriate among them seems to be a letter of 1907, which
contains the impressions of the American pragmatist upon his reading of
Creative Evolution: “Oh, my dear Bergson, you are a magician and your book
is a miracle, a real miracle in the history of philosophy[....] If your next book
excels this one the way it excels both your previous books, be sure that your
name will live for the generations to come as the name of one of the great
creative spirits philosophy knows”; and on the conceptual affinity between
them: “We both fight the same battle, you as a general and I as an ordinary
soldier. The position we defend is called Tyche, i.e. a world of value, a true
world of growth and living” (Mélanges: 724–725). And here comes Peirce’s
reaction (1909), in an attempt not to be compared to Bergson: the question of
whether “philosophy is either a science or not is balderdash, and [...] a man who
seeks to further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of
his science without anxious care to use them with strict accuracy; it is not very
gratifying to my feelings to be classed along with a Bergson who seems to be
doing his prettiest to muddle all distinctions” (in Gunter 1986: 101). 
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I.4. Philosophical Advocacy
In the context outlined thus far, the problem of intellectual effort acquires
clearer contours. An innovative philosophy appears on the intellectual horizon
and tries to find its proper place among the existing schools. Despite the success
of pragmatism, in those years the horizon of philosophy is the discovery of
Truth. The affinity of the new doctrine to the spiritual tendencies of its time
grants it quick recognition which, however, in purely philosophical circles leads
to a paradoxical status. On one hand, it takes on the role of a fad and is accepted
uncritically (something Bergson not only enjoys but also complains about),
while on the other hand it is mercilessly attacked and accused of being
misleading, of promising things it could not do, of being literature and not
philosophy, and so on (cf. Ronchi 1990). More and more palpable in Bergson’s
philosophy become those elements that I view as a defense of the validity of the
original intuitions that generated it. Vladimir Jankélévitch, author of the best
monograph on Bergson’s philosophy so far, describes this peculiarity as
follows: “Bergsonism is one of those rare philosophies in which the theory of
research is conflated with the research itself, thus avoiding the kind of reflexive
splitting that engenders epistemologies, propaedeutics and methods”; but if we
must find some method, then “the method is true knowledge; and far from
offering a doctrinal deduction of notions, it is created gradually, together with
the development of spiritual progress, to which it finally is just the physiognomy
and the inside rhythm” (Jankélévitch 1959: 5–6). This method is none other than
intellectual effort, which is the most important concept for my reading of
Bergson. This is the notion that has survived the influence of time and that
provides the ground on which Bergson’s philosophy confronts some modern
tendencies of thought in which everything seems to arise ex nihilo, and where
the subjects behave like sleepwalkers rather than sentient beings, and wander
the labyrinths of Language, whose boundaries are firmly fixed or, similarly, are
riven by the lack of one or the other linguistic structure. Bergson’s intellectual
effort attempts to surpass the boundaries of language, which is inherited and
which, so to speak, “recommends” to us the world in which we live. My
constant and guiding idea is this: no matter how radically we reconsider the role
of language and of all sign systems for our cognitive apparatus, no matter how
we emphasize the linguistic nature of the world we live in, no matter how
deeply convinced we are of the finitude of being, we cannot imagine existence
without intellectual effort and all the consequences of indeterminacy it brings.
Precisely this constitutive indeterminacy opens the horizon of the interpretative,
and not of the somewhere given, fate of being.
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Despite all my attempts to secure a certain interpretative freedom, however,
I ought to ask to what extent Bergson’s texts are open to such emphasis on
intellectual effort. Knowing the answer in advance, I can claim in sound
historiographic style that the better part of this study will deal with the
presentation of the various strategies, interwoven as a part of the theory and
with which Bergson solves the problems resulting from the discrepancy between
the available philosophical language and its expressive intentions. But in a
rather synthetic way, at the end of an exhaustive evaluation of his philosophical
doctrine in 1922, Bergson says exactly what we would like to hear:
Thus I repudiate facility. I recommend a certain manner of thinking which courts
difficulty; I value effort above everything. [...] Tension, concentration, these are the
words [with which] I characterized a method which required of the mind, for each
new problem, a completely new effort. I should never have been able to extract from
my book Matter and Memory, which preceded Creative Evolution, a true doctrine of
evolution (it would have been one in appearance only); nor could I have extracted
from my “Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness” a theory of the relations
of the soul and body like the one I set forth later in Matter and Memory (I should
have had only a hypothetical construction); nor from the pseudo-philosophy to
which I was devoted before the Immediate Data – nor from the pseudo-philosophy
to which I was devoted before the Immediate Data – that is to say [only] from the
general notions stored up in language could I have extracted the conclusions on
duration and the inner life which I presented in this first work. (CM: 87–89)
Although deprived of the comforting thought that I am presenting the Truth
about Bergson, I can seek support from other studies. As already mentioned,
they are characterised by an initial polarisation, which facilitates their grouping.
If I take those with a positive bias, to which I can add the parts of this study
involving Bergson, we see that their positivity has a well-defined form, and that
it consists not in simply praising various aspects of the doctrine, but in
defending the validity of fundamental though overlooked ideas. To put it
another way, they defend the Bergson of “Bergsonism”. I find in Rorty support
for giving the present study such a status, in the same essay from which I quoted
the notion of “argumentative skill” in my introductory remarks on method.
Rorty asserts that “Perhaps the most appropriate model for the analytic
philosopher is now the lawyer, rather than either the scholar or the scientist”
(1981: 221; Rorty’s italics). For this reason, I add to the methodological notes
my observation on the polarisation of Bergson’s interpreters.
 Perhaps such an ambiguous relationship, which connects the lawyer and the
idea of truth, answers our needs most thoroughly. On one hand, the lawyer
serves the institution, which more than any other stands for the truth, on the
other hand however, especially in the USA, this is definitely not the category of
people who would always tell the truth. It is rather that lawyers stand on the
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opposite sides of a fact and construct truth. The best-constructed truth wins and
becomes, so to speak, the official one of a given fact. However, the methods of
construction are completely dependent of the lawyer’s know-how and
argumentative skill. And pushing forward the interpretative freedom in the
reading of Bergson to such an extent, as far as he is an important philosopher of
the past, I am relieved to be in a good company, the best possible in the context
of this study. Eco, author of The Limits of Interpretation, in his latest book (Eco
1997: 80–99), says the following in a note to the chapter entitled “Rereading
Peirce”: “But it is known that one can make Peirce say everything, depending
on which side one turns him” (n 28: 394). The “advocacy” of a philosopher
consists precisely in making the interpreted philosopher “say” things that
confirm one’s thesis, the only limitation being that of the good intention not to
betray “the spirit of Peirce2“ (ibid.). Correspondingly, to me the measure of
such constructed truth belongs to those monographs on Bergson which I most
often quote and which have helped me to undertake this study. Among them, the
nearest one in time and orientation to my own is Rocco Ronchi’s “Bergson
filosofo dell’interpretazione”. Its author proves the validity of the notions of
“attentive recognition” and “intellectual effort”, as viewed against the
background of general criticism that situates Bergsonism as standing apart from
existential phenomenology. I am deeply obliged to that essay for its
observations on the thoroughly hermeneutic character of the notion of attentive
recognition. Those observations have inspired me to undertake a critical
reconsideration of some general conditions in semiotics.
I.5. Bergson as Columbus
One of the strongest supporters of Bergson’s philosophy is Leon Husson. His
monograph L’intellectualisme de Bergson (1947) is a touchstone in the
development of the doctrine of intuition and intellect, and it once and for all puts
an end to the groundless charges of false irrationality and even the
supernaturalness of intuition as modes of thought in Bergson. Husson brilliantly
shows that intuition is merely a higher form of intelligence, a creative
rationality. In so doing he makes a significant contribution to the construction of
the truth about Bergson’s philosophy – the same “hermeneutic” kind of truth
that makes the present study possible. What is inspirational in Husson’s case is
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that his advocacy of Bergson includes a programmatic attitude that resonates
with my own. Toward the end of his essay “La portée lointaine de la
psychologie bergsonnienne”, Husson reflects on what it would be to remain
loyal to Bergson’s thought. His reflection occurs in the context of a comparison
of Bergson’s thought with the situation of philosophy and psychology several
decades after the peak of the doctrine. According to Husson, this is a difficult
and risky task, which consists in predicting the possible consequences of a
thought that, due to its time, could only be a start: 
“As a beginning, an explorer always has to draw his route according to already
existing maps, though later on his discoveries might show their insufficiency and a
need for revision. Like Maine de Biran in his Memoires sur l’habitude, in Matière et
mémoire, Bergson resembles, according to the happy simile of Gouhier, a
Christopher Columbus searching for America on the maps of his predecessors. It is
very easy to reject him today by arguing that his maps are old-fashioned when to a
great extent we owe him the fact of having others[....] Anyone who would undertake
this effort [a new reading] will discover in Bergson’s philosophy plenty of resources
that are not yet exploited. The moment has come for those who admire Bergson to
denounce the stereotyped clichés, which, under the pretext of an authentic reading,
conserve only that which is the corpse of a thought young and vital in its essence.”
(Husson 1959: 161–162)
This remarkably apt passage outlines a clear picture of what I have just called
“the constructed truth of Bergson”, and provides us the occasion to consider
another milestone in such construction.
In her monograph Bergson l’educateur, Rose-Marie Mossé-Bastide bases
her reading of Bergson’s philosophy on a notion that at first seems of secondary
importance. This is the notion of “bon sens”, which is a quality that Bergson
relates to the aims of education. Bergson introduced this notion in a speech he
gave to graduating students at the end of the academic year in 1895. He
describes what he considers to be a well-developed sense of combining true
(pure) and practical knowledge. A close analysis of his presentation reveals that
precisely this combination of two types of knowledge is the foundation of all the
basic “binaries” from which Bergson elaborates his concepts: body / soul,
intuition / intellect (analysis), open / closed morality, and the like. Mossé-
Bastide’s greatest contribution is to relate this seed of the doctrine to Bergson’s
activities as a lecturer and professor. This is the same relation I shall be looking
for, between intellectual effort as a theoretical subject on the one hand, and as a
prerequisite for realization of the doctrine on the other. “Bon sens” is but a
synonym for “intellectual effort”: “And so, in bon sens I see the internal energy
of an intellect, which reconquers itself every moment, eliminating ready-made
ideas in order to leave more room for ideas that are being created and modeled
according to the real, through the persistent effort of a persevering attention”
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(BS: 365). In addition to its pertinence for our own ideas, Mossé-Bastide’s
monograph is also a masterpiece of historiography. Before the publication of
Mélanges (1972), her book was the main source of texts and documents related
to Bergson’s life and work. 
Though I am convinced that something new and original can be said about
intellectual effort, thus contributing to the rediscovery of a quickly forgotten
philosophy, I must first mention how Bergson himself referred to the work of
one of his staunchest advocates, Vladimir Jankélévitch, whose book on
Bergson, as stated above, is considered the best monograph of its kind. In
addition to the high quality of that book, it was published before Bergson’s
death (in 1941). Thus Bergson himself was able to provide “positive feedback”
on it. The letter Bergson writes to Jankélévitch after reading the latter’s book is
unique among the many documents testifying to his (Bergson’s) judgment of
how his philosophy is received and understood. It is the first totally positive
response we encounter, without a trace of obscurity or reserve on Bergson’s
part: “Your exposition is not only precise and correct; [...] above all, it gives
evidence of a remarkable extension of the doctrine and an intellectual sympathy
[for it]” (Mélanges: 1495). Most important for my purposes is the approval or
even blessing with which Bergson endorses Jankélévitch’s effort: “I would add
that this analytical work is accompanied by a particularly interesting effort at
synthesis: often the points I reach become your points of departure for personal
and original speculations” (ibid.). Intellectual effort guided by intellectual
sympathy, which together develop the doctrine further, in an original and
individual way – perhaps this is the real Bergsonism. And it shows that the truth
for him exists somewhere, as already given. Still, these are the master’s words.
And how far is it possible to think of philosophical discourse as derivative of an
interpretative effort that is required always to be new, and that strives to remain
aloof from general, ready-made attitudes? This we shall see in the closing
chapters of this study.
I.6. Bergson and Saussure
Continuing the comparison with Columbus, we notice that Bergson, too, made
discoveries that would spark further exploration. Ideas that he anticipated or
implied remained largely in embryonic form, as if determined to belong to the
nineteenth century. This fact provoked intellectual efforts to bring his
philosophy into contact with modern discourse include the following: Mathieu
(1971), Deleuze (1956, 1966), Hyppolite (1949a, b, c) and Péguy (1914); the
latter, although contemporary with Bergsonism, nevertheless fits in this
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category. Of course, these publications are only the bare bones of living
Bergsonism, the full body of which consists of myriad critical works about the
philosopher. For example, Henri Bergson: A Bibliography (Gunter P.A.Y.
1986) lists more than 6000 titles pertaining to the philosopher’s work, and still
more exist that are not mentioned in that publication.
To continue our own addition to that literature, we can compare Bergson to
another “Columbus” in his own field, a contemporary of the philosopher, about
whom no less has been written – Ferdinand de Saussure. The theoretical
ramifications of this comparison will be developed in Chapter II. 3. (d). Here I
shall only sketch some differences in the interpretative fates of the two thinkers.
Saussure published a single book during his lifetime, and this while he was
still very young. Although important for its day, the book did not bring him
fame. That would come after his death in 1916, when notes were published that
were taken by students during courses which the Swiss linguist taught between
1906 and 1911 in Geneva (Saussure 1974). Those notes became the famous
Course in General Linguistics. Even after its appearance, a few more decades
would pass before the ideas in the Course gave birth to “structuralism”. In
France, structuralism was comparable in scope and influence to the
“bergsonism” of the beginning of the century. But despite the fact that the two
modes of thought arise at approximately the same time, that both enjoy wide
recognition and wield considerable influence, structuralism belongs to modern
thought, while “bergsonism” remains bound to the past. Saussure, too, has
strong intellectual ties with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But
one must search hard to find them in Saussure’s writing, whereas in Bergson
such ties are immediately obvious. For both thinkers, psychology is the
discipline that makes linguistics and metaphysics possible.
We have already noted some of Bergson’s appeals to psychology, and will
discuss them further below. Saussure, too, openly calls on psychology:
“Everything in language is basically psychological, including its material and
mechanical manifestations” (op. cit.: 6); “mental facts (concepts) are associated
with representations of the linguistic sounds (sound-images)” (11); “Indeed we
should not fail to note that the word-image stands apart from the sound itself
and that it is just as psychological as the concept which is associated with it”
(12). These quotes are not meant to diminish Saussure’s contribution to modern
thought. On the contrary, the limited corpus of his work keeps its extraordinary
insights safe from much trifling debate. For had Saussure gone on to write more
books, he undoubtedly would have had to dialogue with many mediocre authors
of the time. 
Saussure himself might have gone on to expand his doctrine. Doing so
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would have forced him to take account of contemporary authors in much more
detail than his teaching demanded of him. To conform to recent forms of
critique, however, he would no doubt have had to explain many more of his
observations as “delusions” – which is how some of his followers characterize
Saussure’s quainter or outmoded ideas that do not fit his image as the father of
modern structural thought. A good example of this is Tullio de Maruo’s famous
critical edition of the Course (Saussure 1967), which from one point of view
demonstrates how to carry out a successful “philosophical advocacy”. In a long
note, de Mauro characterizes Saussure as a pioneer in the movement to
reevaluate the notion of the “abstract”. But for the same reason, the Swiss
linguist has no valid epistemological grounds, and the existing terminology
“forces” him to say that langue is not in the least abstract, but is “spirituelle”,
without his “being a spiritualist at all” (op. cit.: 389, n70).
When many such “delusional” moments accumulate, however, they exceed
the limit above which a summary reading of an author may take them as
exceptions or delusions. In fact, they give evidence of his far-reaching ability –
his “portée lointaine”. Considering his philosophy in this way, it appears that
Bergson’s greatest “sin” was to succeed in establishing the ideas of the duration
of time, and of intuition as a philosophical method. Some of his ideas were
“modern” enough, but they were made banal by much influential, yet
misguided, discourse about them at the time. Such discourse received much
negative criticism from the next generation of philosophers. The work of those
who want to relieve Bergson of the burden of the epoch proves to be much more
complex than the work of the interpreters of Saussure. Seen from the point of
view of intellectual effort, however, what both Bergson and Saussure develop as
a hermeneutic practice provides the common denominator between these two
“founders of discoursivity”, as Michel Foucault calls them (see I.9, below).
I. 7. Intellectual Effort and Paradigms 
In view of the genesis of Saussure’s Course, it is somewhat ironic that
Bergson’s last publication consists of notes taken by students in his courses on
Metaphysics and Psychology, and Aesthetics and Morals, which he taught from
1882–1887 at Clermon-Ferrand College (Bergson 1990; 1992; 1995). The
relation of those notes to my main topic will be discussed later on. For the time
being we point out that, even at this early stage in his career, Bergson practices
a form of philosophizing that becomes a permanent characteristic of his method.
When Bergson wants to establish a position, he begins by demonstrating
how preexisting, seemingly controversial concepts all make the same mistake,
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thus forcing the philosopher into the same dead-end street. For a thorough
exploration of this argumentative strategy, the reader can consult the chapter “Il
duale in Bergson” in Mathieu (1971; also, Mossé-Bastide 1955: 277–279). Here
I am more interested in how this approach realizes what I called in the previous
section a “discoursivation of intuitions”. That is to say, it is by this method – of
opposing two apparently contradictory views, then proving that both are wrong
– that Bergson introduces his own intuitive solution to a given problem. For
example, in these lectures Bergson introduces one of the most important
concepts in his philosophy, that of Life Force (Élan vital), by first demonstrating
the weakness of both Determinism and Finalism in the explanation of evolution.
Bergson begins by showing the final concepts in which these views would
inevitably result if taken to their logical extremes. He then shows how his new
idea provides the proper solution to the problem. Thus, for Bergson,
Determinism leads to an unacceptable situation (related to the name of Laplace),
for this reason: if a super-intellect comprehends all of the powers that animate
nature and all of the parts of which nature consists, then such an intellect would
also know, without the slightest uncertainty, the past and future of the universe,
from the largest bodies to the smallest atom (CE: 38). On the other hand, the
seemingly controversial Finalism, in its ultimate form (and connected with
Leibniz), regards evolution as merely the unfolding of a pre-established plan
(CE: 39). Both doctrines, according to Bergson, play a speculative game of
notions, by which the intellect produces inferences that are “congenial to
thinking”, but that have little relationship to reality.
In the language of Thomas Kuhn (1971), Bergson opposes two seemingly
different “paradigms”, then proves that they in fact express the same way of
thinking. By overturning or overcoming that way of thinking, we can understand
the true essence of a problem. This is the way “paradigm shifts”, as Kuhn calls
them, take place. In this case, both Determinism and Finalism consider
everything in nature as given; whereas for Bergson, the core of the Life Force is
creative. It is unclear to what extent we can speak of a new paradigm with
Bergson. Still, such a tactic of discoursivation links Bergson rather closely to
intellectual tendencies of his time. He also uses argumentation triangles of this
kind for key notions such as memory (MM, Chapter I), where the idea of the
“image” replaces the “unity and fight” between realism and idealism; he also
shows how “intuition” finds itself wedged between empiricism and rationalism;
and so on. When we add to this argumentative technique Bergson’s typical
disdain for specialized terminology (see, for example, Mélanges: 999–1000), we
begin to see why it is difficult to view him as a founder of discoursivity beyond
the time to which he belongs. We have the opposite situation with Saussure,
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who systematically keeps his distance from the debates of the day, and who
introduces technical terms that, although few in number, prove crucial to the
understanding of all his work.
A close reading of Bergson’s courses reveals an inconsistency in his
argumentative strategy. This “flaw” fits perfectly in the framework of this study,
although it could as easily provide the grounds for much different interpretations
than my own. Bergson dedicated one of his lectures to General Ideas, which are
foundational to his concepts of language and intellectual effort in his (see II. 3.
c, below). The young philosopher introduces the General Ideas in his typical
way, casting them in terms of an argumentative triangle. Atypically, however,
he chooses his problem-solving paradigm from among ones already existing in
philosophy. He opposes nominalists to realists, then argues that the truth in fact
lies in the paradigm of the conceptualists (Bergson 1990: 198). A decade later,
when Bergson returns to the General Ideas in Chapter III of Matter and
Memory, the triangle has a different configuration. Now the delusive paradigms
in opposition are nominalism and conceptualism, and the answer to the problem
is an authentic part of the theory of memory and spirit as it is presented in that
book.
This “inconsistency” need not be read as an index of negligence or error.
Rather, it can serve as a hermeneutic window through which one sees how, in
crucial moments of philosophical discourse, “normal” argumentation is more an
obligation of acceptability, than it is the right method of philosophizing. In these
moments, truly innovative thought shatters existing paradigms, and thereby
accepts the risk of being easily refuted, misunderstood, or even denounced. It is
appropriate to note here the place of Matter and Memory in Bergson’s output.
Though one of the most misunderstood of his works in its time, the most
authoritative advocate of the philosopher describes that book as the most
“genial” of them all (Jankélévitch 1959: 80), a judgement with which I heartily
agree.
Another “hermeneutic” moment occurs in Matter and Memory, which
according to Husson is a recurrent characteristic of Bergson’s thought: 
“Indeed, no matter how direct his statements are generally, in crucial moments (for
example, in the opening lines of Chapter II of Matter and Memory, when he
introduces the difference between the two types of memory and distinguishes the
various levels of association of ideas) Bergson, as if discretely, modulates them with
a conditional and an ‘Everything happens as if’, which should (although then the
author is caught in his own game) keep us watchful” (Husson 1959: 160; also,
Ronchi 1990: 152 and 196). 
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I. 8. Intellectual Effort as Conquest
Henri Hude is the person charged with the daunting task of editing Bergson’s
courses. While this work is underway, Hude publishes a two-volume
monograph in which he offers a new reading of Bergson’s philosophy. This new
reading of all Bergon’s philosophy is made necessary, Hude thinks, by the
discovery of those course-lectures. Not surprisingly, this reading is illuminated
by various findings Hude made while editing the courses (Hude 1989 and
1990a). Although Hude’s claim seems a bit exaggerated, we cannot deny that,
as regards the problem of intellectual effort together with its linguistic
realization, we do find some crucial moments in those lectures.
Premier among those moments is a metaphor that Bergson borrows from the
Scottish philosopher William Hamilton. This particular metaphor seems to be a
kind of archetypal image of all reflections on the problems that Bergson engages
in his later work. Bergson uses this figure in a lecture on language; with it he
represents the dynamic relationship between language and thought. Words are
viewed as an indispensable to the conquest of a territory, such as the advance of
the Russian army in Asia. Words are like small fortresses erected in the newly
captured territories: though the battle is waged by an army of 100,000, without
these fortresses, staffed by only five or six men, the new territory cannot be
considered occupied. In Bergson’s opinion, effort of thought constitutes the
“army”, but without the words, the army would be powerless (Bergson 1990:
224–225). Checking most of Hamilton’s voluminous works, I could not find this
figure in its entirety. But the following fragment will suffice to prove our point:
“A country may be overrun by an armed host, but it is only conquered by the
establishment of fortresses. Words are the fortresses of thought. They enable us to
realize our dominion over what we have already overrun in thought; to make every
intellectual conquest the basis of operations for others still beyond. – or another
illustration: – You have all heard of the process of tunneling, of tunneling through a
sand-bank. In that operation it is impossible to succeed, unless every foot, nay
almost every inch in our progress be secured by an arch of masonry, before we
attempt the excavation of another. Now, language is to the mind precisely what the
arch is to the tunnel. The power of thinking and the power of excavation are not
dependent on the word in the one case, on the mason work in the other; but without
these subsidiaries, neither process could be carried on beyond its rudimentary
commencement.” (Hamilton 1882–84: 138–139) 
One cannot overstate the importance of this metaphorical figure of the
conquest. For if it is accepted as the key to understanding Bergson’s theory of
language, it proves false the criticism that he was an “enemy of language”. That
label, when joined with the charge of “anti-intellectualism” and the rejection in
advance of the significance of language for Bergson’s philosophy, has led to a
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dearth of criticism, positive or negative, concerning many crucial aspects of the
doctrine. And “intellectual effort” takes first place among such omissions.
An eloquent example of how the notion of intellectual effort is ignored
because of labels applied a priori to Bergson’s philosophy is provided by two
readings of Bergson’s theory of language in relation to Saussurean linguistics.
On one hand, the article “Charles Bally: de Bergson á Saussure” (Medina 1985)
opposes two different conceptions of language – langue-nomenclature and
langue-systéme . Bergson is represented with the banal version of Bergsonism,
which casts him as an “enemy of language” and a fan of the old-fashioned idea
that language is nomenclature. Saussure, on the other hand, is viewed as the
innovator, thanks to his groundbreaking idea of language as a system. (langue-
systéme) (op cit.: 99ff).
The opposite relation between Saussurean and Bergsonian theories obtains,
when the French philosopher is represented not from the standpoint of
anti-intellectualism, but of intellectual effort. Thus, in Roudet’s article (1921),
“Sur la classification psychologique des changements sémantiques”, we read the
following:
According to Saussure, in parole we have to look for the embryo of all changes
occurring in langue. A change is an innovation, which has originally appeared in
certain individuals[....] When it becomes universal, it already belongs to langue.
Applied to semantic changes, this doctrine may seem incontestable. A change in
sense always originates from an individual effort to express a thought in language.
This effort, which can be termed an effort of expression, is of the same nature as all
other intellectual efforts. This is a transformation from implicit to explicit thought,
or, if we are to use the words of M. Bergson, an appeal of concept and image from
a ‘dynamic diagram.’ (Op cit.: 678; Roudet’s italics) 
The above quote is instructive in many ways. Most pertinent for us is that it
clears a path for bringing the notion of intellectual effort into (post)modern
discourse. Of course, this cannot happen if I do not mention once again that all
comparisons belong to the sphere of “as if”, and are based on what I referred to
at the beginning of this study as the “discovery of similarities between
seemingly dissimilar authors”. This is a metaphorical sphere, but one of
combining authors rather than words. From this perspective, Bergson’s
philosophical style is very helpful, especially when it comes to the role of
images and figures in his system (discussed below). And when he uses
figurative language instead of the argumentative clichés of his time, called
“delusions” above, it facilitates the task of researchers like myself whose
interpretative milieu is that of metaphor. In addition, the figure of the conquest,
which is central to Bergson’s theory of language, seems eminently compatible
with the theoretical models and strategies used by most modern authors. Such
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figural language helps us to avoid “delusions” of the time, and takes us at once
into metaphorical space, which is the natural milieu of similarities between
authors.
The figure of the conquest also appears in Eco’s encyclopaedia as a
“territory” where language and thought interact (for more on this analogy, and
on Peirce’s role in it, see Chapter II of Part Two, below). Since our interest lies
in intellectual effort and linguistic work, we can disregard the fact that in
Bergson language and thought are of different natures, while in Eco they are
both linguistic. It is enough to see that in the encyclopaedia the acquisition of
new territory is a crucial concept. The following quote, absent from the English
translation, comes from the Italian edition of Eco’s Semiotics and the
Philosophy of Language:
“[The encyclopaedia] is the recorded sum of all interpretations, objectively
conceivable as the library of libraries, where library is also the archive of all non-
verbal information, registered in some way, from paintings to cinema. [...] the
encyclopaedia, as the totality of interpretations, also accommodates contradictory
interpretations; textual activity based on the encyclopaedia, and operating on the
contradictions of the latter, continuously introduces a new re-segmentation of the
continuum; this happens also as the effect of progressive experiences and, in time,
transforms the encyclopaedia; so [the encyclopaedia’s] global representation is
impossible, because it would already be false at the moment in which it is
terminated; also, the encyclopaedia, as an objective system of interpretations, is
possessed in different ways by different users.” (Eco 1984: 109–110)
What to Bergson, as interpreted by Roudet, is an effort of expression that
results in semantic innovation, is called by Eco “textual activity”, a locution that
neatly dispatches the subject. Notice, also, that Eco’s main interest shifts to the
result, which is the ever-enlarging encyclopedia. It is hard to imagine, however,
that the linguistic work required to make this enlargement is performed by
anything other than the free initiative of communicating subjects (see Part Two,
Chapter I). As we shall see, the fate of the term “abduction”, during its transition
from Peirce to Eco, is illustrative in this connection (see Part Two, Chapter II).
Also, key semiotic concepts like “semiosphere” and “intertext” provide similar
reasons for us to ask whose activities are in play, on the basis of the
phenomenon they theorize. For such theorizing ignores the role of acting and
creating subjects, in favor of the illusion that language is speaking the subjects
rather than vice versa.
For Richard Rorty, the notion of “vocabulary” functions similarly to the way
“encyclopaedia” does for Eco. It is also easy to see in this (post)modern thinker
– or “post-philosophical”, as Rorty prefers to be called – an affinity with the
Bergsonian figure of conquest. In the process of an expanding vocabulary /
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encyclopaedia, Rorty emphasizes the criteria by which one description of the
world replaces another. More precisely, he argues that reference to any criterion
not immanent to the descriptions themselves (such as the Good in Plato, Reason
in Kant, the Universal Structure, and so on) results in undesirable effects for the
development of the discourse. Rorty himself sometimes uses metaphorical
language, with characteristic precision: 
“One can use language to criticize and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one’s body
to develop and strengthen and enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in
relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end.
The arts and the sciences, and philosophy as their self-reflection and integration,
constitute such processes of enlargement and strengthening.” (Rorty 1982: xix) 
Here again we see that, in contrast to Bergson, who still considers language and
thought as two different things, Rorty sees no difference in the nature of the
“territory”, the “army”, and the “fortresses”. But there is no doubt that the
expansion – the conquest of territory – takes place through the efforts of the
individual user of language. 
The notion of individual effort brings us at last to Paul Ricoeur, whose work
has been crucial to the present study. Ricoeur lends support to our argument that
the idea of intellectual effort, as a linguistic practice, is fundamentally
compatible with modern philosophical discourse. In The Rule of Metaphor, in a
chapter called “The Metaphor as ‘Change of Meaning’ “, Ricoeur refers to
Roudet’s article, and his interest lies in the term ‘effort of expression’ “
(Ricoeur 1979: 117). Ricoeur notes that Roudet borrows this term from
Bergson, since the latter has “described [it] in the famous essay on ‘L’effort
intellectuel’ “ (op. cit.: 118). The fact that Bergson’s hypothesis comes from the
field of psychology gives Ricoeur some pause. Nevertheless, he generally views
the concept of intellectual effort as “trés positive” (ibid.), and he gives the
notion the attention it deserves. In Ricoeur, the figure of the conquest is reduced
to its purest form, though the relationship with the Bergsonian notion of
intellectual effort is indirect3.
This lack of direct relationship, however, comes at the expense of the fact
that the similarity between Bergson and Ricoeur is introduced into the heart of
the hermeneutic discourse, and especially after it has been compared to the
semiotic approach (op. cit.: 65–100; 120–138; Studies VI and VII). Thus,
Ricoeur perceives the transgression of an existing boundary in order to invade
new territory as an act which 
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“[...] naïve and uncritical – is that of ontological vehemence. I will not renounce it,
I will only mediate it. Without it, the critical moment would be weak. To state ‘that
is’ – such is the moment of belief, of ontological commitment, which gives
affirmation its ‘illocutionary’ force. There is no better testimony to this affirmative
vehemence than the poetic experience. Along one of its dimensions, at least, this
experience expresses the ecstatic moment of language – language going beyond
itself. It seems, accordingly, to attest that discourse prefers to obliterate itself, to die,
in the confines of the being-said.” (op cit.: 249; Ricoeur’s italics) 
I. 9. The Founders of Discoursivity and the Figure of
the Conquest
In my advocacy of Bergson, I have been trying to show the relevance of
“intellectual effort” and linguistic work to current modes of thought. To do so,
it has been necessary to bring Bergson into contact with some significant
representatives of modern thought. The figure of the conquest provides further
support for my thesis, from the standpoint of the notion of the “founders of
discoursivity” as described by Foucault and Kuhn. 
Foucault introduces this term in his essay “What Is an Author?” (in Foucault
1984): “They [the founders of discursivity] are unique in that they are not just
authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the
possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts” (114). This means
that certain parts of the encyclopaedia, such as intertext and semiosphere, can be
regarded as resulting from an individual, constitutive act of foundation. The
novelty here is that the need for intellectual effort is regulated to some extent. A
superficial reading of Creative Evolution may depart from the assumption that
all human beings, upon reaching a certain stage of evolution, become sources of
creativity. Such a reading may go on to identify this stage with the romantic
ideal of the Genius. Readings of this kind probably contributed to the
widespread approval and popularization of “bergsonism” at the beginning of the
century. That is why a comparison with one of the most severe authors of today
can help disentangle Bergson from “bergsonism”. Foucault focuses our attention
on how creativity can exist within the bounds of modern discourse, yet without
resorting to the transcendental categories of the nineteenth century. Bergson
himself responds to that attention to creativity in a way that fits perfectly within
the framework of the basic figure (see I. 8.), again in a metaphorical manner, in
spite of using the philosophical vocabulary at his disposal. This contributes
quite a lot to the immediacy of the comparison.
For Bergson, the originary act is akin to drilling the ocean depths, inasmuch
as it brings to the surface the “very different materials” on which “disciplines
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normally work” (IM: 199). What makes the analogy even more appropriate, and
brings it closer to Foucault’s concerns, is the problem of truth. Bergson notes
that, in deep-sea excavations, the fundamental event is the strike of the drill, and
not the “truth” that is mined out and brought up for all to see. Here precisely lies
the extreme similarity between all great thinkers, though disputes between them
may arise later, when analysis has begun to “dry up” and “harden” the
excavated material (ibid.). Bergson’s equivalent term for discoursivation is
“logical perfectioning”; in contrast to the originary act, which is ephemeral and
momentaneous, the process or refinement can go on for centuries (op. cit.: 192).
In his essay on authorship, Foucault outlines a key difference between the
above-mentioned founders of discourse – of which Marx and Freud are “the first
and most important cases” (Foucault 1984: 114) – and scientific discourse. The
former are marked by a creativity that is more personal and of greater
responsibility than is the creativity of great scientists. The latter are limited by
the scientific method, and their responsibility lightened, inasmuch as it is shared
by the objective proceedings of science. Bergson, on the other hand, focuses on
the lack of such a boundary: “I take the view that several of the great
discoveries, or those at least which have transformed the positive science or
created new ones, have been so many soundings made in pure duration” (IM:
193). Without going into too much detail, and with the explicit reminder that
“modern science is neither one, nor simple” (op. cit.: 197), as Bergson reminded
the positivists, let us recall here Kuhn’s view of the development of science.
Kuhn distinguishes between periods of “normal science” and periods of
“revolution”. Revolutions lead to the formation of a new paradigm, which does
not accumulate over the previous one, but instead changes fundamentally the
research problematics and agenda. When Foucault grounds the difference
between discourses, saying that if one reexamines Freud or Marx, this would
result in changes in Freudianism or Marxism, whereas to reexamine Galileo’s
texts would not bring a change in mechanics (Foucault 1984: 116), he obviously
sticks to a model of normal science. Moments of paradigm shift, however, are
rather close to the other type of discoursivity as represented by Freud and Marx.
Kuhn argues that philosophy and the other humanities do not function much
differently than science does; however, the criterion for progress in science
cannot be applied with the same convincingness to the humanities as it is to the
hard sciences (see the chapter “Progress through Revolutions”, in Kuhn 1971;
see also, Vattimo 1983). Like the sciences, the humanities also oscillate between
periods of the normal and the revolutionary, but the oscillations occur much
more frequently there than they do in the sciences. This is what Bergson has in
mind when stating that the notion of intuition (the strike of the drill) is
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fundamental for both types of discoursivity, while “logical perfecting” is
secondary. One of the most radical of Kuhn’s conclusions refers to the problem
of truth. The very idea of “revolutions” in science implies that the latter cannot
be progressing toward truth. Thus, science resembles an army that conquers new
territories on its way to the Promised Land. But each time the victory seems to
be within reach, someone appears who convinces everyone that the army is on
the wrong planet. Then everything starts anew, the only change perhaps being
that all concerned have gained a bit more experience.
Kuhn compares his inferences about science to Darwin’s theory. At the time
Darwin first advanced his views on evolution, it was not difficult to agree with
the idea that species are not given, but that they evolve and that man descends
from the ape. The greatest problem was caused by the idea that evolution has
neither plan nor destination, neither scheme nor telos. Both the evolution of
species and the development of science, however, are intimately connected with
the idea of progress. And progress presumes a leading to something, towards
some form of truth, no matter how various the versions may be.
In the same way, my reading of Bergson, led by the figure of the conquest,
disregards everything in his philosophy that refers to the nature of the territory,
the army, the aims of the conquest and so on, so as to focus single-mindedly on
intellectual effort, a notion which, as we have seen, has much in common with
some basic ideas of outstanding modern thinkers and theoreticians. The
following chapters will explore this commonalty and its importance for the
reevaluation of certain axioms of modern thought, such as “The limits of our
world are the limits of our language”. Before that, I shall first make more
precise the concept of intellectual effort by tracing its ethical, practical and
theoretical relevance to and in Bergson’s philosophy.
4 Soulez (1997: 79, 85) speaks about the “phenomenology of passion” in Bergson.
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II. The Phenomenology of
Intellectual Effort
It seems to me time to deny oneself the convenience,
which has become a laziness in thinking,
of lumping the whole of western thought
together under a single word,
metaphysics.
– Paul Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 311.
Before we explore the various aspects of the notion of intellectual effort in
Bergson’s philosophy, some particularization is needed. The interpretative
perspective I offer does not at all question the core importance of the notion of
intellectual effort. On the contrary, it is the very key to the reading of Bergson’s
philosophy. The model for our reading is the monograph by Moss_-Bastide,
who, as already mentioned, takes the concept of “bon sens” as her key to
interpreting Bergsonism. From that point of view, Bergson’s philosophy
constitutes a “phenomenology of intellectual effort4“, and my task is to make it
appear from the psychological framework. Indeed, the notion of intellectual
effort itself first arises from the conjunction of two fields, metaphysics and
psychology, and this determines Bergson’s philosophical position as a follower
of Maine de Biran. As Mossé-Bastide puts it, the realm of intellectual effort is
where spiritualism combines with the spirit of science (Mossé-Bastide 1955:
275 n1). It is from this starting point that Bergson later approaches the problems
of evolution and morality.
As mentioned above, in his first significant work, Time and Free Will
[1889], Bergson introduces the idea of “duration” (endurance), and in doing so
he encounters unexpected obstacles of communication. Because “nous parlons
plutôt que nous pensons” (49) [“we speak rather than think”], the usual situation
is one in which “speech dominates over thought” (70). To communicate
successfully, Bergson must help the reader overcome the disposition to privilege
word over thought, in order to give himself over to the immediate data of
consciousness. In Matter and Memory Bergson develops the dynamic principle
of the duration of consciousness. “L’attention à la vie” – intellectual effort – is
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the principle by which memory determines the materiality of perception. Several
years later the essay “Intellectual Effort” is published; in it Bergson further
clarifies the dynamic principle discussed in Matter and Memory. According to
Bergson, “if metaphysics is possible, it can only be an effort to reascend the
slope natural to the work of thought” (IM: 183). On the basis of the dynamics of
intellectual effort, Bergson considers issues such as dreaming, déjà vu, and even
the comic. It is not difficult to detect the principle discussed in Matter and
Memory in Creative Evolution, too, for in the latter we find the same mutual
penetration of memory and matter, only now expanded to global dimensions.
Life Force is the effort with which super-consciousness penetrates matter,
impregnating the latter with indeterminacy. The human species constitutes the
successful accomplishment of this effort. In The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion, Bergson reveals the outcome of this effort in the realm of social
existence. That outcome is open morality, which is the love for all people, as
opposed to a closed morality directed toward family, ethnic group or nation.
Open morality, characteristic of religious mystics and heroes, concludes the
adventure of the founding effort.
Of course, this second phase of Bergson’s thought – the globalization and
“cosmologization” of principles – takes away from the modernness of the notion
of intellectual effort. Even so, the relation of this second phase to the rest of the
doctrine enables me to argue that the issue of linguistic expressive effort
(linguistic work) is not of the secondary importance that philosophy textbooks
ascribe to it. In this way we can raise the status of the notion of intellectual
effort by demonstrating both its relevance to today’s philosophic-linguistic
discourse, as well as its centrality to Bergson’s philosophy. This is our goal in
the following examination of ethical, practical and theoretical facets of
intellectual effort.
II. 1. The Ethics of Intellectual Effort
Bergson’s philosophy can be understood, very schematically, as being
composed of two basic tendencies. The first of these tendencies is his thesis on
the manners or modes of philosophizing; the second deals with the realization,
through these manners, of the doctrine itself. The first tendency directly pertains
to intellectual effort as a method of philosophizing. The second one refers to the
discoursivation of the method within the framework of the philosophical and
epistemological situation of Bergson’s day. This two-fold division is not
obvious, but such non-obviousness is one of the most precious elements in
Bergson’s philosophy, according to Jankélévitch (1959: 5).
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It is precisely the exploration of the non-obvious which leads us to the
connections that Bergsonism has with modern thought. It is a way of separating
the doctrine from its dynamic relations with the discourse of time, without
making the a-historical claim that we are getting closer to those elements in it
which refer to its own “thrown-ness” in an epoch. As already mentioned, some
studies reconsider Bergson from the standpoint of existential phenomenology,
which is generally based on epochal thrown-ness (see Ronchi 1990 and the
exhaustive bibliography there). In Bergson éducateur comparisons are also
made with Sartre, whose thought was the philosophical fashion in France at that
time (see Mossé-Bastide 1955: 252). The present work takes its place within
that line of studies.
Mossé-Bastide clearly demonstrates the close relatedness between Bergson’s
philosophy and his activities in education, which include 40 years of teaching
and active participation in the reform of secondary education in France in the
1920s. Today, we find Richard Rorty claiming in his Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature, after a detailed panorama of modern, post-metaphysical thinking, that
a single opportunity remains – philosophical discourse as “edification” (Rorty
1979: 357–394). In arguing this conclusion, Rorty draws on ideas from
Gadamer, the most hermeneutical of all authors. Gadamer’s basic notion is that
of Tradition, of which education and “sensus communis” are basic components.
He refers directly to Bergson’s concept of “bon sens” (1979: 19–20) when
introducing his thoughts on Tradition. The similarities between Tradition and
“bon sens” go much deeper than it first seems. They will be further explored
here and in Part Two. 
After referring to Bergson, Gadamer goes on to describe the life of Tradition
(its truth) as consisting in its need always to be resumed in each new
hermeneutic situation or interpretative endeavor. This is the essence of
Bergsonian “bon sens”, with the additional requirement for intellectual effort,
which every interpretative endeavor of this kind demands. The paradox of the
hermeneutic relevance of the “old-fashioned” Bergson reaches its ultimate
dimension when it turns out that today’s “radical hermeneutics” (Caputo 1987)
comes closest to his thought. John Caputo criticizes Gadamer, saying that
although the latter has correctly outlined the hermeneutical problem, he has
taken the easy way out by relying on something already established, such as
tradition. Caputo considers such compromises unacceptable, because a radical
hermeneutics attempts “to stick with the original difficulty of life” (op. cit.: 1).
This original difficulty consists roughly in perceiving life as “flux”, and in
realizing that there are no grounds for referring to something outside of that flux
in our efforts to understand and interpret it. If flux is the very physics (phisis) of
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life, then every attempt to transcend it is a “meta”. Radical hermeneutics should
teach us “to get up the nerve to stay with it” (op. cit.: 3). When Bergson
introduces us to metaphysics, he says essentially the same thing: Life is duration
(= flux); intuition is the effort to overcome all easy, ready-made and rigid
solutions that we find in language, in order to get in touch with the fluidity of
life. Bergson says, “I value effort above everything” (CM: 87–88). And Caputo
seconds him: “Hermeneutics thus is for the hardy” (1987: 3). It appears that
Bergson’s metaphysics is a radical hermeneutics! 
Despite the irony of this observation, and the limitations of Caputo’s project,
the connection between Bergson and Caputo is stimulating for my study. Even
to one who is not a radical “hermeneutician” or a metaphysician of duration, and
even without “thinking” as yet being defined, the positive value of intellectual
effort is obvious: to think more is better than thinking less; the life of one who
has the ability to think, and who does it as often as possible, is more sensible
than the life of one who doesn’t; and finally, a society of individuals who have
the right and the ability to think, and who do so regularly, is more humane than
a society in which this does not happen. The ethics of intellectual effort starts
from the acceptance of this position. Such an ethic calls for “getting up the
nerve to stay”, and it calls for endurance, in view of the fact that the living
world (Lebenswelt) cannot be “said” once and forever, but that life consists in a
continuous “saying”. Whether this “saying” is theory, interpretation,
signification, phronesis, dissemination, conversation, metaphorisation,
foundation of discoursivity and so on is a matter of great importance, but the
mode of saying takes second place to the primary ethics of intellectual effort.
We thus turn to places in Bergson’s philosophy where the ethical aspects of
intellectual effort are exposed most directly. They are concentrated mainly in
four speeches Bergson delivers between 1882 and 1902. Mossé-Bastide has
proved the significance of those speeches to the essence of Bergsonism. Here
we want to stress that Bergson’s manner of directly addressing students points
up the faintness of the boundary line between intellectual effort and edifying
philosophy. Although the speeches just mentioned center on four different
topics – science, attitude towards the Other, classical education, and creative
effort – they are linked by a common concern: the location of the subject within
a ready-made system or paradigm. The subject may remain placidly within the
given system, or he may attempt to get out of it. To do the latter necessarily
requires intellectual effort.
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II. 1. a) “La spécialité” and the System of Science
One of the most consistent aspects of Bergson’s philosophy is his concept of
education, and it corresponds significantly to the “tradition” that Gadamer
discusses in Truth and Method (1979: 25–38). In general, Bergson promotes
education free of any practical purpose. Education, for Bergson, involves the
mental formation of personality, not its practical or professional realization. This
is the axis along which most educational reform projects are developed. The
more the state tries to provide educational opportunities for everyone, the more
pressing becomes the problem of a return on this considerable investment. No
wonder that in the eyes of the most pragmatic people in the world, the
politicians, it is not morally justifiable to fund studies of Latin, Greek,
metaphysics and so on when the same funds can provide the state with
specialists for operating its industrial and bureaucratic apparatus.
Between 1919 and 1925, as the most prominent French intellectual of the
day and a member of the Higher Council of Public Education, Bergson directly
participates in the development of educational reform projects. But even as early
as 1882, when barely 23 years old and a philosophy teacher at a lycée, Bergson
responds to these issues with enviable clarity and persuasiveness. He calls his
speech “La spécialité” (Mélanges: 257–264), and in it he attacks the image of
the specialist: “The man of only one occupation resembles a lot the man of only
one book” (258). Bergson describes the specialist as a hostile individual who
compensates for the fact that he cannot talk about anything but his own specialty
with the pleasure of noting his interlocutor’s mistakes. “He has practiced his
science too much to have mercy on you” (ibid.). And here lies the main ethical
problem: because he has devoted himself completely to his specialty, the
specialist is unaware of everything that he does not know. To him the
boundaries of the world are those of his own expertise. Within these boundaries
he feels himself omnipotent, which is why modesty is unknown to him. To
Bergson, such specialization is just the opposite of true education. He compares
the situation of the beginning student to mankind’s first steps toward
understanding the world. Just as people from Antiquity to the Enlightenment
who had the “noble and naïve ambition to know everything” (259), the student
who is introduced to education must be guided by the innocent and generous
desire to understand everything. Bergson equates truth with the ability to look
first at all specialties from above, as it were, “in their most general outlines”
(ibid.), and only then to participate in any of them. He compares this with the
process of looking under a microscope. In his field of vision the specialist
clearly sees all that is under the microscope; but because he does not have the
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ability to go beyond his specialty, he does not know what he is looking at. One
first needs to view with the naked eye of common sense that which one places
under the microscope, so as to be able to associate it with the rest of the world.
After these initial comments, Bergson makes an observation to which Thomas
Kuhn would surely subscribe. The prevailing ethics of specialization has led to
the situation in which “in an environment of abundant inventions there are
almost no discoveries” (260). According to Bergson, scientists are more and
more taking on the role of fact-collectors and fact-combiners at the expense of
the search for principles. To them, “the principles are already given” (ibid.). To
Bergson this lack of aptitude for general knowledge “serves as a fulcrum for
rising above specialized science, dominating it, and arriving at principles” (260).
Specialized scientists bring science down to the level of a “commérage
scientifique”. The furthest antipode to this attitude towards science Bergson
recognizes in Descartes, who has “judged that it is better to study all the
sciences in order to extend one of them” (261). Even better is the example of
Pasteur. The latter is a contemporary of the specialized scientists of whom
Bergson speaks, but the difference between Pasteur and them is enormous: “It
is not by accident that he [Pasteur] is a philosopher and man of letters at the
same time” (ibid.). It is this attitude that has elevated the great scholar to
“posing anew the problems of this science and refining its methods” (ibid.).
Bergson’s instructions to his students call to mind Kuhn’s distinction
between “normal” and “revolutionary” science. The French philosopher also
defines two possible scientific approaches, but he does so from an ethical
standpoint. He does not oblige his students to be revolutionary scholars, but
recommends to them the “noble and naïve” attitude that mirrors the attitudes of
real pathbreakers such as Pasteur and Descartes. Here the implication of
intellectual effort is obvious, although Bergson does not point it out directly.
Philosophy, or general knowledge, forces the scholar to think across a broad
range of problems. Doing so places him beyond the methodologically
sanctioned domain or paradigm, and forces him to create pertinence all by
himself.
Scientific discovery is viewed as intellectual effort in Bergson’s system, and
it is one of the examples he uses in the essay on “Intellectual Effort”. In addition
to the figure of the drill (see I. 9., above), which also refers to scientific
revelation, Bergson describes Newton’s discovery of the principle of gravity as
an “effort of imagination” (Bergson 1990: 192), which draws together two
different subjects and abstracts a single quality from them. On the whole,
thinking is an “effort of abstraction” (op. cit.: 190); by contrast, intellectual
laziness is the acceptance of ready-made abstractions and using them for
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specific task. 
In his speech on specialization Bergson describes the consequences of this
kind of thinking in the humanities. His protest accords with that of all the
hermeneutic authors considered in this study: “[The humanist] is succeeded by
the research man engaged in research projects. These, rather than the cultivating
of erudition, lend to his works its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man
no longer needs a library at home.” These words encapsulate the whole of
Bergson’s thesis, but are written by Heidegger (in Caputo 1987: 229). The time
limitations of a speech do not allow for lengthy development of this core issue
of hermeneutics, but what Bergson does say to his audience is enough for my
thesis. Bergson points out that the specialist in literature, for example, avoids the
problem of revealing the meanings of what the author wrote, and instead
examines all the facts related to the material creation of the author’s works. His
effort goes into becoming acquainted with all the versions of a certain work and
discovering the mistakes in them. In that misplaced effort, according to
Bergson, “we assimilate mental work as physical [i.e., manual labor]” (262). He
compares the specialist to the worker who performs simple tasks well. But
though division of labor is the major necessity for effective production, its
merciless logic reduces man to a machine. The alienation of the worker from the
totality of the production process deprives him of the possibility for
self-reflection. The machine is in fact the perfect specialist: it makes no
decisions. The specialist seeks situations in which the facts will speak for him
and thus relieve him from having to make interpretative decisions. In the
humanities, the demand for “facts” pushes the researcher towards a philological,
historiographical, and positivist approach in which “everything remains dry and
sterile” (262). Bergson finds in Nature another example of specialization leading
to inhumanity: “And this, my young students, is what primarily differentiates
intelligence from instinct, man from beast. The whole inferiority of the beast is
here: it is a specialist” (263). 
This fundamentally ethical position generates in Bergson’s future
philosophical system a complex concept of science that only a surface reading
could label as entirely negative. All the basic components of this multi-faceted
attitude are concentrated in his talk on specialization. As we have seen, Bergson
is well-acquainted with the epistemological system of the time. Matter and
Memory is based completely on observations from scientific psychology;
Creative Evolution deals with the evolution of life; Duration and Simultaneity
(1965a [1922]) is dedicated to Einstein’s theory of time; and so on. Bergson
says nothing against science as such. His entire polemic is directed against the
inertia that the scientific approach induces toward understanding the life of
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consciousness. He argues against the unreasonable facility which the positivist
approach (having acquired its fame in the description of matter) projects on
attempts to understand the mental and spiritual side of man. This inertia leads
one to describe something dynamic and in process, such as duration or flux, in
terms of ready-made, static, and ultimately inappropriate categories. Bergson,
on the other hand, is for the hardy of mind. Bergson is for intellectual effort.
II. 1. b) “La politesse” and the System of Etiquette
“La politesse” is a speech that Bergson first delivers in 1885, then again with
some revisions in 1892. In it Bergson touches on ethical problems that he will
deal with exhaustively 45 years later in The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion. As does his lecture on specialization, this speech, too, contains the
seeds of ideas that generate his entire theoretical corpus.
The power of Bergson’s speeches comes from the fact that they directly
address the students and that they do not merely impart data. Freed from the
burden of writing, Bergson advances the innermost principles of his doctrine.
The topic of politeness is particularly related to the practice of this kind of
ethics. Here Bergson explores an area that lies on the very boundary of that
which can be taught and/or learned, and that which goes beyond it.
The point of departure of all Bergson’s speeches is etiquette, or “les Codes
de la civilité” (319). Bergson asks whether this set of rules and clichés can
guarantee valid interpersonal dealings in a society. In other words, “it remains
to be seen whether it is true that civility and politeness are one and the same”
(ibid.). Taking his usual approach, Bergson distinguishes two types of
politeness, and the need for effort (here, pain) immediately comes as the point
of differentiation: “I do not believe that ready-made formulae, which can be
learned by heart without even minimum pain, are the latest thing in politeness”
(320). Thus, Bergson opposes formal graces, or social politeness, to “politeness
of spirit”. The latter, of course, does not completely disregard existing rules of
etiquette. It simply shifts the emphasis from the signs being exchanged to the
attitude that is realized through this exchange. Such an attitude, more than any
other, calls for a flexibility of spirit that has empathy for the uniqueness of every
single moment. This kind of higher intellectual effort, referring to Otherness, is
taken up in the Conclusions of this study. Thus I shall present here only its main
principle.
If formal politeness (formalities, the politeness of manners) is based on the
idea of equality, then politeness of spirit, quite to the contrary, predisposes one
to look for the qualities and talents of the Other, distinguishing him according to
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his virtues. This is not just a matter of good will, but an effort that demands
“intellectual flexibility” and “moral plasticity” (332). Social life clothes people
in roles and professions that cover up their individuality, which is precisely the
stuff of true politeness. Intellectual work is needed to penetrate behind the layers
of labels that are deposited by social existence and that facilitate identification
– labels, which themselves are the language of formal politeness. “[This] calls
for another ability, which corrects or softens the consequences [of layering], the
ability to renounce, finally, the habits that have been formed or even the natural
disposition one develops in himself; the ability to take the place of others, to be
interested in their occupations, to think their thoughts, in other words, to live
their life and to forget ourselves” (322). The ethical result of such an attitude is
the impression made by the polite person: “that he has a secret preference for us
and that he is not the same with everybody” (ibid.).
The difference between formal and true politeness towards the Other is the
difference between habit and effort. Herein lies the embryo of such basic
notions in Bergson’s philosophy as static and dynamic ethics, open and closed
morality, and so on. The speech on politeness continues with a discussion of
communication as a talent, and a comparison of politeness to even more delicate
behaviors. To explore these matters, however, would lead us astray from my
project here. Yet is worth mentioning that these are some of the most gracious
pages of Bergson’s work. 
II. 1. c) “Le bon sens” and the System of Languages
“Le bon sens and Classical Studies” (1895) is the most famous of all Bergson’s
speeches and the only one published in a separate edition. In French dictionaries
the definition of “bon sens” long ago acquired the essence of Bergson’s
description.
As we have mentioned several times, “bon sens” is intimately connected
with intellectual effort. It is the ability to behave appropriately in every
situation, social or non-social. It is the instance that decides if there is a need for
intellectual effort to harmonize, or “syntonize”, our behavior with reality. At the
same time, bon sens is this work itself. “Resembling the very principle of life, it
[le bon sens] alerts and works unceasingly, more burdensome because of the
matter it spiritualizes, but aware of the realness of its action due to the
materiality of its effort” (BS: 363). After describing this most precious human
quality, Bergson presents to his young audience its connections with classical
education. Matter, spiritualized by bon sens, concerns mostly “the dead weight
of vice and prejudice” (366) that is passively absorbed by the environment and
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that limits the spiritual scope of a person. Language is the fundamental carrier of
such elements since pure intellect has an affinity to its formal building blocks.
Thus, the attitude that sees the world as constantly changing and demanding
continuous attention departs radically from the attitude that everything is given
in a clear and stable formal system.
“You have probably noticed in front of our monuments and museums those
foreigners with an open book in hand, in which undoubtedly are described all the
surrounding splendors. But do they not forget sometimes, absorbed in reading, the
beautiful things that they have come to see for themselves? Thus, some of us travel
through existence with eyes fixed on the formulae we read in some kind of internal
guide that, ignoring the observation of life itself, follows only what has been said,
with thought focusing on the order between words and not between things.” (367)
Having thus posed the problem, Bergson sees the role of education as not so
much to expand students’ “encyclopaedias”, but to prepare them to be less
dependent on the closed system of language which they inherit. The most
effective strategy for this purpose is to offer them the alternative of a language
that, so to speak, “originally” revealed the world to them. Although the study of
Latin and Hellenic Greek is associated mostly with erudition and
encyclopaedism, for Bergson classical education contributes to the better
intellectual performance of the student, making him distrustful of what culture
offers as ready-made:
“In classical education I see precisely that it is an effort to break the ice of words and
find underneath the free stream of thought. The practice of translating your ideas
from one language into another, young students, accustoms you to crystallizing them
in (more) different systems; from there, they are released from any irrevocably
closed, verbal form.” (my italics, 368).
Having in mind this very paragraph, in Truth and Method Gadamer blames
Bergson for not also inverting the question: “how helpful is le bon sens for
classical studies?” (1979: 26). By failing to do so, Bergson leaves the
hermeneutic valence of the notion unexplored. It is evident, however, that here
Gadamer is influenced by the context in which he quotes Bergson, and it is the
introduction of fundamental notions of the tradition of the sciences of man. But
when Gadamer outlines the mechanisms for “the production of truth”, for its
happening in each new hermeneutic situation, he dedicates a whole chapter to
“The Hermeneutic Relevance of Aristotle” (op. cit.: 278–289), and there we can
see that the notion of phronesis makes almost no difference to Bergsonian bon
sens. Gadamer emphasizes the difference that Aristotle claims exists between
moral and theoretical knowledge. This difference is based mostly on their
relation to the universal. Moral knowledge is a knowledge that cannot draw its
validity only from the universal, for it always involves within itself the subject
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who exercises it and the particular situation in which it is exercised.
Hermeneutic consciousness does not directly concern moral issues. Yet both
moral and theoretical knowledge are based on application (op. cit.: 281). When
Bergson explores the relation between bon sens and truth, he notes the same
hermeneutic relevance of this notion:
“If [bon sens] resembles science in its care for the real and its insistence on always
being in touch with facts, it differs from science by the kind of truth it is after; since
it does not strive, like science does, for universal truth but for the truth of the
moment, and does not insist so much on being right once and forever but on
commencing over and over again to be right” (BS: 362).
Bergson compares the inertia of applying scientific methods to ethical matters
to the kind of excessive endeavor that leads some people to use laboratory
scales in their kitchen: “There is a big mistake that consists in reasoning about
society and about nature in the same way” (369). Without doubt, this is the
general position of all hermeneutic discourse.
At first glance it might seem that Bergson’s effort goes entirely toward
overcoming prejudices, while philosophical hermeneutics, as outlined by
Gadamer, is aimed at rehabilitating them. Thus it is easy to understand
Gadamer’s misjudgment of the notion of bon sens. But the affinity between the
two thinkers becomes clear immediately, when the exact meaning of “prejudice”
is questioned. At the beginning of Truth and Method, Gadamer says, “that
which changes forces itself far more on the attention than that which remains the
same” (Gadamer 1979: XIII–XIV). Precisely what remains the same – tradition
– is of the nature of prejudice, and so is our experience with truth. When science
pretends that there is a universal method for finding truth, it in fact cuts itself off
from and represents itself as something greater than Tradition, in the sense that
through natural science we can learn the truth about nature and through the
science of man we can learn the truth about history, arts and so on. Gadamer’s
thesis is that we can understand science better if we take it as one means, among
many, of realizing tradition (i.e., science as a kind of pragmatic metaphysics,
which begins with Plato and Aristotle). The main idea is that we cannot go
beyond this tradition, for we are originally “abandoned” to it; we can only
interpret it in each new hermeneutic situation. What, however, is the basis for an
always new hermeneutic situation? What must interpretation fight against in
order to draw its truthfulness from tradition? And what conceals things, so that
there is a general need for the hermeneutic process? In my view, it is prejudice.
That which remains the same and that which changes are prejudices. “What
distinguishes legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones, and what [must]
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critical reason overcome?” (Gadamer 1979: 246). Posing the question this way,
Gadamer focuses on one side of the hermeneutic process. If we are able to
understand the world, it is because we are involved in a tradition, which enables
us to have a world at all. But our being in this world is inclined to totalize itself
and project its stability in all directions. Thus, it clothes in ready-made answers
many spheres of the potential experience of the subject. Tradition opens to us
the world we inhabit, but its specific form limits that world. It is this
presentation of the world as being easy to understand that makes possible the
practical life of community. Thus, self-forgetting is necessary for practical
purposes, a forgetting of history and of the finitude of being. At least from
Heidegger onwards, the hermeneutic project is aimed at limiting self-forgetting.
Bon sens is the intellectual effort that must “break the ice” of prejudices which
obstruct spiritual growth. It is the appeal of consciousness not to remain formed
by the system of prejudices the situation offers, but to fight constantly against
“reality” so as to gain personal experience in every moment, so as to
continuously gain truth (in II. 3., I use Ricoeur’s notion of “ontological
commitment” for this particular attitude). In other words, Bergson and Gadamer
focus the hermeneutic problem on the two different types of prejudices it is
occupied with. The one rehabilitates “the good ones”; the other discredits “the
bad ones”. But the idea of an intellectual attitude that demands constant and
active thinking in every new situation, is the same in both philosophers.
Bergson also discusses briefly the problem of the knowledge of history. He
brings up this issue within the framework of the criticism of prejudices, whose
differentiation is made even more obvious: “Certain sciences have the
advantage of placing us as close to life as possible. Thus, a profound study of
the past helps us in our understanding of the present, given, however, that we
remain watchful for wrong analogies and that in history [...] we seek for reasons
rather than for laws” (369). Scientific method itself is one of today’s greatest
prejudices, and it has to be overcome by critical reason. The application of the
scientific method to history leads to a cause-and-effect explanation of events
and thus subordinates them to a kind of truth that is not their own. In Bergson’s
time this tendency is very popular, and whenever the problem of history is
mentioned, he expresses the same opinion. Mossé-Bastide (1955: 250–259)
explores in detail these moments and summarizes the general position of
Bergson as follows: “Above all, what opposes history to physics is that the
former is populated with creations of human personalities, and once we have
creation, there is neither equivalence, nor necessary links between causes and
effects” (253–254).
Bergson witnesses World War I, in which he participates by accepting a
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diplomatic mission to the USA. As early as 1921, together with other notables,
Bergson takes part in an initiative to revise history textbooks, in which wars are
praised, and the images of certain nations are deformed and reduced (141). The
idea is to replace these negative images with ones that are free from narrow-
mindedness and that are dominated by an optimistic view of international
relations. This kind of positive rehabilitation is necessary, as opposed to the
mere representation of facts, which leaves no room for interpretation, nor for
doubting the truthfulness of so-called objective data. In recent years the need for
such an initiative as regards the Balkans has become manifest, after the outbreak
of many ethnic conflicts that turned into wars.
II. 1. d) “The Creative Power of Effort” and the System of
Metaphysics
In the last speech of this kind, known under two different titles, “La puissance
créatrice de l’effort” and “De l’intelligence” (Mélanges: 554–560) and delivered
in 1902, Bergson most directly formulates the ethics of intellectual effort. He
summarizes the ethical logic of overcoming closed systems as an effort to
overcome oneself. Here, the closed system is the totality of all the systems that
build up the intelligible environment of the individual. In this speech Bergson
presents education as a culture of continuous effort, which makes the student
used to going beyond what is given. Bergson’s wants to make his students trust
themselves, by demonstrating the relations between the world they inhabit and
their own intellectual performance. Intellectual effort increases their capacity for
understanding, which itself results in an increase in their exchanges with the
world. With this speech more than with any other, Bergson aids the hermeneutic
reading I have undertaken. The problem of understanding is central to his
argument, and thus we are carried to the very core of the hermeneutic project, at
least according to Bergson’s own most competent formulation. Indeed, in
Gadamer’s opinion, “The problem of understanding [...] pervades all human
relations with the world” (Gadamer 1979: XI). For this purpose, Bergson
employs two different words, “comprehension” and “intelligence”, both of them
equivalent to “understanding”. This particular text has not been translated into
English. But in a very similar context, the sentence “Cet achèvement de
l’intelligence du texte dans un intelligence du soi caracterise la sorte de la
philosophie reflexive” has been translated as “This culmination of
understanding of a text in self-understanding is characteristic of that kind of
reflective philosophy” (in Ricoeur 1970). To help explain to his students “the
creative power of effort”, Bergson gives the example of a classmate of his, who
The Phenomenology of Intellectual Effort
                66
was rather mediocre in all disciplines, but who later became a highly respected
physician. According to Bergson, the reason for his classmate’s success was that
he found a field that stimulated him enough to concentrate all his efforts. This is
also the way to overcome oneself. Mediocrity is not something that is given;
rather, it is a lack of the will to overcome oneself (555). Unfortunately,
“intelligence” is used as a label by which to favor some students over others. To
provide a safeguard against such prejudice, Bergson analyzes this quality,
reducing it to “comprehension”. In his view, there are two types of
understanding: the first kind is a general, quantitative understanding; the second
is the more purposeful and qualitative one. Instead of dividing the students into
intelligent and not-intelligent ones, they would be better served if they were
taught to discern the mechanisms of understanding by which they relate to their
studies and to the world in general. The first type of interaction with what is
studied consists in a distant acquaintance with a growing set of themes, which
is “a rather general ability to understand, infinitely expandable, that is
something like a greater elasticity of intelligence” (556). In the second type of
interaction there is no distance between student and object: “True understanding
is that by which we enter the interior of our study, when we touch it in its
depths, and it inspires us with its spirit, as we feel the pulse of its soul. Whether
it is the understanding of a lawyer or a physician, of an entrepreneur or a
tradesman, understanding is always the current of sympathy which flows
between people and things as between friends who understand each other
without words and who have no secrets” (ibid.). After determining sympathy as
a basis for understanding, Bergson refines the explanation by describing the
mechanism of its functioning. Also, in contrast to the first type of interaction
between student and object, this latter kind is not gradual and systematic, but
sudden. Once we have devoted ourselves to something, understanding comes as
if “by sudden enlightenment” (359). As mentioned in the introduction to this
study, the happening or moment of truth in Gadamer’s formulation of the
hermeneutic problem is given in the same way. It is compared to the
experiencing of the beautiful. Both truth and the beautiful “make themselves
immediately apparent in their being” (Gadamer 1979: 438). What Bergson adds
to the understanding of the hermeneutic experience, is the idea that, although it
is an epiphany, truth does not appear randomly nor everywhere. While the
opposition between hermeneutic and scientific truth emphasizes the former’s
epiphanal nature, it at the same time ignores the process before its appearance –
ignores it, because scientific method acknowledges the discovery of truth only
if that discovery is preceded by positivist research practice. Correspondingly,
the scientific method rejects the truthfulness of any other type of experience.
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Epiphany is the opposite of discovery, although this opposition seems to involve
ignoring the methodological preparation for the discovery of truth. To the fact
that truth is an event and not the monopoly of a universal method, we can add
that it happens where cognitive initiative uses effort to question the coherence of
that which we have so far taken to be the order of things, and to reach out for the
very source that makes it possible. Of course, Bergson does not name this
source “tradition” or “Lebenswelt”, but he often employs expressions like “life”,
“the things themselves”, and “duration”. Whatever term we choose, the lesson
of Bergson refers to the overcoming of oneself through the effort to understand.
And as a primary mode of being, the overcoming of oneself is a constant
re-opening of the thought/being relation in a new way. 
At the time Bergson delivers his speech on the “Creative Power of Effort”,
he is also preparing one of his most important works, which he publishes the
next year. This is the Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), and in it he introduces
the notion of “intuition” that would undoubtedly sound familiar to every student
who has heard Bergson’s speech. He defines intuition as “the sympathy by
which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with
what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it” (IM: 161; Bergson’s
italics). If my reading reveals the obvious hermeneutic relevance of intuition,
which takes for its point of departure our experience with truth, then it could be
claimed that this is only a minor moment of its interpretative fate. The critical
fortunes of “intuition” range from the most superficial interpretations – which
Capek describes as representing (vulgar) “Bergsonism” and mostly arising from
“the enthusiastic response to the emotional color of certain words, like
`intuition’, `creation’, `élan vital’ , without the slightest effort at critical
analysis” („apek 1971: IX–X)5 – to the most serious objections of both
analytical philosophy and existential phenomenology. But no matter how
discoursively concealed the notion of “intuition” might be, its relation with
ethically purposeful speech unites the theme of the philosophical method with
that of the overcoming of oneself. In addition, the introduction of the notion of
“intuition” and intuitive truth in the Introduction to Metaphysics is opposed to
the analytical (which to Bergson means the “scientific” or “intellectual”) way of
knowing things. In this case, too, the theme of intellectual effort constructs the
difference between the two approaches: “if metaphysics is possible, it can only
be an effort to re-ascend the slope natural to the work of thought, to place
oneself immediately, through the dilation of the mind, in the thing one is
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studying” (IM: 183; my italics).
The usual, easy approach to knowing things consists in reducing them to
preexisting forms, or: “Analyzing therefore consists in expressing a thing in
terms of what is not it” (162). In his Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson is not
far from the idea that science does not think at all, a view which places him in
the company of Heidegger, Gadamer, Rorty, Pareyson, and Vattimo (see
Vattimo 1997: 16–17). As they all do, Bergson relates science to authentic truth
only in those moments which, after Kuhn, are called “revolutionary” and are the
exact opposite of the unitary model of ordinary science (recall the example of
the drill, in I.9.). 
All of these ideas are clarified at length in the essay on “Philosophical
Intuition” (in Bergson 1988), where the notion is applied to the interpretative
act. Bergson distinguishes and opposes two ways of reading of a philosophical
text, which lead to two opposing ways of understanding. One way of reading is
to reduce the philosopher’s doctrine to ideas in circulation at the time (the
example is Berkeley). Bergson ironically compares this to “a salad which, at a
distance, will have a certain resemblance to what Berkeley accomplished” CM
:115). This way of reading closely resembles what Gadamer calls “the
immanent effort of a literary consciousness”, which “is indifferent to the `truth’
of its texts” (Gadamer 1979: 445). The other way of understanding is
accomplished by “sudden enlightenment” and is oriented towards intuition,
towards the philosopher’s truth, which is “something simple, infinitely simple,
so extraordinarily simple that the philosopher has never succeeded in saying it”
(CM: 108–109; see also, Ricoeur 1979: 366 n102, who comments on the same
idea, as it is presented by Heidegger 1968: 50).
With these observations, I temporarily conclude the topic of the ethics of
intellectual effort. I shall approach it again in Part Two, and expand it with
results gained from the exploration of the notion of “linguistic work”; there I
shall compare it to the (post)modern discourse of linguistic being. Returning to
the figure of the conquest of territory (I.8), we can note that the content of
Bergson’s four speeches orients it to a more theoretically grounded
argumentation. Now we come to the difficulty of the foundation of discoursivity
and its relatedness to tradition and prejudice. John Caputo tries to convince us of
the opposite when blaming Gadamer (and Ricoeur) for taking the hermeneutic
project away from its original radicalness, by basing his argumentation on a
metaphysical element like tradition. Tradition is something like a facile
substitute for thought, which seeks for the laboriousness of pure radicalness. But
the concept of intellectual effort makes us think that a purely radical thought
needs tradition as much as possible, so as to be able to question it. The truly
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radical thinker opens a gap in the depths of being that breaks the crust of the
self-confirming discourse of the time, in order to problematize and dethrone it,
whereas the quasi-radical thinker simply skims the surface, making
“outrageous” statements. Making tradition speak is not a one-dimensional
interpretative act, but rather an archeological work, which brings to the surface
something we have been living upon without realizing it. This very thing forces
us to reconsider Being itself (and not the beautiful fireworks of heaven that
make our heads spin). The same line of inquiry can be applied to the notion of
creativity, although the stereotype always places the latter on the side of the
fireworks. 
When Rorty speaks of philosophy as being part of a conversation that always
offers new, creative, and more interesting descriptions of the world, we witness
a neglect of the relatedness of philosophy with tradition. This neglect, typical of
American authors, makes everything easier (and Vattimo quite rightfully
accuses Rorty of having a somewhat romanticized concept of hermeneutics;
Vattimo 1985: 157). If hermeneutic discourse leads to very similar conclusions
by most authors, it is far more difficult to arrive at those conclusions by keeping
tradition in mind than by rejecting it.
II.2. The Practice of Intellectual Effort
II. 2. (a) Bergson, the Enemy of Language
In the previous chapter we examined the crucial ethical aspects of intellectual
effort. Here we shall look at ways in which intellectual effort is practiced, as
represented by Bergson in many brief passages scattered throughout his texts.
Our focus is primarily on linguistically expressive manifestations of intellectual
effort, the so-called “effort d’expression” (see I.6.). 
Bergson is unsystematic in demonstrating the possible uses of creative
language that transcends the expressive restrictions of everyday speech (the
same restrictions which prompted Barthes to say that “language is a fascist”;
Barthes 1978). This lack of system in the presentation of creative language-use
has led to the general assumption that Bergson is an enemy of language. Indeed,
it is hard to fault such a reading. For looking at the central themes of
Bergsonism, one finds that only his negative views on language are
systematically presented. Such a one-sided reading can, however, easily
misconstrue Bergson’s negative attitude towards the passive use of language as
a negative attitude towards language as a whole. The task of our former study
(Bankov 1995) was precisely to rehabilitate Bergson’s complex and dynamic
attitude towards language. For present purposes, we find in Gunther’s
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bibliography (1986: 79, 223) mention of a letter from Bergson to Raimundo
Lida concerning the latter’s essay, “Bergson: Filosofo del lenguaje” [“Bergson,
Philosopher of Language”], which was published in an obscure Argentinean
journal (see Lida 1933). Lida’s essay itself is unavailable, but Murillo Zamora’s
(1965: 89) description of it suggests that the essay attempts to present
systematically the positive aspects of Bergson’s attitude towards language. The
philosopher’s highly affirmative response to Lida’s essay indicates how
important he considered this topic to be. Yet even without philological evidence
to help us, we could not abandon this issue and leave the problem half-solved.
Mathieu (1987: 107) describes the point of departure of the language problem
very appropriately: “The need to animate simple intuition in a complex
analytical form is present in Bergson, but is usually neglected at the expense of
the need never to confound soul and body, analytic concepts and intuition”.
Thus, the practice of intellectual effort is a fundamental argument against the
criticism of Bergson as being “anti-language”. Criticism should be directed
instead against the intellectual laziness to which the linguistic environment
predisposes one. This is not a simple task, because some of the most typical
expressions in Bergson’s philosophy coincide with his criticism against the
passive use of language; at the same time, the synthetic form of those
expressions isolates them from his other theses. The model of this type of
expression is the statement, “Metaphysics is therefore the science which claims
to dispense with symbols” (CM: 162). This statement also can be summarized
by that which is most easily remembered from Time and Free Will, the work in
which many of his fundamental theses find their ultimate expression. The
problem engaged in that book concerns the extent to which the language we
inherit can inhibit us from perceiving the immediate data, endurance, and
psychological depth of consciousness. “Our language is ill-suited to render the
subtleties of psychological analysis” (13). And more insistently: “In short, the
word with well-defined outlines, the rough and ready word [...] overwhelms or
at least covers over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our individual
consciousness” (132). 
The whole first chapter of Time and Free Will goes to clarifying the meaning
of the word “intensit_”. Common usage of that word clearly demonstrates how
we tend to shift spatial forms of thinking, which are relevant to the manipulation
of material surroundings, to the valuation of psychological conditions. Similarly,
Bergson corrects terms like “unit” (80) and “several” (121). In the last chapter
of his most well-known book, Creative Evolution, he makes another move
against language. This time he attacks the practice of labeling – a practice
whose harmful effect on the interpretative fate of Bergson’s own philosophy we
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have been accentuating. Bergson summarizes the history of philosophical
systems, the common denominator of which is their inability to rid themselves
of a conceptual tradition that imposes limits on what is thinkable. He discusses
in great detail how the Aristotelian doctrine of language relies necessarily on the
language in which Aristotle thinks (is there a modern thinker who would
question this view?). He thus views the whole tradition in terms of its
dependence on the language/intellect opposition. This reading, aimed at
emphasizing the importance of the intuitive method, again makes Bergson out
to be an opponent of language. Yet every time he speaks of the “ma”tres du
philosophie”, separately or together, Bergson stresses just the opposite – their
profound intuitions and independence from the vocabulary they have inherited.
Commenting on the saying that metaphysics can “dispense with symbols”,
Jeanne Hersch (1943: 220) notes that “Only one science can dispense with
symbols – silence”; yet Bergsonian philosophy, to the extent that we have
“heard” it, obviously does not belong to that science. On the contrary, in the
Creative Mind Bergson himself tells us that, “Intuition will be communicated
only by the intelligence” (42). This communication is the practice of intellectual
effort.
II. 2. b) Expression and Effort
Bergson’s anti-linguism is an interpretative key to any doctrine that discards the
role of intellectual effort. Having noted his main points of departure, we can
now look at the other side of the coin: how Bergson views the creative use of
language. In II.1. we outlined a fundamental tenet of Bergsonian philosophy:
intellectual effort must be made in order to transcend the limits imposed by
existing sign systems. We have also seen that metaphysics is a laborious
overcoming of the habits of practical thought. Bergson applies the same line of
reasoning to the use of language:
“But it [metaphysics] is strictly itself only when it goes beyond the concept, or at
least when it frees itself of the inflexible and ready-made concepts and creates
others very different from those we usually handle; I mean flexible, mobile, almost
fluid representations, always ready to mold themselves on the fleeting forms of
intuition” (168; my italics). 
The belief that metaphysics should create new concepts hardly seems to fit with
an anti-linguistic bias. And Bergson goes even further as he analyzes the role of
effort in the creation of these “concepts bien différents”:
“Thought which is only thought, the work of art which is only conceived, the poem
which is no more than a dream, as yet cost nothing in toil; it is the material
realization of the poem in words, of the artistic conception in statue or picture, which
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demands effort. This effort is toilsome, but also it is precious, more precious even
than the work it produces, because, thanks to it, one has drawn out from the self
more than it already had; we are raised above ourselves.” (ME: 28–29)
The effort to express something by signs is not restricted to metaphysics and art;
it is also a way to overcome ourselves. Bergson goes on to say that only a
creative effort of this kind can be a source of joy, as opposed to the pleasure of
ordinary, material existence6. 
As we saw in I.4., Bergson represents the formulation of his own
philosophy, from work to work, as such a creative effort of expression.
Something new comes from each new work, and that something can hardly be
deduced from what went before it.
A close look at Bergson’s texts reveals that new terms are much scarcer than
new ideas. This is another side of the creative effort of expression: the creation
of new concepts need not require the creation of new terms. In fact, Bergson
admires the capacity to express a new thought in ordinary words. Here again,
effort makes the difference: “In fact, there is no philosophical idea, no matter
how deep or subtle, which cannot be expressed in everyday language. The more
common are the words we chose, the better they translate what we think, if we
are to take the pains of thinking.” (1913a: 999–1000; my italics.) Bergson draws
a comparison with mathematics: simple words are like the infinitely short lines
of which any curve can be composed, in contrast to complex philosophical
terms that necessitate lengthiness. In the language of prét-â-porter, the same
idea is expressed as follows: “what in the beginning seemed to be a comfortable
garment, at the end turns into a straight jacket for thought” (ibid.).
In contrast to his summary reading of the philosophical tradition, Bergson
gives copious and detailed examples of great French philosophers who, through
the creative use of simple language, succeed in expressing highly original ideas.
He quotes Descartes, Malebranche, Condillac, Rousseau, Pascal. The result of
the effort of these thinkers is tangible. Though they do not introduce new terms,
they conquer new territories. Their efforts are all the more valuable because they
have “very much contributed to the power and flexibility of the French
language” (1915: 1184). Their “efforts d’expression” brought notable semantic
changes that directly transformed the langue, or system, of the French language.
Although Saussure believes it is impossible for an individual speaker to change
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the language system, whose nature is social, this is in fact what happens (in I.8.
we explored an essay by Roudet, who explains semantic changes in the same
way). It is enough to remember Dante and the system of the Italian language
before him, or words like “unconscious” or “libido”, which thanks to Freud (or
Jung) are now in everyday use (though their original meanings have changed
somewhat). In this sense, Bergson offers another strategy for transcending
closed systems – namely, etymological competence. “One feels stronger and
more self-confident if one can remount to the original signification of words [...]
in fact, it is one thing to acquire a ready-made word, and quite another to assist
in its generation” (1922: 1368). This kind of competence enables the thinker to
gauge the degree of freedom he can afford in his effort of expression (ibid.).
Modern hermeneutic discourse exhibits innumerable examples of the creative
use of notions that are based on the etymological discharge of a single meaning.
II. 2. c) Overcoming Language: Images and Metaphors
One of the most consistent features of Bergson’s philosophical style is his use of
metaphors and comparisons (he calls the latter “images”). Analytical
philosophers have often found fault with Bergson’s use of figural language.
Peirce’s reaction to being compared to Bergson is one such case (see I.3., last
paragraph). In contrast, most modern non-analytical and non-positivist
philosophers of language approve of the use of figural language, and the Nobel
Prize Bergson is awarded in 1928 is for literature. In his speech at the awards
ceremony, Per Hallström describes Creative Evolution as “a poem of admirable
greatness” (in Bergson 1965b: 20). It will be interesting to see to what extent
Bergson consciously uses figures and metaphors as a means to transcend the
limits of the philosophical language he has at his disposal. Again in a
non-systematic form, we find numerous passages where the usage of figures is
represented as one more strategy for the creative use of language. “And so, I
have decided to bring my reader [of Creative Evolution] to a particular way of
thinking, which goes beyond `concepts’ and abstract ideas and cannot be
expressed otherwise than with images: images that are not just an ornament, but
the only means of expression, adapted to the thought” (Bergson 1972: 960). In
Laughter (1913b), Bergson contrasts the use of “poetic metaphors” and
“illuminating comparisons” with various types of word-play. The former two
figures “always seem to reveal the close harmony that exists between language
and nature, regarded as two parallel forms of life”; mere word-play, however,
“make[s] us think somehow of a negligence on the part of language, which, for
the time being, seems to have forgotten its real function and now claims to
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accommodate things to itself instead of accommodating itself to things” (1913b:
121).
In his introduction to The Creative Mind, Bergson defends this view in a
way that in 1922 probably sounded quite original: “there are cases in which it is
imagery in language which knowingly expresses the literal meaning, and
abstract language which unconsciously expresses itself figuratively” (43). As we
have seen, and will see again, Bergson starts all his reflections on the use of
language from the presumption that understanding is always based on an initial
meaning, of which signs are the aspects of its fulfillment (see II. 3. e). Signs
prompt a more and more precise foretelling of what has yet to be understood.
The mechanism of image functioning, presented by Bergson in his Introduction
to Metaphysics, most comprehensively meets this hermeneutic concept: 
“No image will replace the intuition of duration, but many different images, taken
from quite different orders of things, will be able, through the convergence of their
action, to direct the consciousness to the precise point where there is a certain
intuition to seize on[....] By seeing that in spite of their difference in aspect they all
[the images] demand of our mind the same kind of attention and, as it were, the same
degree of tension, one will gradually accustom the consciousness to a particular and
definitely determined disposition, precisely the one it will have to adopt in order to
appear unveiled to itself.” (166)
But meaning has still not been attained, since it too requires intellectual effort.
Thus, the figures serve as a communicative strategy that artificially separates us
from a statistically constant language-use based on clarity. The figures put us in
a state of expecting new meanings, which require the effort of dynamic
comparison. “But even then the consciousness must acquiesce in this effort; for
we shall have shown it nothing. We shall simply have placed it in the attitude it
must take to produce the desired effort and, by itself, to arrive at the intuition”
(ibid.). Jeanne Hersch, author of one of the most profound studies of Bergson’s
use of images (Hersch 1932), explains their efficiency as follows: at first, they
involve the reader on the basis of his personal experience, then transport him to
the desired frame of mind. After that, the reader himself breaks through the
conventional meaning of words and refocuses his imagination upon them and
their relations with things (119). 
Bergson also is not indifferent to formal techniques of overcoming the
limitations of meaning that are imposed by the strict use of language. In Time
and Free Will, where he generally gives language no quarter, Bergson provides
the example of a “bold novelist” (romancier hardi), whose writing is so
penetrating that he makes us feel that he knows us better than we know
ourselves (133). Factors like “choreography of the discourse” (ME: 849) and
“punctuation and rhythm” (CM: 86) contribute greatly to the flexibility of
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meaning that is needed to achieve an authentic expressiveness. Bergson
summarizes all this in the following phrase, which says the opposite, but means
the same as the Jacobsonian poetic function (1960) of communication: “The
truth is that the writer’s art consists above everything in making us forget that he
is using words” (ME: 57). 
II. 2. d)  “L’émotion créatrice”
Thus we come to one of the most significant points in Bergson’s concept of
language-use. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1986 [1932]) he
speaks of the interdependence between emotion and creation, and again opposes
two possible attitudes towards work:
“Anyone engaged in writing has been in a position to feel the difference between an
intelligence left to itself and that which burns with the fire of an original and unique
emotion, born of the identification of the author with his subject, that is to say, of
intuition. In the first case the mind cold-hammers the materials, combining ideas
long since cast into words and which society supplies in a solid form. In the second,
it would seem that the solid materials supplied by intelligence first melt and mix,
then solidify again into fresh ideas now shaped by the creative mind itself. If these
ideas find words already existing which can express them, for each of them this
seems a piece of unexpected good luck; and, in truth, it has often been necessary to
assist fortune, and strain the meaning of a word, to mould it to the thought. In that
event the effort is painful and the result problematical. But it is in such a case only
that the mind feels itself, or believes itself, to be creative.” (46)
To get an idea of the domain to which the notion of creative emotions
transfers us, we can relate this passage to the aesthetics that derive from the
existential analytics of Heidegger and that argue for the ontological relevance of
art. Vattimo devotes many essays to this kind of aesthetics; in one from the late
1960s (Vattimo 1967) he touches on two questions that can help us reconsider
Bergson’s terminology. On one hand, Vattimo grounds his argument in the
evolution of the problem of affectivity in Heidegger. In Being and Time, this
problem is related to the notion of Befindlichkeit. But this notion disappears in
his later work in order to avoid misunderstandings that might arise due to any
“emotionalist interpretations” (158), where it is replaced mainly by reflections
on poetry and “its function of opening worlds” (ibid.).
On the other hand, Vattimo defends Heideggerian aesthetics from the charge
that, “like most aestheticians of phenomenological origin, [his] attention is
focused on the ready work and its fruition, and not on the act of becoming and
producing” (163). According to Vattimo, however, it is easy to demonstrate that
the same elements by which the work introduces its reader to existential
dimensions (especially the element of shock, Stoss) are also characteristic of its
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creator.
Bergson’s “creative emotion” gives us reason to return to the comparison
with Columbus and old maps. Following such maps, Bergson has reached a new
continent. He cannot give up the concept of “emotion”; thus, he makes every
effort to define it better. He simply specifies that psychology places things from
various orders under the same notion, the only difference being in their extent
(Bergson 1986: 46). Thus, Bergson speaks of two opposing types of emotion
(43–47), which we can call the “psychological” and the “ontological”.
The psychological kind refers to well-known emotions such as “surface
agitation” and “stirring of sensibility” (43), with which psychologists usually
deal (love, anger, melancholy, fear and so on). These emotions have
particularity, and their representation lies completely within the individual’s
intellectual range. The subject knows them; they are “infra-intellectual” (44). By
contrast, the ontological type of emotion is “supra-intellectual” (ibid.), and it is
the reason for, and not the consequence of, states of mind. Ontological emotion
is a “generator of ideas” and anterior in time, as compared to the intellectual
image of the world we are in. The difference between this emotion and
derivative states of mind, such as particular emotions, is the difference between
“that which generates and that which is generated” (ibid.). In the final analysis,
Bergson has no doubts about the ontological validity of this kind of emotion:
“That a new emotion is the source of the great creations of art, of science and of
civilization in general there seems to be no doubt” (43). 
As for the second word in Bergson’s expression, “cr_atrice”, we can now
consider it from a new perspective. Just as it is possible to set “emotion” free
from a limited psychological meaning, it is possible to free “creativity” from its
romantic burden. Though Bergson may be a phenomenological writer, when he
describes “creative emotion” as the basis of new worlds, he is taking a con-
structive or affirmative position that is generally uncharacteristic of
phenomenology’s decon-structive aesthetics. If we have entitled this chapter
“Phenomenology of Intellectual Effort”, we may well classify these pages of
Bergson’s as a kind of “Phenomenology of Creative Effort”. If the analysis of
anguish or angst, which is the fear of Nothingness, best fits the typical
passiveness of the phenomenological approach, then it should be possible to
look for the same constitutive relationship between being and
being-in-the-world (entity) in an analysis of creative emotion, as far as it is “the
joy of All [Everything]”. The creative emotion of shock (Stoss) prompts the
author to make an effort that is painful because it questions the established
language (langue, order of things). This painful effort endows the work with
life. The work itself contains a fundamental tension, the source of which is
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tradition. Thus, something we have always felt, but never known was a part of
us, comes to the fore, now seen in a completely new light. This shock is not the
mild excitement aroused by the roiling of ocean waves as seen from safely
onshore – it is the terror of the moment, when we realize that this earth, our
world, is just a raft, suddenly shaken by the rough sea and no longer secure
against wrecking. Both reader and artist experience this shock from the work,
but it is not always a moment of anguish and terror. The experience of this
fundamental relationship between being and entity is also the hope that we can
sail towards new worlds.
Hence, we come to the topic of the great Work of Art, and of human spirit,
thought and civilization as a whole. They are the only means through which
genuine being speaks as it picks its way among the obstacles of its time-bound
state of being-in-a-world. To describe the trans-epochal ability of the authentic
work of art to remind us of being, Bergson compares it, perhaps with silent
irony, to money (which more than anything else draw many artistic practices
away from authenticity):
“But if he [who is engaged in literary composition] does succeed, he will have
enriched humanity with a thought that can take on a fresh aspect for each generation,
with a capital yielding ever-renewed dividends, and not just with a sum down to be
spent at once” (op. cit.: 254).
II. 3. Theory of Intellectual Effort
“Theory of intellectual effort” refers to those parts of Bergson’s philosophy in
which he examines that effort most profoundly and systematically. This does
not mean that his overall position on intellectual effort is unclear. On the
contrary, what we here call “theory” is meaningful only in combination with
“ethics” and “practice”, together with which it outlines the main aspects of the
same core problem. By “theoretical” we simply mean those places where
Bergson talks technically and specifically about that which elsewhere he talks
about only suggestively or emotively. In this sense, the theory of intellectual
effort is represented primarily in Matter and Memory and in the essay on
“Intellectual Effort”, in which we come as close as possible to a phenomenology
of the problem. Such an approach is one of the primary means by which living
Bergsonism becomes fully integrated into modern philosophical discourse. 
As mentioned in I.6., Matter and Memory is the principal source of the ideas
that constitute “la portée lontaine” of Bergson’s doctrine. Ronchi, paying special
attention to this issue (1990: 197 n12), underlines the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s
rediscovery of Bergson is based entirely on a new reading of Matter and
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Memory, which the former offers in his courses (Merleau-Ponty 1968).
Although generally critical of Bergson’s concept of time, Heidegger in turn
notes that Matter and Memory contains “moments which are far from being
exhausted” (cited in Ronchi 1990: ibid.). As already mentioned, Jankélévitch
describes this work as Bergson’s “most genial” one. Other important attempts to
relate Bergson to existential phenomenology are also based on Matter and
Memory; these include Hyppolite and Giroux (1971), Mathieu (1971), and
Deleuze (1966). Interestingly enough, all these readings, explicitly or implicitly,
refer to the same topic, namely, the differentiation that Bergson makes between
the ontological valence of memory and the psychological interpretations of the
endurance of consciousness as discussed in Time and Free Will. Our own study
follows the same line of inquiry. 
Using Ronchi’s hermeneutic-pragmatic observations as our point of
departure, we shall now try to develop further the concept of linguistic
intellectual effort. This will prepare us to integrate Bergsonian theory with
semiotic discourse (Part Two: Chapter II), and to compare it with the work of
certain hermeneutic authors. (Ronchi himself made excellent preparations for
such a comparison, but left the task to future studies such as the present one.)
For this purpose, we shall first describe how Bergson represents intellectual
effort in its dynamic relation with memory.
II. 3. a) Matter and Memory
In Matter and Memory, Bergson primarily aims to formulate a radically new
hypothesis of soul/body interrelatedness. This formulation should transcend the
fundamental opposition between materialism and idealism as well as the
extremes of “vulgar dualism”. His strategy, as usual, consists in exposing the
common and erroneous characteristics that are shared by seemingly opposing
hypotheses. He does so by demonstrating that both are grounded in one and the
same epistemological metaphysics. Using his well-known method, Bergson
points out various combinations of elements, in both materialism and idealism,
that differ in nature, whereas the ordinary view sees in them only a difference in
degree. Conversely, he reveals in both of those doctrines the posing of false
problems, where in fact there are only differences in quantity (an exhaustive
description of Bergson’s method is found in Deleuze 1966: 7–29). Bergson
starts with a phenomenological analysis of the perceptual process, and comes to
the conclusion that, in both materialism and idealism, “perception has a wholly
speculative interest; it is pure knowledge” (MM: 28, 179). In place of this purely
cognitive view of perception, Bergson substitutes a principle that returns man to
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nature and places him on the level of other living creatures. Long before – and
this “before” is not chronological but ontological in nature (Ronchi 1990:167) –
“perception” is identified with “knowledge”, it is based on the purely pragmatic
principle of Primum vivere (CM: 53), a term that refers to the living organism
and its interaction with the environment. “Memory, imagination, conception and
perception, generalization in short, are not there `for nothing, for pleasure’[....]
one must refer to the fundamental exigencies of life to explain their presence”
(CM: 53). This pragmatic first-principle calls forth the images (pure
perceptions) by which the body, to the extent that it is matter, connects at every
moment with other bodies. This principle outlines the potential influence upon
those bodies that one’s own body needs and exercises. The specific and
practical act of Primum vivere, whose potential is far greater in man than in any
other living organism, receives assistance from the memory, which is the sum
total of all recollections, i.e., from the entire past of the subject. The drama of
the spirit/body relation unfolds between the two essentially different elements of
pure memory and pure perception. Bergson dedicates a substantial part of
Matter and Memory to the defense of this fundamental difference. This
difference has been obliterated by a jumbled mode of perception that has led to
all the speculative hypotheses of epistemological metaphysics, against which the
philosophy of durée represents a “return to things”. Having thus posed the
ontological problem, Bergson devotes the second and third chapters to
theorizing the complex mechanism by which the pragmatic Primum vivere
principle is realized at the levels of complexity and articulation that are typical
of a mature, reflexive consciousness. Bergson focuses on the processes of
perception and understanding, thus downplaying intellectual approaches that are
concerned only with results. In this way, the theme of intellectual effort comes
to the center of his discourse. It is the driving force of the dynamic processes of
perception and understanding, and it calls for the attention à la vie that balances
opposing tendencies and makes the subject adequate to the situation. These
chapters and the essay on “Intellectual Effort” combine to give us most of the
ideas by which every interpretation of Bergson distinguishes ontological
inferences from their psychological frame. Fortuitously or not, Bergson casts
most of his examples in terms of the functioning of language, which plays into
our own study of the effort of expression and interpretation.
II. 3. b) “The Debut of the Spirit”
A principal strategy with which Bergson defends his thesis of the substantial
difference between memory and matter, is to demonstrate that recollections
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cannot be housed in the brain. He criticizes this view of suffering from the same
kind of inertia that forces reason to “spatialize” every object that it takes an
interest in. Recollections are not located “somewhere” in the brain; they are not
stored in a “place” from which an associative mechanism picks out those
memories that resemble previous ones. Rather, recollection is the instance that
guarantees the endurance of consciousness and that separates it from dead
matter. Dead matter is repeated in every single moment; i.e., the same
conditions of interaction lead always to the same result. Every moment is
predetermined by the previous one; thus, there is no need for an instance in
which to remember anything. Or, if we agree that identity of response is a form
of recollection, then this recollection is always repeated. The opposite relation
obtains with a consciousness based on continuity in time. There is no repetition
here, but the continual generation of unpredictable novelties. There is
consciousness whenever things that have already taken place accumulate so as
to enrich the present with increased potential for what will occur in the future.
This accumulation is not some kind of log or data bank, recorded on a material
carrier (for example, the spinal cord and cerebrum as “records” of an ever-
increasing number of habits). Rather, this accumulation is a principle that
introduces indeterminacy (creativity) into the process of material repetition,
questioning the latter’s monotonous responsiveness by inserting into it specific
moments from the past of the conscious being. Such “insertions” guarantee the
novelty that is produced, inasmuch as the personal past grows richer with every
moment. In a sense, even the personal past becomes “new” (something we shall
discuss later).
This, more or less, is the metaphysical background of the theory of
intellectual effort, the validity of which is further supported by Bergson’s acute
observations of the immediate data of consciousness. (Almost all of the authors
we have cited offer original interpretations and reevaluations of this
fundamental metaphysical issue, the most pertinent being the ones of a
phenomenological-existential nature: Hyppolite, Giroux, Lisciani-Petrini,
Ronchi). In arguing his main thesis, Bergson adduces the interpretation of a
huge corpus of experimental data from neurology and psychopathology
(especial concerning aphasia, apraxia and amnesia). He then combines that
interpretation with the analysis of particular intellectual and perceptive
practices, the dominant one being the use of language.
“Such was the conclusion to which I was led by the especially detailed study of
normal and pathological facts, more generally through external observation. But
only then did I become aware of the fact that inward experience in the pure state, in
giving us a `substance’ whose very essence is to endure and thus continually to
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prolong into the present an indestructible past, would have relieved me from
seeking, and would even have forbidden me to seek, where memories are preserved.
They preserve themselves, as we admit; for example, when we pronounce a word. In
order to pronounce it we have to remember the first half of it while we are
articulating the second. But no one will think that the first [half of the word] has
been immediately deposited in a drawer, cerebral or otherwise, so that consciousness
may come for it a moment later. But if that is the case for the first half of the word,
it will be the same for the preceding word, which is an integral part of it as far as
sound and meaning are concerned; it will be the same from the beginning of the
sentence, and the preceding sentence, and the whole discourse that we could have
made very long, indefinitely long had we wished. Now, our whole life, from the time
of our first awakening to consciousness, is something like this indefinitely prolonged
discourse.” (CM: 74–75)
The passage above unites the main elements of the problem. There is the
temporal dimension linking past, present and future in a single dynamic
structure; there is memory as the ontological (not psychological) basis of this
structure; there is a primal sense enabling further interaction with the world; and
finally, there is language, which puts those elements in circulation within a
discourse. The above passage calls to mind the words of Gadamer. At the
beginning of Truth and Method, in trying to outline the hermeneutic project
Gadamer makes a comment that resonates strongly with our own view: “It is
time to rescue the phenomenon of memory from being regarded merely as a
psychological faculty and to see it as an essential element of the finite historical
being of man” (1979: 16). Gadamer himself leaves that task undone, which
opens a space for our own exploration of the issue. 
Relieved of psychological connotations, intellectual effort introduces
memory to the hermeneutic problem – not as a faculty but as a constitutive
principle of understanding, as we shall see. For this purpose, it is good to
examine closely the two types of memory which Bergson reveals. These two
ways in which memory functions derive from the fundamental
matter/consciousness opposition, but regarded in terms of immediate
experience. According to Bergson,
the past survives in two distinct forms: first, in motor mechanisms; secondly, in
independent recollections. But the practical, and, consequently, the usual function of
memory, the utilizing of past experience for present action – recognition, in short –
must take place in two different ways. Sometimes it lies in the action itself and in the
automatic setting in motion of a mechanism adapted to the circumstances; at other
times it implies an effort of the mind which seeks in the past, in order to apply them
to the present, those representations which are best able to enter into the present
situation” (MM: 78; my italics).
The first type of memory, motor mechanisms, is the sum total of a person’s
experience that enables him to respond appropriately to changes in his
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surroundings, of which, however, he should not think. Those mechanisms act,
so to speak, “automatically” (160). This type of memory belongs to the body,
where, according to all observations, it is registered in the brain and the spinal
column. Motor memory has nothing to do with temporality. It has no
transitional moment between stimulus and response; the past is simply
integrated into a unifying habit that does not contain the past as history. This is
a past-in-itself (“en-soi”, as Ronchi puts it, using Sartre’s famous phrase), in
which the effort is purely motoric. 
In contrast, “the existence of this past-for-itself (pour-soi) signals the debut
of the spirit” (Ronchi 1990: 171). This is pure memory, in which every moment
exists in itself and in the historical succession of its happening. These
recollections are dated, although not always present and updated. This type of
memory also serves the Primum vivere principle; i.e., it helps the subject to
interact with the present situation. Here, however, a new dimension of
consciousness is revealed: memory realizes itself, represents itself, instead of
acting automatically. In order to meet the needs of the moment, such memory
selects from an enormous virtual inventory of possibilities, which is the
preserved string of representations through which it has passed on its way to the
present. The memory’s act of selection is not a matter of adequate response or
of the association of ideas, but of actual representation, understanding, and
interpretation. “We touch the present reality of the self-realized spirit at that
point [...] where a hesitation in the motor reaction tears some being away from
the necessary plan in order to throw it into the circle of interpretation” (op. cit.:
177; author’s italics).
The ability to tear ourselves away from the necessary plan is purely human.
The other species do not have anything like pure memory to assist them in
unexpected situations. We resort to imagination, and to do so more or less
suggests a prior hesitation in reaction. That hesitation keeps us in the realm of
the human spirit; no adaptive default-mechanism of our motor-memory switches
us there automatically.
“This is a view of the very way that consciousness exists, as far as it is an incarnated
consciousness. But what is the meaning of this hesitation, which calls the past to
exist for-itself, awakening it from the sleep of matter? It is hesitation and research,
indecisiveness and choice, reflection and effort.” (Ibid.; author’s italics)
Thus, intellectual effort – the effort to understand and interpret, to represent and
express – turns out to be the point of differentiation between the two types of
memory. And this differentiation, more than any other, brings Bergson face to
face with his “historical enemy” – experimental (positivist) psychology. The
reality into which intellectual effort places the living individual stands in
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contradiction to that of the quantifiable subject of positivist psychology. When
pure memory, with all its unpredictability, takes control of the individual, here
comes the need to postulate a “black box” that isolates the debuting spirit, along
with the promise of a scientific explanation of his mystery as soon as possible.
II. 3. c) The Two Types of Memory and Language: General Ideas
as Habitat and World
Let us now examine the discoursive part of Bergson’s model. As we saw above,
in the long quotation from The Creative Mind, the dynamic of memories and
their relations with the world is enacted by language. In the previous chapter we
outlined the need to reconsider Bergson’s position on language, which has
traditionally been regarded as negative. Now it is time to end this prejudice once
and forever. And this is not only our goal. For example, Deleuze, one of the
most authoritative interpreters of Bergson, even speaks of “an ontological
foundation of language”, which, together with the “transcendence of sense” is
“so very important for an author who [...] is blamed for making a rather general
criticism of language” (Deleuze 1966: 51). The type of reading of Bergson that
Deleuze is engaged in prevents him from taking this theme further, despite the
unquestionable significance of the passage quoted; we, on the other hand, have
no such restriction.
This ontology of language can be discovered on many levels in Bergson (and
we shall examine the most important ones). In general, however, his view is that
only language can make possible the “debut of spirit”. And a philosophical
problem can hardly be more “honored” in the context of Bergson’s thought.
According to the principle of Primum vivere (as represented most profoundly in
Creative Evolution), in the pre-linguistic phase man differs from the other
species in his ability to manipulate his material environment in a non-immediate
way. This ability gives him extraordinary advantages but, considered in itself,
does not raise him above the material existence of the other species. This
rudimentary form of intelligence nevertheless contributes to man’s winning in
the competition for survival with the other species, and this victory opens the
way for the linguistic stage. If the material conditions won are enough to afford
individuals some respite from their fight for survival, then they can afford “a
surplus of energy to spend” (CE: 159), and this rudimentary intelligence start to
reflect upon itself in verbal form. Here the intelligence’s innate ability to
suspend the immediacy of the subject, its capacity to operate with “mobile” and
not “adherent” (ibid.) signs, finds beneficial ground for development. “Without
language, intelligence would probably have remained riveted to the material
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objects which it was interested in considering. It would have lived in a state of
somnambulism, outside itself, hypnotized by its own work” (ibid.).
This is no lucky coincidence: humans are predisposed to speaking; speech is
not some superficial by-product of existence. “Even though each word of our
speech is conventional, language is not therefore a convention, and it is as
natural for man to speak as to walk” (CM: 80). Thus, the crucial transition to
this stage comes when intelligence leaves the logic of necessity in order to
become subjected to its own manipulative acts. This is how intelligence is
self-realized for the first time and begins to understand how it conceives of
itself. “Thus is revealed to the intelligence, hitherto always turned outwards, a
whole internal world – the spectacle of its own workings” (CE: 159; my italics).
This internal world makes the human being enter a temporal existence. For the
world, which is based on the mobility of signs, on the conscious simulation of
what might be but not necessarily what will be, is already ontologically bound
to historicity and thus requires pure memory (the integral preservation of
experience) for its accomplishment. Therefore this stage, which is more
important for the ontological distinctions introduced by Bergson than for its
prehistoric reliability, also draws us theoretically closer to the hermeneutic
problem. In one of the most significant sections of Truth and Method, in the part
called “Language as Experience of the World”, Gadamer compares the same
two modes of being: “Thus the concept of `world’ or `environment’ (Welt) is in
opposition to the concept of the `surrounding world’ or `habitat’ (Umwelt), as
possessed by every living thing [...] This does not mean that he [man] leaves his
habitat, but that he has another attitude towards it, a free, distanced attitude,
which is always realised in language” (Gadamer 1979: 402–403; my italics).
We thus come to another one of Bergson’s chief concerns: the genesis of
articulated speech, and the relation of that speech to the material interaction
between the individual and its Umwelt, as well as the introduction of the two
types of memory into this relationship. All these issues are incorporated in the
notion of “General Ideas”. The great contribution of Bergson to this discourse,
is the problematization of the Welt/Umwelt relationship, and the replacement of
that static opposition with a dynamic image, whose crucial condition is
intellectual effort. Bergson begins the discussion of general ideas in a way we
have already described (in I.7.). He criticizes two opposing hypotheses of the
genesis of general ideas, Nominalism and Conceptualism, in order to draw out
a concept that meshes with the rest of his doctrine. According to Bergson, both
Nominalism and Conceptualism suffer from one and the same metaphysical
formulation, which “forgets” to problematize its own material origin: “Now
when we get to the bottom of these two opposite theories, we find in them a
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common postulate; each will have it that we start from the perception of
individual objects” (MM: 157). Bergson accuses this common postulate of the
unsound “luxury of perception” (158) that is characteristic of a refined reflexive
consciousness. But the origin of general ideas is much more humble and primal
than that. It is of no psychological nature at all. “It would seem, then, that we
start neither from the perception of the individual nor from the conception of the
genus, but from an intermediate knowledge, from a confused sense of the
striking quality (qualité marquante) or resemblance: this sense, equally remote
from generality fully conceived and from individuality fully perceived, begets
both of them by a process of dissociation” (ibid.; author’s italics). Bergson now
takes this logic beyond the Primum vivere principle, asserting that the way in
which a plant takes mineral salts from the soil is not essentially different from
the way in which “hydrochloric acid always acts in the same way upon
carbonate of lime whether in the form of marble or of chalk” (ibid.).
(Commenting on this passage, Ronchi reveals many similarities between
Bergson and Pierce, but again leaves them undeveloped; we discuss them
below, in the chapter on Eco.) Can we talk of “perception” here? Even if we use
that term, it would designate merely a “hardware” perception that ontologically
precedes any other. If we consider the purpose of the nervous system in animals
and man, we see that their evolution is a translation of the primal generalization
into a habitat, understood as a set of habits that regulate life in a given
environment. This is a gradual transition that takes many thousands of years to
go from a “hardware” to a “software” condition. The network of habits of
response is rather complex in man, but it is of a psychological order and has
nothing to do with the spiritual realm: “This similarity of reaction following
actions superficially different is the germ which the human consciousness
develops into general ideas” (160).
The appearance of “the general idea of genus” is a crucial moment in the
development of the system of habits – an idea that is typical of man and his
social-communicative nature. Although it parallels the “debut of sprit”, the logic
of generalization always remains in the order of the psychological, of the habit.
Consciousness precipitates the generalization of the practical success of
generalized habits from a relatively primary level into a more abstract one. And
this process, which gives birth to language, goes on for thousands of years. “It is
enough to say that the understanding, imitating the effort of nature, has also set
motor apparatuses, artificial in this case, to make a limited number of them
answer to an unlimited number of individual objects: the assemblage of these
mechanisms is articulate speech” (161). The term “understanding” (entendement)
here should not mislead us (as “knowledge” threatened to do in a previous case),
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for Bergson does not use it in the same sense in which we use it in hermeneutic
discourse. As we shall see, Bergson uses “sens”, “intellection” and
“interpretation” as stand-ins for “understanding”. It is important to note how,
together with ontological language (spectacle, a whole internal world), Bergson
also reveals a motoric, functional and conventional language. This mechanized
language marks the end of the tendency for generalization that links us closely
with the rest of nature, a part of which is our social organization. “What is
essentially human is, in fact, the labor of an individual thought which accepts,
just as it is, its insertion into social thought and which utilizes preexisting ideas
as it utilizes any other tool furnished by the community” (CM: 61). In many ways
these two languages are one, but their difference refers to the attitude towards
being. The language we acquire ready-made from the community, which is the
“record” of the millennia-long know-how of being, has accumulated the
synchronous configuration of statistically established habits of response. Such
received language is a habitat (Umwelt), though rather a complex one, which is
of the nature of the natural habitat of the rest of the species. The other language,
the language-World (Welt), speaks to us when the habitat we have found
becomes too constricted to contain our soul; when das Man takes the road to
authentic being; when interpretation replaces identification as a form of
understanding; when the realized consciousness is expanded in a time that
proceeds from pure memory (the past-in-itself). These two languages are
mutually sustaining: the language-World is impossible without the
language-Habitat, and the language-Habitat is the environment where the
language-World is possible. It is the always already given sense which makes the
language-World ask itself about the sense of its own being. We cannot speak
only the language-World because it is always immersed in the ocean of the
language-Habitat. And this language-Habitat is none other than tradition. We can
always cover it in new interpretations and seek to mine its depths, but we can
never reach the bottom. The bottom is out there, in the transition from
“hardware” to “software”, in a space that it is impossible to think.
We can say, however, that to Bergson intellectual effort is the requirement, as
well as the essentially human feature, for becoming “syntonized” from one
linguistic order to the other. This “syntonization”, as seen in II.1., is the
foundation of the ethical approach to intellectual effort, and also the condition for
the overcoming of closed linguistic systems (II.2.). In order to explicate the
dynamics of “syntonization”, Bergson develops the theory of general ideas
further. “The essence of the general idea, in fact, is to be unceasingly going
backwards and forwards between the plan of action and that of pure memory”
(MM: 161). 
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II. 3. d) “Langue” and “Parole” in Bergson
In the spirit of Bergson, we shall divide linguistic experience into two distinct
tendencies and then examine their interaction in immediate experience.
Bergson’s analysis of the functioning of linguistic communication is one of the
most complex passages of Matter and Memory. To help clarify that text, it is
useful to draw comparisons between it and another methodological division of
language, already classical in the history of modern thought – namely, the
Saussurean distinction between langue and parole. As noted in I.6., the
similarities between the two thinkers should not be ignored, and the deeper
those similarities go, the more new ones come to the fore, as if to challenge a
way of thinking that forces Saussure and Bergson into incommensurable
traditions of thought. Parenthetically, we add that the same is true of the relation
between Bergson and Peirce. Such “synchronic” comparison of Bergson with
the fathers of semiotics, his contemporaries, will clear the way for Chapter II of
Part Two. There we shall undertake a “diachronic” interpretation of the
corresponding perspectives in semiotics from the standpoint of intellectual effort
and linguistic work. 
Bergson and Saussure pursue very different goals with their division of
language. Nevertheless, the division itself and the scientific tradition they both
oppose are quite similar. Saussure seeks a methodologically pure science of
language, as against a comparative, philological tradition that regards language
as nomenclature. Bergson, in turn, seeks a metaphysics of the pure endurance of
consciousness, as opposed to the positivist tradition in psychology, which views
words and other recollections as separate elements preserved in specific places
in the brain. What Saussure distinguishes as a synchronic system, la langue,
which depends not on external objects but only on formal internal relations, is
present in Bergson when he analyses motor recognition in speech perception.
Similarly to Saussure, Bergson asks how we manage to identify signs correctly,
even when they are cloaked in quite different acoustic substances and appear in
various situations. To him, this ability is not a matter of recollection but of
motor response. The heard sign does not call to mind its own memorized
reflection but is rather identified by means of a general schème moteur, or
“motor diagram” (MM: 111)7, preserves a separate image for each separately
perceived utterance of a word. “This is because the diagram, by means of which
we divide the speech we hear, indicates only its [the word’s] salient outlines [...]
To understand it, we need only to realize in it what is essential, just enough to
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distinguish it from all other possible movements” (112; my italics). Bergson
even uses an expression like “internal structure” (ibid.) to explain the motor-
habit that permits the functioning of this immanent linguistic system, which, like
langue, is based on the differences between its elements. The definition of the
immanence of the linguistic system leads Saussure to the modern concept of the
sign as a value based on its formal distinction from the other signs. Bergson, in
contrast, isolates the whole system as a separate facet of consciousness, whose
functioning does not demand intellectual effort. To him, this is immanence.
He gives various examples that, taken in the Saussurean sense, seem
paradoxical. These are examples of speech without “parole”; instances where
language is exercised without going beyond the strict immanence of “langue” in
itself. These are mainly pathological cases of persons whose relationship with
real life is broken, and yet who manage to converse “sensibly”. “In the case of
dementia, we sometimes find that intelligent answers are given to a succession
of questions which are not understood: language here works after the manner of
a reflex” (MM: 86). Referring to an article by Robertson on “Reflex Speech”
that appeared in the April 1888 issue of Journal of Mental Science, Bergson
says the following:
“Current conversation is composed in great part of ready-made responses to
conventional questions, the response succeeding the question without intelligence
being interested in the meaning of either. Thus, patients in a state of dementia can
keep up an almost coherent conversation on a simple subject, although they hardly
know what they are saying.” (IE: 204: author’s italics)
Bergson gives examples of “normal” individuals, too, for whom the
preservation of the immanence of the linguistic system is intentional. For
instance, in the first stage of Prendergast’s system for learning language
(Handbook in the Mastery Series, London, 1868), the student learns to say
ready-made phrases (articulated sounds) without knowing what they mean. The
goal at this stage is to get the motor part of language to combine these phrases,
under the teacher’s direction, into grammatically correct forms, “without
understanding being mixed with it” (192). (This system would no doubt appeal
to those post-structuralisms that focus on the play of the “signifier”.) We also
can easily follow the solution of a mathematical problem, identifying every sign
we see without even minimal assurance that we understand it: “The sentences
that we read or hear have a complete meaning only when we are able to make
them up ourselves, to create them anew, so to speak, by drawing from ourselves
the expression of the mathematical truth which they teach” (205). Similarly, we
can recite verses that we learned at school without necessarily being guided by
the sense of poetry. We identify the signs – we well recognize the language in
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which we recite – but we remain immanent to the system, without being forced
to understand (193). Intellectual effort is such understanding. It is a
reconstruction of sense based on the meaning of signs, but it is also the
transcendence of sense. 
Completely absorbed in the abstract, immanent system of language,
Saussure often gives examples with the game of chess, but to do so he needs to
make a very important specification: “In order to make the game of chess seem
at every point like the functioning of language (langue), we would have to
imagine an unconscious or unintelligent player” (Saussure 1974: 89).
Completely absorbed in the phenomenology of intellectual effort, Bergson
also gives an example with the game of chess, but the player he imagines is just
the opposite of the Saussurean one. He refers to those extraordinary
chess-players who can play simultaneously on many boards, even without
looking at them (IE: 196–197). This difference in chess-playing examples is
particularly indicative of the reading of semiotics we intend to make. In
Saussure, the division of language into langue and parole is a methodological
move, and the foolish chess-player is only a metaphor. But the whole tradition
that stems from Saussure forgets the origin of this division and ontologizes the
method itself (one member of this tradition is Eco, in La struttura assente,
1968). Indeed, the subject of structural semiotics resembles the foolish
chess-player, inasmuch as it is immanent to semiotic systems. By contrast,
interpretative semiotics offers its subject some freedom. Yet with the model of
the encyclopaedia it pushes him towards an environment that should be World,
but whose ideal state is statistical constancy in the use of signs. Thus what
should be the World is constantly reduced to a Habitat. 
Postmodern thought, or what Smith (1997) calls “weak hermeneutics”
(15–17), was established more or less as a reaction to “structural
fundamentalism”. Yet it, too, deprives the subject of any ontological
commitment. By contrast, “strong hermeneutics”, to which Smith’s book is
dedicated and which is represented by authors like Gadamer and Ricoeur, seems
open to the philosophy of intellectual effort. We have already noted several
substantial points of intersection between Bergson and Gadamer. As for
structuralism and the hermeneutic project, there is no author as relevant as
Ricoeur, in whom we can seek the continuation of the comparison we are
making. In contrast to his semiotized postmodern colleague, the subject of
strong hermeneutics thinks with his own head and exercises intellectual effort.
This, it seems, is his most significant feature.
We have already seen that for Bergson the immanence of the linguistic
system constitutes an area of consciousness in which one can operate without
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effort. “To work intellectually is to take one and the same idea and lead it
through different planes of consciousness, in a direction which goes from the
abstract to the concrete” (IE: 214). Arguing against the structural approach,
Ricoeur defines the hermeneutic problem as the need to situate the
understanding of the text beyond the immanence of language. In his opinion, the
structural analysis of a text explains it, but does not interpret it (Ricoeur 1970).
He grounds his polemic on a theoretical division that reveals the difference
between sign and sentence, a difference which the structural view considers as
only “quantitative”. Ricoeur, who refers to Benveniste and Frege, not only uses
the same method as that of Bergson, but he and Bergson also reach similar
conclusions. Bergson undertakes an analysis of language in Matter and Memory
after noting that “to hear some theorists discourse on sensory aphasia, we might
imagine that they had never considered with any care the structure of a
sentence” (124). Ricoeur explains the matter as follows:
“There is no reference problem in language: signs refer to other signs within the
same system. In the phenomenon of the sentence, language passes outside itself;
reference is the mark of the self-transcendence of language.” (1979: 74; Ricoeur’s
italics)
Benveniste calls “semiotics” the linguistics of the sign, and “semantics”, the
linguistics of the phrase. Ricoeur introduces the hermeneutic project in analogy
to this distinction: “At the first level, it [hermeneutics] deals only with entities
belonging to the order of sentences. At the second level, it addresses that are
larger than the sentence. It is at this level that the problem reaches its full
amplitude.” (216). Thus, finally, that which is the referent of the phrase in the
text (work) is the World, and “hermeneutics then is simply the theory that
regulates the transition from structure of the work to world of the work” (220).
To throw further light on this process, we have to see how Bergson’s theory of
interpretation and understanding fits into the framework of the hermeneutic
project as it is outlined by Ricoeur. 
II. 3. e) The Circle of Sense and the Effort of Interpretation
In our interpretation of Bergson’s theory of intellectual effort we have gradually
revealed how, starting from a general issue in metaphysics – the doctrine of the
body/soul relationship, which is equally remote from materialism, idealism and
vulgar dualism – one arrives at the problems of sense, interpretation, and
language. In this transition we have constantly differentiated between two
tendencies, which have taken various forms at different stages of this study:
matter and memory, pure memory and motor memory, language-World and
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language-Habitat, and so on. Although we have implied it here and there, we
shall repeat it once more: the overall formulation of the problem sets this
differentiation under the common denominator of Primum vivere, which is the
pragmatically vital basis of the existence of consciousness. That is why we have
focused on existential-phenomenological, Bergsonian interpretations of the
status of memory, which preserve the ontological function of past-for-itself.
After overcoming certain impediments to such an interpretation – mainly the
concept of durée pure as presented in Time and Free Will, as well as some
misleading uses of terms in Matter and Memory – the philosophy of Bergson
opens up rich theoretical perspectives. For example, Ronchi notes that, after
Bergson, Husserl makes an equally radical break with the traditionally
metaphysical concept of time as a sequence of present moments, but the French
philosopher goes even further (Ronchi 1990: 178–179). Husserl is still bound to
a contemplative tradition of thinking that considers the forth-coming given as
the “spectacle of a disinterested perception” (MM: 158). For Bergson such
disinterestedness is a “luxury of perception”, and in its enduring time the present
moment owes its cognitive density (thickness) to the projection of a pragmatic
intention, which grounds the that which is forthcoming in a purposeful
projection of the past. “In fact, in the endless analysis of temporality that
Husserl performs, he leaves as marginal the equally fundamental dimension of
the experienced present, which is the future” (ibid.). As we know, one of the
main perspectives in which the existential analysis of Being and Time develops
the phenomenological doctrine, is exactly the insistence on the future, and
Bergson’s anticipation of it several decades earlier can also be regarded from
this standpoint. Central to the theory of intellectual effort is the perspective of
the future that makes the present moment endure as it reveals to us many
pragmatic possibilities synthesized by the past, thus diverting the present from
resorting to fixed habits of response. As hesitation creeps into response, the
present moment begins to take on cognitive density; it “thickens” because of the
ec-static coexistence of two new dimensions: the past and the future. “Time is
this very hesitation, or it is nothing” (CM: 93). The ontological role of pure
memory is to enable this “thickening” of the present, through which the object
of perception is wrested from the logic of immediate identification within an
immanent system of habits of response (Habitat), and is transferred into the
circle of interpretation and, thus, of sense. “The fact is that it is memory which
make us see and hear” (IE: 207). Thus, disclosing the deepest aspects of the
affinity between Bergson and Heidegger, Ronchi concludes that, “In Bergsonian
metaphysics memory is intended as the initial openness to sense, the aletheia or
interpretant that enables the realization of being in the present, so that it begins
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to be present in its own as such” (Ronchi 1990: 183). To Bergson the future
itself is the “sense” of enduring time, as both direction and meaning (180; cf.
also, MM: 280, 291; ME 7–8, 20–21). This future-sense has variable thickness,
depending on the impulse of endurance in which the consciousness has placed
itself, within the interpretative circle that encompasses the objects of perception.
As already said, this impulse can be close to zero if for some reason
consciousness subsists on a single level, i.e., in an immanent, reflexive system.
This system need not be not only verbal language but may include all other
systems with which we interact. The above examples refer mainly to
pathological or extreme situations of language-use, and Bergson prefers them
for their explicative clarity. But in fact, his philosophical system supports a
similar view of culture as a whole. He gives an example with everyday objects,
which constitute a system-habitat that provides consciousness with freedom for
different purposes. “In fact, we commonly act our recognition before we think
it. Our daily life is spent among objects whose very presence invites us to play
a part: in this the familiarity of their aspect consists” (MM: 95; my italics). In
this case, the general purpose of daily environment is to be assimilated on a
reflexive level, i.e., to be maximally immanent to itself. This means that we can
move freely in it, without being forced to “understand”, but only to respond.
Bergson’s whole ethics of intellectual effort (II.1.) begins to make sense when
this relation of immanence (lack of effort) is preserved in the interaction with
other sign systems. In contrast to the daily environment, which is characterized
by an artificially achieved invariability in time and space, in Bergsonian
metaphysics reality is “the continuous creation of unforeseeable novelty” (CM:
91). Science would have ceased to develop if it were satisfied with an
accomplished image to inhabit as a “home environment”. Onto our relations
with other people we can project a stereotypical and familiar classification to
solve communication problems. We can even take ourselves to be the sum total
of all systems that motivate us in our social environment and that make it
familiar. But true science, true politeness, and true metaphysics are quite
another thing in Bergson’s view. The artificially attained habitat may well
provide living conditions, but it also dulls consciousness to ontological
commitment. This commitment is a prior agreement between consciousness and
ever-changing reality. It involves the risks we take and efforts we make to reject
the ready-made answer and to accept the tasks of studying, understanding, and
interpreting. Intellectual effort is the need to be constantly attuned to reality, to
plunge the drill as often as possible beneath the symbolically represented
surface of reality. It is our participation in the sense of time, as far as it is the
acceptance and defense of our finitude. To the extent that it is a condition for
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persisting in the ontological commitment to reality, intellectual effort gives us
the time in which consciousness exists. It is the impulse that commits us to both
that which is forthcoming and to the committed past. Intellectual effort and the
commitment to reality – both determine the temporal horizons of the conscious
being, in the “small time” and in the “large”. 
As we have already said, spirit makes its debut when a hesitation in our
reflexive interaction with the environment (material, social, or linguistic) takes
us out of the regime of time-repetition in order to draw us into enduring
(ec-static) time. Let us now examine, against the background of the ethical
consideration just made, the steps by which the debuting spirit is realized.
According to Bergson, the mechanism by which consciousness is made to
harmonize with reality is not linear but concentric; it is not centripetal but
centrifugal. This is true of all mechanisms of perception, although the may
involve different types of memory. “Our mind notes here and there a few
characteristic lines and fills all the intervals with memory-images which,
projected onto the paper, take the place of the real printed characters and may be
mistaken for them. Thus we are constantly creating and reconstructing” (MM:
103). These observations lead to a more central issue: “The question is, how can
the knowledge of a language, which is only memory, modify the material
content of a present perception” (109). In answering this, Bergson introduces
one of the two geometric schemes by which all the problems of Matter and
Memory are represented (105). This scheme depicts the circle of interpretation
and provides a clear explanation of the summary statement that Bergson makes
a few years later: “The fact is that it is the memory which make us see and hear”
(IE: 207). The object O (in the center of the scheme) is always represented with
a corresponding semicircle in the area of consciousness, marking latter’s
permanent need for memory, which is crucial for the perception of the object (in
his essay “Memory of the Present and False Recognition”, in Bergson 1975, he
develops further the recollection/present relation and demonstrates their
simultaneity and codependency). There is no perception without memory, even
in the simplest instances. This memory, as we have said, is the very
intentionality of consciousness, which places the object in a pragmatic
perspective that is always already given by the Primum vivere principle. Having
this intentional beginning, intellectual work is characterized by a symmetrical
expansion of the memory and of the reality in question. Bergson illustrates this
process with a series of increasing semicircles, their common center being the
same object O: “Behind it [O], the larger and larger circles B, C, D correspond
to growing efforts at intellectual expansion” (104). The other side of the
diagram represents circles B’, C’, D’, “so that in the measure in which the
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circles B, C, D represent a higher expansion of memory, their reflection attains,
in B’, C’, D’, deeper strata of reality” (105). Having postulated this circular
principle of perception, Bergson faces the theoretical challenge of combining his
own concept of the integral preservation of recollection with the fact that
attention usually employs only particular images. To put it in the terms of
Matter and Memory, Bergson must account for how memory is actualized from
its state of virtuality. In trying to solve this problem, Bergson encounters some
difficulties. There is no problem at all in the first edition of Matter and Memory,
Chapter Two, where the scheme is unveiled for the first time. (The passages in
question were published in separate essays in Revue philosophique; see Bergson
1959: 1489; and Ronchi 1990: 186–187, 203.) Non-motor memory is
represented there simply as “independent recollections”. It is only when
Bergson starts working on Chapter Three that he faces the severe need for a
concept that can distinguish the general presence of memory in its virtuality
from the realization of specific images that give sense to perception and action.
This new concept is “pure memory”, and in introducing it, Bergson has to make
substantial corrections to Chapter Two of Matter and Memory, mainly to
replace many times the term “image” with “souvenir” (recollection). The second
scheme Bergson proposes, in Chapter Three, represents the functioning of pure
memory. Yet this scheme, too, was obviously not sufficient. Perhaps unsatisfied
with the way his book is received and interpreted, Bergson further elaborates his
theory in the essay “Intellectual Effort”. There the distinction is emphasized
even more, and “pure memory” is reduced to a “dynamic diagram”. This change
opens space for an interpretation that has not been considered by other
interpreters of Bergson. It is based on the relationship between “motor diagram”
and “dynamic diagram”. And it suggests how, for Bergson, one and the same
principle, concerning a structural concept for the functioning of sense, moves
perception at all levels, from the identification of signs to complex
communicative interactions. Thus, as we anticipated above, intellectual effort
appears at the core of the hermeneutic problem: “hermeneutics, then, is simply
the theory that regulates the transition from the structure of the work to the
world of the work” (Ricoeur 1979: 220).
Let us see how Bergson comes to the theory of the dynamic diagram. The
second scheme he introduces in Chapter Three of Matter and Memory is
three-dimensional and deals mainly with the operating of consciousness. It is
represented as a cone with AB at the base, where Bergson places “my
recollections in their totality” (MM: 161); on the top S is “the present perception
which I have of my body” (ibid.). Reality is represented as the plane P, which
runs parallel to the base of the cone and intersects its top S. Bergson forcefully
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demonstrates that the particular life of consciousness passes between the two
poles AB and S, without necessarily corresponding to any of them (163). At the
same time, however, this scheme illustrates how pure memory, at every level of
concentration on the relevant perception, even infinitely close to point S, is
integrally present – every section of the cone is a circle representing the AB
base. Each level of the presence of pure memory offers a different degree of
virtuality. At the same time, this memory, in its wholeness, is constitutive of any
possible experience. Bergson makes great efforts to describe this process with
the terminology he has adopted, and this results in a text that is far from easy to
comprehend. Even at the end of the chapter, in his summary explanation,
terminological difficulties are still evident: “In other words, memory, laden with
the whole of the past, responds to the appeal of the present state by two
simultaneous movements, one of translation, by which it moves in its entirety to
meet experience, thus contracting more or less, though without dividing, with a
view to action; and the other of rotation upon itself, by which it turns toward the
situation of the present moment, presenting to it that side of itself which may
prove to be the most useful” (168–169). From the same perspective, Bergson
explains that a higher degree of virtuality of the pure memory involved means
more personality in the act, whereas a decrease in virtuality not only facilitates
but also banalizes it (169). Deleuze comments as follows on the part of Matter
and Memory that deals with this scheme: “We more and more insist on the fact
that this analysis, which at first glance is characterized by a remarkable
psychological subtlety, in fact has an entirely different meaning. It plays to our
affinity towards being, to our terms with Being and to the variability of this
attitude. Psychological consciousness is yet unborn. It comes to the world and
finds its ontological conditions here” (Deleuze 1966: 56). 
In “Intellectual Effort” Bergson gives a clearer terminological description,
which remains within the framework of ontological discourse. Even in Matter
and Memory, when he “analyzes psychologically” the overall (“without
dividing”, 169) functioning of pure memory, we come across expressions like
“transformation of the whole system” (104) (transformation du système),
“different systematizations” (169), and “ever-widening systems” (104), and yet,
to explain them he still uses terms like “translation”, “contracting”, “rotation”
and so on. In “Intellectual Effort” Bergson sets out to explore several types of
memory-use, whose common feature is that they suggest a real generative
transition (IE: 210) “from the abstract to the concrete” (214), “from the
intensive to the extensive” (230), where “the idea of meaning [Fr: signification]
has a large place in it” (196). Of course, these terminological uses are closer to
modern semiotic discourse than to the overall contents of the essay. But on the
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other hand, they unambiguously show that behind them there is a searching
thought that demands interpretation. The “motor diagram” demonstrates how
consciousness anticipates perception of the acoustic continuum by means of an
abstract pattern that helps to articulate that continuum on the basis of the
internal differences of a system (see II. 3. d) Here, Bergson introduces the
“dynamic diagram”, which has the same function, but which articulates larger
portions of reality. The first case involves the motor memory, whereas the
second case involves memory composed of independent recollections. To
Bergson, perception is always bound with memory, in the sense of what it is
still-not, and this anticipation arises through the projection of some kind of
ideality, of something abstract that is essentially different from specific images
(similar to the whole of Kant’s discourse on schematism). And this is the way it
should be. Following the logic of Bergsonian analysis, we cannot imagine
“recognition” in a different way. Reality is in constant transformation, and
consciousness can never experience two identical moments (see Essai:
121–126). This means that the inventory of consciousness never contains an
image independently identifiable with the one coming from perception (in the
simplest case, the acoustic image of a word twice uttered identically). The
pragmatic principle of Primum vivere prods consciousness always to reduce that
which is new to a system of interests connecting us with reality. This projection
of ideality upon perception is a form of ad hoc generalization. In the case of the
phonological system of words, which involves the motor responses of the body,
the operation of the principle is characterized by a high degree of objectivity
(this is why phonology is the most rigorous field of structuralism). When
consciousness operates in a regime of endurance, when the hesitation in the
motor response ec-statically summons its past in order to solve the new
indeterminacy of the forth-coming, the horizon of anticipation is expanded. The
dynamic diagram is the instance that bounds the ecstatic coexistence of past and
present. Through semicircles B, C, D on the one hand, and B’, C’, D’ on the
other, the dynamic diagram includes the object perceived in the “ever-widening
systems”. It is a kind of pragmatic structure of memory, which ad hoc sorts out
the virtual inventory of recollections according to their iconic (schematic)
affinity to the object perceived. 
All this can be observed in the three types of memory-use Bergson considers
in “Intellectual Effort”: recollection, understanding and interpretation, and
invention. In all three cases consciousness aims at reaching some image, some
specific result, a memory that is provided at the moment of hesitation, as an
integral whole and in its virtuality. Depending on the degree of complexity of
the hesitation and on the pragmatic discourse, intellectual effort, through the
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dynamic diagram, attempts to find images that can satisfy the pragmatic
intention (no matter whether we are remembering something, understanding a
text, or thinking of something new). 
The simplest case is recollection. It demands intellectual effort when the
images we need are not immediately related to a habit of response. The
recollection of poems often takes no effort since the lines “call out” for each
other automatically, as it were (IE: 193). In most cases of recollection, however,
the ec-static experience of the present moment is marked by a forth-coming that
needs a specific image and by the whole past in its virtuality. What we know we
have to recall – the need for an image – is also represented in its virtuality, but
by the dynamic diagram which is the appeal of the present to the memory. The
examples Bergson cites are mainly from studies of mnemonic techniques, which
intentionally reduce images to schemes that can easily be developed back into
images. In that way, these schemes/structures reduce entire texts to “a single,
simple and undivided idea (Fr: représentation; in the original, p. 194)8“. This is
the case with the preacher described by William James in Principles of
Psychology (1950, vol. I, p. 667 n 1), who needs only a single analytical reading
of the sermon in order to reduce the entire text to a unique scheme from which
he can then reconstruct it (ibid.).
In Bergson’s view, understanding and interpretation operate according to the
same principle, but with one additional element: the perception of the
surrounding reality. Here the scheme is dynamic in the fullest sense of the word,
for it involves the interaction of two mobile instances. Jankélévitch best
expresses the core of the process of understanding in Bergson: “In fact, we move
not from sign to sense but from sense to sense through the sign” (Jankélévitch
1959: 111; author’s italics). The sense from which we start is given, as we have
seen, by the hermeneutical-pragmatic constitution of consciousness that enables
its endurance in time. This endurance, which follows from a hesitation (lack of
automatic response), characterizes the human spirit in certain situations. It is, so
to speak, a priori – man is intended to live remote from immediate relatedness
with the situation. This remoteness concerns time and, more precisely, keeps the
individual within temporality. Thus, remoteness expands the horizon of the
forth-coming, while the pragmatic intention strives to involve those parts of the
memory that should guarantee the relevance of the ec-static present. “The
meaning”, says Bergson, “which is less a thing thought than a movement of
thought, less a movement than a direction” (CM: 121). This direction/sense is
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the future, and the process of understanding is “a certain ec-centric projection of
images which descend towards perception” (IE: 209–210). The successfulness
of the hermeneutic process (its pragmatic efficiency) depends to a great extent
on the selection of images that should give sense to the present (“the fact is that
it is the memory which make us see and hear”; IE: 207). It is by intellectual
effort that the dynamic scheme establishes the relation between the two image-
orders. Bergson compares this process to adjusting the focus of a camera and
gives an example with verbal speech:
“[...] it must be the meaning (sens), before everything, which guides us in the
reconstruction of forms and sounds.[...] Then, setting out from ideas, – that is to say,
from abstract relations,– we materialize them imaginatively in hypothetical words
which try, whether or not they can cover exactly what we see and hear.” (Ibid.;
author’s italics)
One of the most important things to note in Bergson’s model is the fallibility of
this process, which, except for being based on an always already given sense
(memory as intention), is also characterized by the need to be continuously
exercised. “It is a continuous transformation of abstract relations, suggested by
the objects perceived, into concrete images capable of recovering those objects”
(210; my italics). This is also the nature of our ontological commitment to
reality, which becomes more intensive as we move farther from an immediate
identification of percept and concept, as more unexpected combinations of
perceived and recalled images appear. 
All that is most clearly demonstrated in the analysis of the effort of
invention. There Bergson emphasizes particular moments in order to infer that
they are characteristic of every type of intellectual effort. These moments are the
competition among many images that satisfy a given scheme, and the reverse
influence with which certain images can change the scheme. Bergson, referring
to works like Ribot’s L’imagination créatrice and Paulhan’s Psychologie de
l’invention, argues that invention means to imagine schematically the final
solution, the “complete result”, and then turn it into particular images (211). The
effort is in the transition, and it appears as the synchronization, or
“syntonization”, with reality. This process is extremely problematic for it lacks
even the illusion of something firm to serve as a point of departure (such as
“scheme” for recollection, and “external image” for perception). Images and
schemes move hand in hand towards a representation, which, however, is never
certain to be where it is expected to be.
“We must not believe, however, that the scheme remains unchanged throughout the
operation. It is modified by the very images by which it endeavors to be filled in.
Sometimes there remains nothing of the primitive scheme in the final image.”
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(212–213)
Bergson lays great importance on “the part of the unforeseen” (ibid.), which this
exchange of leadership between scheme and image introduces into the whole
process of invention. Sometimes only a certain part of the machine attracts all
the attention of the inventor, and he gives up the rest of the initial project in
order to invent a new machine. Or, in a novel, a certain character
“unexpectedly” begins to influence the original idea and, in doing so, changes it.
(We could also mention the contemporary case of a heart medicine that, thanks
to a side-effect observed in the experimental stage, has been commercialized in
a quite different way from its initial purpose: Viagra). In addition to the
instability of the process of invention, the accompanying effort is characterized
by the necessity of choosing among possible solutions; or, more precisely,
“In general, when several different images are competitors, it means that none of
them entirely fulfils the conditions laid down by the scheme. And that is why, in
such a case, the scheme may have to modify itself in order to obtain development
into images.” (219–220)
The more Bergson discusses this process, which he variously calls
“competition” (221), “a struggle”, and “an interference of ideas
(representations) with one another” (222), the more obvious becomes its
significance for intellectual effort and, correspondingly, the more it draws
attention to the issue of the fundamental metaphoricalness (figurativeness or
iconicity) of our experience with the world. In II. 2. c) we saw the meaning
which, to Bergson, places figurative expression within that framework of
expressive effort that is mostly referred to as philosophical and artistic
discourse. In “Intellectual Effort” the same principle marks only intellectual
effort, which is the ontological relationship with reality.
“But, in the case of intellectual effort, the images which follow one another might
just have no real external likeness among themselves. Their resemblance may be
wholly internal; it is an identity of meaning (Fr: signification ), an equal capacity of
solving a problem towards which they occupy analogous or complementary
positions, despite their differences of concrete form.” (228–229)
* * *
This ontological relation to reality is linguistic in nature. In II. 2. c) we saw
that, on the basis of the fundamental principle of Primum vivere, an inhabitable
environment comes into being, for humans as for the other species. And that
environment is defined by elements that make up the natural affinity of
materiality among organisms. This, according to Bergson, is the origin of
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general ideas and of the articulation of the surrounding world as a whole, be it
pre-reflexive, pre-psychological, or pre-spiritual. But Primum vivere is also the
origin of articulated speech, which may be elaborated infinitely thanks to the
ability of humans to use mobile signs as well as their social mode of being. In
this way, the psychological dimension takes precedence over our initial
predisposition. We have called this type of articulated environment “Habitat”,
which is the environment or culture that one encounters, and it opens to him in
the objective and social way in which it opens to the rest of the social group. It
is of a psychological, reflexive nature. In II. 3. d) we discussed the example in
which Bergson compares the perception of a language that we don’t know to the
perception of one that we do know. In the first case, we remain passive to an
unintelligible stream of sounds that is hardly distinguishable from ordinary
noise. In the second case, a complex scheme of “motor diagrams” intercepts the
stream of sounds and articulates it into separate units. Similarly, in Bergson’s
system the language-Habitat parses all of the surrounding reality into
meaningful units. The natural principle of generalization develops into the
“language” in which reality speaks to us. This language does not exhaust reality,
just as a natural language does not exhaust the acoustical spectrum. Each case
represents only one of all possible articulations. These are, however, systems
immanent to themselves. They are closed and tend to retain their form in time.
When there is no intellectual effort, these systems “speak” the subject that
inhabits them, instead of him speaking through them. They are like verses of
poetry we can reproduce reflexively, without referring to the sense of the words.
In the case of the language/world relationship, this is a way of being that
reproduces sign systems in various communicative situations just as statistical
invariability has entered it as (a) norm(al) in the culture-encyclopaedia. Bergson
mounts an ethical argument against this mode of being, which keeps the
individual safe from the risks and efforts of taking a personal position, whether
that mode be excessive scientific specialization, learned etiquette, or a
philosophical puzzle of ready-made concepts. We have qualified this
(non)position as a lack of ontological commitment to reality. It is particularly
obvious against the background of a philosophical system like Bergson’s, where
reality is regarded as a constant reproduction of untranslatable novelties. The
ontological commitment to reality is above all a subscription to the condition
that demands an ever-new interpretative effort. It is a dialogue with the
language-Habitat in which we have something to say, although our saying is
mostly a blind feeling of something that moves and that we are aware of – blind,
for we are always submerged in the language-Habitat, and it reveals all possible
horizons to us. But still we have something to say, since we are free to move
The Phenomenology of Intellectual Effort
                101
and stir that habitat similarly to the movement we feel, which is that of an extra-
linguistic reality. In doing so we transcend the limits of language, by moving
metaphorically in the realm of sense; and the moves we make are creative,
iconically and metaphorically schematic, abductive, and unsure. These efforts
are also the means of conquering new territory (see I.8.). Language-World,
intellectual effort, ontological commitment – all these are the elements of a
questioning of the language-Habitat-Tradition on the basis of the stirring of its
own texture in an iconic similarity to some movement felt in reality. The subject
who exists in enduring time is like the swimmer who refuses to succumb to the
life-threatening currents, but instead pushes himself up with great effort in order
to see the horizon and make his way to safety. And the more his pushes displace
the water, the higher his efforts raise him.

PART TWO
LINGUISTIC WORK
AND INTERPRETATION
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I. Interpretation as Linguistic
Work: from Rossi-Landi’s
Theory towards Hermeneutics
Part One of this study was dedicated to the revaluation of Intellectual Effort, a
highly significant concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. There we
observed that the challenge and difficulty of this endeavor lay in the obvious
mismatch between this notion and most tendencies in contemporary
(post)philosophical thought. Playing the role of advocate, we tried to excavate
from under this apparent mismatch a plethora of affinities that show Bergson’s
philosophy to be highly relevant to contemporary thought, and especially to the
discourse generally known as philosophical hermeneutics. We took considerable
care not to make any pretense at “truth-finding”, and we did so by replacing
such a positivistic criterion with the requirement for interpretative plausibility,
by which we could justify the present study. 
Put another way, our aim in Part One was to argue in a plausible way for the
pertinence of certain aspects of Bergson’s thought to any language-centered,
contemporary mode of philosophy. In brief, we argued that Bergson has more to
tell us. In Part Two we shall focus on particular hermeneutic and semiotic
authors whose work can be better understood, we believe, from the point of
view of Intellectual Effort. We anticipate that the dialogue between Bergson and
these authors will further elucidate what Part One outlined as the Theory of
Intellectual Effort.
I.1. The Rossi-Landi Case
The unique philosophical and semiotic theory of Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, which
is based on the homology between material and linguistic production, has an
extremely important place in this study. The very fact that such a theory exists,
that a philosopher of such note has devoted almost all of his works to the
hypothesis that linguistic activity is also a form of labor, is itself enough to
legitimize the need to consider intellectual effort as a requirement for the
existence of speech – as far as it is a disposition toward living in a world (Welt)
and not in an environment (Umwelt). Our reading follows the axis of effort /
Interpretation as Linguistic Work
                105
labor, which should be compared to that of individual / social. In the latter case,
we find our own position to be opposed to that of Rossi-Landi. This is the
reason why “the Rossi-Landi case” has a peculiar relation to the general
tendency of Part Two. First we take advantage of the solid theoretical grounds
of his conception of language as labor. Then, however, we develop our findings
into an argument for the individualized aspect of speech activity. In so doing,
we find ourselves at odds with the fundamental ideology of the Italian
philosopher. 
I.1. a) The Starting Considerations of Rossi-Landi
Rossi-Landi’s starting point is remarkably simple and convincing. It is based on
the classical view of Hegel and Marx concerning what is “human” in a human
being. A human being is formed as such only after it has overcome the quest to
satisfy only its immediate needs. That which is human appears in the moment
when this overcoming becomes systematic, when we start producing behavior
instead of just responding. At this stage, labor enters into our existence. Labor
is the process by which we increase our potential impact on the environment,
and this potential is proportional to our rejection of immediacy. Labor is
purposefulness that is opposed to the natural disposition to act. This places us in
the unique position, as compared to other life-forms, of self-producing beings.
According to Rossi-Landi (Marx and Hegel), anything human results from the
labor of man himself (Rossi-Landi 1983: 35–37; 1975: 31–69).
The human world is an artifact produced by man. In this statement, which is
not particularly original in itself, Rossi-Landi reveals a neglected perspective
that holds huge theoretical potential. When we talk of a “world-artifact” we
usually mean the “artificially” produced, material environment of man. But
what can we say about language? Did language exist in nature before man’s
arrival? Are there articulated sounds and meanings without man? Obviously not;
and there is no other possibility than to consider language an artifact and,
consequently, a result of human labor (1983: 35). The importance of this
perspective is revealed by semiotics, that discourse of which focuses on the
priority of sign systems in the construction of the world we live in. Although
many similar attempts have been made (especially in the 1960s in France) to
combine Marxism and semiotics into a single paradigm (structuralism), no one
has concentrated on labor, as Rossi-Landi does, which is implied by all sign
systems. Rossi-Landi develops his arguments along two main lines. The first
one deals with the homology between material and linguistic production. The
second one engages the problems of ideology and alienation. 
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I. 1. b) The Homology between Physical and Linguistic Work
Rossi-Landi discusses the relation between physical and linguistic work mainly
in his essays from the 1960s (1965, 1969, 1983 [1968]: 118–152), although this
issue is implicitly present in all of his later studies. His goal is to define the field
of the linguistic world, and to apply to that field the analytical and critical
apparatus of Marxism as related to physical work. On the whole, the attempt is
quite successful, thanks largely to his “argumentative ability” (in the sense in
which we presented this term in the introduction to this study). Rossi-Landi also
reviews all of the existing studies in this area, which further strengthens the
theoretical base of his discourse. Together with the notion of labor, he identifies
in language such typically Marxist concepts as “goods”, “market”, “capital”,
“exchange value”, “user value”, “private property”, and so on. Sometimes he
has difficulty in tracing the homology to smaller details; for example, in the
complex pages devoted to the dialectics between exchange and user value in
message exchange (1983: 54–61), and in defining private property (168–169).
A close examination of these moments would lead us astray from our present
task, however, and so we shall consider only the most important ones.
As is evident from the title of the chapter, of most significance are those
moments in Rossi-Landi’s theory that refer to philosophical hermeneutics and to
interpreting the latter from the standpoint of intellectual effort. Such a moment
is not long in coming. Rossi-Landi considers the approach of Analytical
Philosophy to the functioning of language as fundamentally wrong, since it is
based on the analogy between word and tool (128–130). According to the Italian
philosopher, this analogy (and even homology) is possible only if we compare
the use of an instrument with that of a message instead of a word. “We use a
tool as a totality made up of parts which are of no interest to us; and in the same
way, we use a sentence as a totality expressing a complete thought, without
giving heed to the parts that make it up” (129).
In II. 3. d) we saw that the same distinction helps Ricoeur to define the
hermeneutic project in relation to the field of semiotics. This distinction also
enables Bergson’s interpretation of immanent systems and of intellectual effort
as the condition for their transcendence, in the name of a more relevant
(ontological) commitment to dynamic reality. Rossi-Landi’s introduction of
dialectics into the mix complements our own formulation of the problem. In his
view, the dialectical dimension of language (langage) mediates between
language-system (langue) and speech (parole), and only it can reveal the
dynamic essence of this phenomenon. Dialectics involves the linguistic system
in an activity that is far from a static instance or once-and-for-all social
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objectification, as it appears in Saussurean langue. Dialectics underlines the
process of making and of an always-new becoming. Just as hermeneutics calls
for always-renewed interpretations, in Rossi-Landi’s theory, purposeful
activities (labor) take center stage. Although he does not say so directly, it
seems that the dialectical nature of language is adduced in order to demonstrate
the unsoundness of the common view, which states that the limits of our
language are the limits of our world. Hence the need for both dialectics and
hermeneutics, in order to distinguish a purely semiotic logic of immanence: one
to account for the operation of signs within the system (or “encyclopaedia”), and
the other to determine how messages function in concrete linguistic practice. 
Before we continue, a terminological specification is needed, lest I be
blamed for misunderstanding Rossi-Landi. On many occasions (e.g., 39, 132,
152) he pays special attention to the distinction between his own concept of
linguistic activity and that of Saussurean parole. Rossi-Landi uses the term
“common speech” (parlare comune) so as not to focus on the individual
instance or user of language. To him, any reference to individual perspective
constitutes a form of “idealism”, which is the ideological antipode of his
discourse, just as the anti-hero in hermeneutics is Metaphysics. Furthermore, in
Rossi-Landi’s system, “ideology” serves the same function as that
phenomenological dictum in hermeneutics which states that, no matter how a
discourse is constructed, it is condemned always to be read against the horizon
of meaning of the particular epoch. In this sense, he is fully aware that his own
discourse is laden with “ideology”, but he avoids nihilistic implications that
refer to a future revolutionary practice that would erase the disjunction between
consciousness and activity (see 104–105). It is crucial to point out several
problems with this anti-individualistic “ideology”, for these allow us to take
advantage of the richness of the Theory of Linguistic Work in our outlining of
the Theory of Intellectual Effort.
In his essay on “Ideologies of Linguistic Relativity” (1973), Rossi-Landi
criticizes that contemporary view which identifies the limits of the world with
the limits of language. According to him, the ideology of such a view consists in
the way it attributes to language alone the capacity to exhaust all aspects of
being. The plan of his criticism is two-fold: 1) to demonstrate the independence
of thought from language and 2) to point out the alienation caused by the
ideology of linguistic relativity. For both tasks, Rossi-Landi quotes Bergson to
support his own ideas. In the first case, he refers to the theoretical work of the
French philosopher: “Bergson introduced intuition as against the intellect, and
duration as against mechanistic time, in spite of the spatio-temporal structure
and substantive-adjectival character of the French language, through the meshes
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of one of the most rigid syntaxes of Europe” (57). Bergson belongs in the
company of Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Einstein, who constructed similar
discourses, despite the resistance they met in preexisting structures of languages
(ibid.). To me, the dependence of thought on language is most easily confuted
by examples of individual use, similar to the ones we adduced in I.9. as
“founders of discursivity”. This is a fundamental point in understanding
linguistic activity as effort and labor, and it should in no way be reduced to any
form of common speech. 
Concerning alienation, Rossi-Landi again appeals to Bergson, now
emphasizing the content of his thought: “[in Bergson’s philosophy] one
denounces a disturbing lack of identification between the speaker and his
language” (73). Alienation, which spreads in tandem with the ideology of
linguistic relativity, presumes that speakers are “spoken” by language, instead of
speaking it. Rossi-Landi calls such an attitude “idealistic” and again stresses that
such a view conceals the dialectical dimension, i.e., the practice of language, the
linguistic work. Here we must take issue with his critique of Bergson. For we
have already seen in Part One that Bergson’s entire doctrine of non-
identification between language and meaning, as based on the notion of
intellectual effort, is developed in purely individualistic terms. It is the effort of
the individual to overcome the linguistic systems (and not only verbal ones) in
which he is originally situated, in order to have a more intense relationship with
the dynamic reality. 
The second crack in Rossi-Landi’s anti-individualistic edifice appears in his
examples of exchange and user value in language. As long as he takes the
everyday use of language as his example, his argument holds up. But when he
turns to Dante and Benedetto Croce as his examples, he makes rather disputable
statements. In the works of Dante, for instance, the creative and unusual use of
a word like “water” (1983: 60) is reduced to a mode of production in which the
entire value of the tool is invested in the product (even in daily uses, such as
“the water is clean” and “give me some water”, the tool “water” produces
countless similar messages). However, Rossi-Landi does not mention that,
thanks precisely to Dante’s creative effort, the word “acqua” increases in value,
so that after him the whole linguistic community acquires a potentially
improved tool for message-production. It is safe to say that Rossi-Landi would
never question Dante’s individual (subjective) contribution to the development
of the contemporary Italian language, with all the possible values that inhabit it.
But his system has no place for “individual innovations”. To Rossi-Landi,
strangely enough, the latter are identified with a private language. He argues,
however, that these “private” innovations and products are comprehensible
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precisely and only because understanding already exists among the speakers as
a group, and this in turn depends on the fact that language (langage) is the
dialectical co-presence of language (langue) and speech, both of which are
collective in nature:
“[...] the notion of a `collective’ language spoken only `individually’ that – even in
its verbal formulation, here exaggerated, but no less real, declares incomprehensible
the linguistic innovations and personal creations of individuals. Scienza borghese,
amen” (1983: 152; last sentence appears only in the Italian edition [1968: 228]).
In Part One, our analysis of the use of language, in Chapter in II.1. *) and all
of II.3, showed that the capacity for creative linguistic activity is based
completely on the individual’s belonging to a given tradition (linguistic
environment or Umwelt). Those creative linguistic acts presented as deserving
respect were likened to a drilling (following Bergson’s metaphor) into the
depths of this tradition, and bringing to the surface those elements that are
determinative for, but not obvious to, our being. Rossi-Landi gives the example
of Benedetto Croce’s definition of art in order to demonstrate (ironically) how
exchange value is created through a “known term in a series of definitions” (61),
in a process similar to the stage in market development when, before the
appearance of money, a particular good serves as the unit of measure for all
other goods. He completely ignores the aspect of effort, with which Croce opens
horizons for discursivity that are later used by a number of “linguistic workers”.
We should never forget that it is precisely thanks to brilliant minds like Croce –
and those whom Eco calls the giants on whose shoulders we stand (1979: 49;
1977: 26) – that there are always fresh ideas and new horizons to stimulate the
linguistic work of those, whom Kant refers to as “mechanical minds”9 and
“shallow-pates”10, and who, if left to themselves, would spend their time
discussing trifling matters.
It seems, however, that in Rossi-Landi’s theory the homology between
linguistic and physical work preserves the blindness of the Marxist view that
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does not consider as “labor” the effort of those who create work for the others11.
We may well ask, How does Marx himself stand in relation to the countless
Marxists that came after him? Are they not “workers” in the discursive field that
he opened? Since we cannot imagine them without him, it turns out either that
he, by his individual philosophical effort, has offered a system of values to
“open their eyes”, or that he simply exploits them! 
Influential intellectual efforts made by individuals are not limited to
philosophy and art. All social strata display examples of individual ontological
commitment to dynamic reality; these individuals serve as a source of
discursivity (linguistic work) for other members of the linguistic community.
Some of the most influential studies of media impact on public opinion long ago
adopted the so-called “two-step flow of communication model” (Lazarsfeld &
Katz 1955). The essence of this model is that the media flow of information
does not directly influence everyone who comes in contact with it. Initially, this
flow is understood and interpreted by the more active community members and
opinion leaders, who then “translate” it to the rest of the group. This translation
does not refer to the formal language in which the information is submitted, but
is rather a means of mediating between two value systems: that of the media and
the local one. Opinion leaders are those who spontaneously take on the burden
of evaluating media facts and then, in informal conversation – at work, at the
barber shop, while shopping – “discursivize” them through common language.
Opinion leaders are individuals who talk all the time. Studies indicate that
exactly this type of dialogue forms the most influential public opinion. (People
usually say that their opinions of media information, such as pre-election
propaganda, are influenced by the opinions of others.) Though implied, the
dynamics of intellectual effort is present here as well, and it constitutes a way of
overcoming the closedness of a given local system (encyclopaedia) through
personal interpretative initiative. 
I. 1. c) Alienation, Behaviorism, and Transcendence
In transferring the issue of intellectual effort to mass culture or, more precisely,
to the environment of so-called common speech, we come to the main focus of
Rossi-Landi’s theory: the problem of alienation. The following passage
epitomizes the sweeping denunciative power of this theory, which derives from
the homological model of production:
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“In this way, we lose contact with the human and historical reality that brings into
being these words and messages as these words and these messages. Then the
consequences of what we may well call the fetish character of words and messages
unfolds before us, incomprehensible to our eyes. This fetish character lies in the fact
that the production and exchange of words and messages at a certain point becomes
so regular and systematic that it seems to be something that no longer requires a
work felt to be particular and personal. Then the words and messages, which are, in
reality, the products of sign-work, take on the appearance of autonomous existence.
What is more, [this occurs with] language, together with all the verbal messages
actually articulated, and the totality of the channels through which they are
articulated, as well as the non-verbal sign system in its immediate and
institutionalized reality (commodities and Levi-Strauss’s women) – that is to say, the
system of the relationship into which, by speaking and communicating, men
(actually) enter.
If we want to get behind this mask, to reveal the fetishism of words and
messages and to begin demolishing the wall of linguistic and communicative
alienation, we must start from the general determining factors of language (verbal
and non-verbal), from the conditions that must be satisfied for man to use signs,
speak, communicate verbally or not, and be understood: we must begin, in the first
place and fundamentally, from language and communication as work. (77–78;
Rossi-Landi’s italics)
The hermeneutic dimension of the above quote stands out clearly. Alienation is
a matter of understanding. The fetishization of language and communication
makes linguistic activity almost automatic – it no longer requires a work felt to
be particular and personal – at the expense of interpretation and effort.
Rossi-Landi speaks of the loss of “contact with the human and historical reality”
that brings “the linguistic work” to “a situation where he [the speaker] does not
know what he is doing when he speaks, why he speaks as he does speak” (64;
Rossi-Landi’s italics). We have described this situation as a lack of ontological
commitment to reality, and saw that the way out of it lies precisely in
interpretative effort, which in turn is understanding. 
Rossi-Landi considers the same solution: “get behind this mask, to reveal the
fetishism”. To denounce is to explain something hidden, to reduce it to an object
that is comprehensible to consciousness. Alienation is a system of automatisms
that are passively reproduced by the one who is alienated before he has even
begun to understand. To understand, to grasp the essence of processes in which
one takes part without knowing, enables the individual to start deconstructing or
“demolishing the wall” (“lavorar di piccone aulla muraglia”; It. ed.: 104) – the
wall being the sign systems that determine one’s being.
At this moment Rossi-Landi’s program converges with our recognition of
language and communication as labor. From our hermeneutic perspective, this
function belongs to the recognition of intellectual effort, and the need for an
always-new interpretation for every new situation as a condition for ontological
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commitment to the dynamic reality. However, a fundamental difference exists
between Rossi-Landi’s view and our own. In the theory of intellectual effort, the
future is characterized by the idea of a fundamental Otherness, which allows for
unpredictable interpretations “on the spot”. For Rossi-Landi, in contrast, the
utopian dimension of the future is the leading one. As already mentioned, he
does not deny the “ideologicalness” of his own discourse. Nevertheless, it aids
the good cause of achieving a future in which the very conditions for ideological
discourse will not exist. The future social modification involves “the entire
reality that makes all discourses ideological” (105). 
But who is Rossi-Landi addressing? And what can bring about this change?
Obviously, his addressee is the community of “linguistic workers” who are
subjected to alienation. But such an ideology-free utopia is doomed to failure,
and the reason why is purely hermeneutical: most of the people potentially
concerned with this theory are unable to understand it. Rossi-Landi’s appeals to
reconsider linguistic activities and communication as a form of labor are made
from high atop a philosophical platform that only professional philosophers can
reach. In order to define the problem comprehensively, Rossi-Landi uses all the
resources of his erudition. But his language is absolutely opaque to the average
consumer of media products, the one who should be directly involved. The
average consumer can hardly bear 30 minutes of news when nothing sensational
has happened. How can he be expected to grasp complex theoretical
abstractions of ever-elusive social structure? This question is not rhetorical, for
the author of this study has lived for some time within a far broader utopian
project that was tested in a score of countries. The utopia of
“Marxism-Leninism” failed mainly because of the inability of those responsible
for its implementation to understand the philosophy on which it was based,
although much more comprehensive issues than linguistic work were involved.
Disregard for the hermeneutic view, that social development demands an
always-new interpretative effort from individuals, strikes the death-blow to any
lasting revolutionary plan that relies on the masses for its success. 
The behaviorist basis of Rossi-Landi’s semiotics erects an insurmountable
wall between the theory of linguistic work and the hermeneutic view, regardless
of their obvious affinity. Rossi-Landi starts as a researcher and proponent of
Charles Morris and never loses contact with the behaviorist semiotics of the
American scholar (1953, 1955, 1961, 1992: 17–82). An ideology of behaviorism
can be traced throughout the course of modern semiotics, mostly in the powerful
school founded by Peirce (in the next chapter we shall examine possible
alternative interpretations of Pierce). This ideology involves the requirement for
methodological “purity”, and both in experimental psychology, which is its
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original field, and semiotics, behaviorism shifts our gaze away from the
so-called “black box”, a metaphor for the internal subjectivity of the individual
(The Spirit as a Behavior is the title of one of his books). Behaviorism, not by
chance called Stimulus-Response (S-R) Psychology, is interested in observable
processes that exhibit statistical constancy.
In II. 3. ß) we saw that, from the perspective of intellectual effort as a
hermeneutic approach, the interesting part starts at the moment when S-R logic
is disrupted and a founding hesitation challenges the individual to interpret and
to understand. This seems to be what Rossi-Landi means in his long quotation,
and yet his behaviorist concept of linguistic activity holds the constant potential
for contradiction. 
Such a potential contradiction is easily seen in the work of another
contemporary revolutionary thinker, Herbert Marcuse, whose Marxist criticism
is as ardent as that of Rossi-Landi. In his book, One-Dimensional Man (1997
[1964]), Marcuse writes some very powerful lines on the possibility of
revolutionary thought in the contemporary situation. Just like Rossi-Landi, the
German philosopher sees the revolutionary act as the only way out of the
oppressive system of capitalism, but his remarkable way of understanding the
situation only confirms the impossibility of revolution (a fact that is more and
more convincingly argued by history itself). He studies all the fundamental
factors of society, such as the industrial system and the resulting consumer
culture, the political system and the closing of discursiveness, the
one-dimensionality of positivist philosophy and the desublimation of art.
Marcuse shows how the iron fist of technological regulation takes possession of
all these, imposing a mass behaviorism that is antithetical to “habits of thought”
(1997: 34–35). This system produces the one-dimensional man, who is
constantly reduced to the logic of stimulus and response, and whose excessive
consumption leaves him no time for mental “escapes” from the system. This is
the “capitulation of thought” (10). Marcuse maintains a constantly
individualistic dimension in his criticism, and keeps an eye on the relevance of
his own discourse:
“Similarly, intellectual freedom would mean the restoration of individual thought,
which today is engulfed by mass communication and indoctrination, [and] by the
destruction caused by `public opinion’ and its creators. The unrealistic sound of
these statements is indicative not of their utopian nature but of the might of those
powers that obstruct their implementation.” (1997: 21; my italics)
Marcuse uses the term “transcendence” (77, 98, 294) to designate the thought-
liberating act that overcomes the behaviorist attitude. His use of that term is well
summarized by the editor of the Bulgarian translation of One-Dimensional Man:
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“Marcuse psychologizes the Kantian term with regard to the new tasks of reason in
the world of technological rationality: here transcendence is the individual protest
against unification and depersonalization, against the limitation of the spiritual world
of the modern man” (323).
Marcuse’s “transcendence” closely corresponds to the notion of intellectual
effort, and with this common denominator between him and Bergson we
temporarily end our exploration into Marxist-oriented social criticism. We
return to this issue again in the conclusion to this study, when I discuss the
decline of effort in consumer society. There I shall counter the Marxist view of
mass society with the one proposed by the Spanish philosopher, Ortega y
Gasset.
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II. The Semiotic Relevance of
Intellectual Effort
In this chapter we shall try to integrate the theory of intellectual effort with
semiotic discourse. Part One offered some preparatory attempts in this respect,
by pointing out certain convergences of thought between Bergson and Saussure.
I continue here by drawing even stronger parallels between Bergson and Peirce.
To establish the relevance of the theory of intellectual effort to semiotic
discourse, my argument unfolds in two stages. First I analyze the affinities
between contemporaries of Bergson, such as Peirce and Saussure, who occupy
various positions against the epistemological backdrop of the epoch. Using
information from that analysis I then draw parallels between fundamental
concepts in modern semiotic discourse and our interpretation of Bergson’s
theory. If we take Peirce and Saussure to be the founders of interpretative and
structural semiotics, respectively, then I attempt to advance here a semiotics of
intellectual effort. Though more limited in scope than the other two, our own
semiotics argues for the constitutive role of indeterminacy and creativity in sign
processes.
II.1. Peirce and Bergson
As mentioned in our methodological introduction, the identification and
investigation of similarities between apparently dissimilar thinkers is one of the
few underexplored areas remaining to current philosophical inquiry. In this
sense, our comparison of Peirce and Bergson is particularly emblematic, and the
so-called incompatibility of those two thinkers is reinforced by the Frenchman’s
total disregard of the work of his American colleague, as well as by Peirce’s
hostility towards Bergson, as we saw in the letter quoted above (Part One: I.3).
This seeming incompatibility is further evidenced by the extremely short list of
publications that deal with the relationship between the two philosophers:
Gunter’s detailed bibliographical monograph (1986), includes 6000 titles, yet
only four articles mention the names of both philosophers, and none are
dedicated entirely to exploring the parallels between the two thinkers. In this
respect, the most significant work we have found is a monograph on pragmatism
written by a Bulgarian philosopher and student of Bergson at the Collège de
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France, Ivan Saraïlieff (1938). In turn, Bergson’s semiotics is outlined only in
general terms by Ronchi, in his monograph Bergson: Philosopher of
Interpretation, which has nevertheless proved invaluable for our study. I was
also extremely fortunate to attend a presentation of Prof. Kalaga, which was
dedicated to the same topic. In sum, within what Kuhn would call the “scientific
community”, Bergson and Peirce have remained strangers to each other. I join
the few who have tried to reveal the affinities between them, which are
generally present between great philosophers of all times. 
II.1. a) “Bergsonism” vs. “Peircism”
We begin with the general conditions on which the presumed differences
between the two philosophers are based. These conditions would indeed
discourage anyone who limits himself to what is generally known about the two
philosophers. This is the kind of superficial knowledge of Bergson that in Part
One we described with Merleau-Ponty’s term “Bergsonism”. The latter,
combined with similar banalization of Peirce (“Peircism”) leaves us with two,
mutually exclusive philosophical discourses.
Peirce is most famous for his anti-Cartesian polemic, which later grows into
his comprehensive doctrine of signs. A key notion of his polemic is that of
intuition. According to Peirce, no intuition is capable of immediately bringing
things to consciousness. Things are always mediated by signs and always
involved in semiosis, which reveals what we know about them in an
interpretative way. We can never be sure that we have arrived at the thing itself.
Bergson is of course famous for his own concept of intuition. His philosophical
method, known as intuitionism, refers to the “the sympathy by which one is
transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is
unique and consequently inexpressible in it” (IM: 161). Peirce is renowned for
his view that thinking is purely a sign process. The father of semiotics often
states that “man can think only by means of words or other external symbols”
(EP: 54). It seems that Bergson’s method is based on exactly the opposite view:
“Metaphysics is therefore the science which claims to dispense with the
symbols” (IM: 162). 
Another obstacle in finding similarities between the two thinkers lies in their
respective attitudes toward philosophical language. Peirce favors specialized
terminology and devotes his essay “The Ethics of Terminology” (CP 2.219–26)
to this problem. Bergson, as we saw in Part One: II. 2. b) takes the opposite
view: a true philosopher can state even the most complicated idea in everyday
language. Peirce’s strongly negative attitude towards Bergson is due precisely
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to what he views as the Frenchman’s sloppy usage of terms: 
“[...] that philosophy is either a science or is balderdash, and that a man who seeks
to further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of his science
without anxious care to use them with strict accuracy, it is not very grateful to my
feelings to be classed along with a Bergson who seems to be doing his prettiest to
muddle all distinctions” (in Gunter 1986: 101; my italics). 
Their conflicting ethics of philosophical discourse have an obvious effect on
the reception history of the two philosophers. Peirce was hard to read, his
lectures were scantily attended, and his standing in the institutions to which he
belonged was usually tenuous at best. In contrast, Bergson enjoyed crowded
auditoriums and world-wide readership, and during his lifetime attained the
highest possible honors, including membership in the French Academy and the
Nobel Prize for Literature (see Part One: Chapter I.2.).
II. 1. b) Peirce the “Universe” 
In the course of time – that sure arbiter of all philosophical doctrines – their
fortunes are reversed. The more Bergson is forgotten and ignored, the more
popular Pierce becomes, and thanks to him semiotics continues to live and
develop even after the decline of structuralism. 
The rediscovery of Peirce brings to semiotic discourse the dimension of
interpretability. This dimension is not limited to speculations concerning the
interpretative nature of semiosis, but represents a general approach to semiotic
theory. The form and content of Peirce’s immense and diverse body of work
does not lend itself to systematization as one particular semiotics. It is enough to
attend a single semiotic congress in order to learn of the theoretical richness and
variety not only in the American pragmatist’s major works, but even in his
letters and fragments that are scattered among the tens of thousands of pages he
left behind. This situation calls to mind a remark we quoted in Part One: I.4.,
which Eco makes in reference to the manifold possibilities for interpreting
Peirce: “But it is known, one can make Peirce say everything, depending on
which side one turns him” (Eco 1997: 394 n28). For that reason, Peirce’s work
constitutes a “universe”, an open system of interpretations that is constrained
only by the authority of those who reside in it, rather than by the “interpretive”
resistance of the texts of this “founder of discoursivity”. This is the proper
background against which an analogy with Bergson can be elaborated. This
analogy has its place in the “universe” of Peirce as well, although it is situated
in its scantily inhabited outskirts, which most semioticians avoid.
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II. 1. c) The General Course of Thought
Though difficult to find, a common denominator links all the philosophical
works of Peirce. It is his desire to outline “the general course of thought” (CP
4.530), with all its epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical
implications. The thought process, which for Peirce follows the scientific
method, transforms phenomenological experience with reality into knowledge.
The general course of thought brings about an increase of objective and valid
knowledge, which, though confirmed through experimentation, is always
fallible and open to new interpretations. Each relatively stable position in the
course of thought serves as a starting point for new cognitive-experimental
contacts with the realities constructed by immediate and dynamic objects, which
realities, however, never reveal themselves entirely. Peirce’s thoroughgoing
modernity is revealed in the way he focuses on how reality looks and appears,
rather than trying to postulate the actual state of things. Pragmatic semiotics sets
out to explain the appearances of reality, and the doctrine of signs enables this
inquiry. 
Unfortunately, too much attention has been paid to Peirce’s comprehensive
classifications of signs and their interactions, at the expense of the role of living
thought, which is the very engine of sign processes. It is not my intent to
devalue his doctrine of signs, but rather to conceptualize the general course of
thought, in its constitutive sign-ness, from the point of view of intellectual
effort. This brings us to our Bergsonian reading of Peirce. In Matter and
Memory Bergson traces the course of thought in a way that is amazingly similar
to Peirce’s, though without sign processes as a background. To borrow a
metaphor from information science: both philosophers deal with the same
phenomenon, but Peirce describes it discretely, while Bergson describes it
analogously. This comparison is suitable, however, only if we recognize that
living thought holds some importance for Peirce, and that his entire doctrine is
not reducible to the general statement that “man is a sign”. 
Bergson speaks of the interpretive nature of the course of knowledge, but
instead of representing it as a chain of sign transformations, he concentrates on
the interaction of memory and perception. Bergson does not accidentally ignore
the central mediating role of signs. To him, however, signs are merely points
along the way, which help us to reproduce a thought while thinking of it. Thus,
he warns: “[...] analyzing this endless series of transformations and yielding to
more than one irresistible need for symbolic representation, scientific thought
interrupts the major stages of this evolution and makes them freeze into ultimate
forms” (MM: 135). This warning reveals the ultimate tragedy of Peirce’s theory
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of signs: he never manages to trace precisely the course of thought, despite his
brilliant typologies of signs. Still, his attempts to do so have laid the firm
foundations of a semiotic discourse, thanks to the scientific rigor of his methods.
Although devoted more than any other thinker to the “psychological realism” of
the thought process, Bergson, in turn, remains misunderstood and without
faithful followers. That is why, inspired by Bergson’s warning, I now offer
some clarifications of Peirce’s concept of signs.
II. 1. d) The Omnipresence of the Icon
There is a widely held view that sees iconism as both the most important and the
most obscure part of Peirce’s theory of signs. I share this view, and further think
that the icon, which appears on all levels of semiosis, incorporates the
preconditions for revealing the significance of living thought to the cognitive
process. Bonfantini, from whom the title of this chapter is borrowed, outlines
the problem as follows: 
“All meanings are essentially – by nature, so to speak – icons. Of course, all signs
participate both in symbolism and indexicality. But these functions do not refer to
the signifying quality of the sign: the symbol establishes a conventional relationship
between the representamen and the immediate object, and, correspondingly, seeks to
keep the frame of this object within the socially imposed standards; the index
transfers the meaning to the referent. However, the signifying content – the
immediate object – does not change its nature for this purpose. It remains forever an
idea, an image, a more or less structured icon.” (Bonfantini 1980: XXXVII) 
Peirce, as we have mentioned, is interested in the conditions for the growth
of objective knowledge, the model of which is the scientific method. This
growth can be achieved only within the logic of iconicity (ibid.). When
outlining intellectual effort within the framework of linguistic (sign) practice,
we employed a metaphor used by Bergson, in which the central element was the
conquest of new territories (Part One: I.8.). Peirce’s agenda fits perfectly into
this model (see, especially, his essay “The Law of Mind”, CP 6.102–163); and
in Peirce, the iconic nature of sign innovation plays the same role of establishing
the ontological relationship to reality as intellectual effort (and, consequently,
intuition) does in Bergson. Although an icon is seemingly a sign, and
intellectual effort a mode of thinking and being, both participate in the same
dialectic. In his essay on intellectual effort Bergson introduces the notion of
Dynamic Scheme, which is a synonym for icon. And yet, the dynamic scheme
is as much a sign as it is an act (see Part One: II. 3. ,).
It is a thought in action that has all the potential for resulting in the synthesis
of something new. To Peirce, this ambivalent cognitive act rides a
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merry-go-round of synonymous terms – icon, abduction, hypothesis,
interpretation (XXVII) – and no interpreter can decide which is which in the
absence of the rest. What strikes us is that two of these terms – abduction and
interpretation – are not mere substantives but processes of thought. In this way,
the merry-go-round of synonymous terms represents, much better than the
dynamic scheme does, the fundamental existential moment in which sign and
act are mutually constitutive yet not reducible to the same thing. Peirce seems to
ignore this obvious irreducibility; or at the least, he stimulates readers who
might be biased in this respect to do so, though he himself is not quite so
categorical about it. In what is perhaps his most famous text, “Some
Consequences of Four Incapacities” (CP 5.264–317), Peirce reduces his entire
argument to the following two mottoes:
“[...] the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every
thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought,
proves that man is a sign. [...] Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the
man is the thought”. (CP 5.314)
Despite the fact that on the same page he says he would not fatigue “the reader
by stretching this parallelism too far”, and that between man and thought “There
is a distinction doubtless”, with this text Peirce clears the semiotic terrain of
embarrassing problems related to the “black box” of Mind. Eco’s reading of
Peirce, by which he lays the foundations of his own interpretative semiotics, is
based exactly on these inferences. A major outcome of a reading like Eco’s is
that creative acts come to be viewed as unusual or superfluous. To the dominant,
scientific version of semiotics they appear as mere ornaments to rigorous sign
theories based on statistical invariance. 
In my view, however, creativity and indeterminacy are constitutive of the
sign functioning of thought, and this is true not only in sublime moments, but on
every level of thinking. More precisely, from the point of view of intellectual
effort, great theoretical importance attaches to linguistic practices that are
irreducible to a logic of behavioral response. And this is where the identification
of sign with the action of living thought has brought the most distinguished
interpreters of Peirce, with Morris and Eco among them. The statistical
constancy of interaction with the sign, which results in habit-formation, would
relieve thought of its commitment to reality and put the personality on
“automatic pilot”, as it were. This mental state is the rejection of ontological
commitment and of openness to the fundamental Otherness of reality, of
creativity, and of abduction. 
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II. 1. e) Abduction and Intuition
Peirce explains the complexities of iconicity mainly in terms of the sign. This
bias permits a metaphysics-free semiotics, but it overlooks the role of living
thought, i.e., the act that co-constructs the iconic experience of reality. We are
led to this statement from a comparison of Peirce’s sign model to the analogous
one in Bergson. In Part One of this study considerable efforts were made to
restore the sign dimension of Bergsonian thought, a dimension which
conventional readings ignore completely. It is now time to take the “offensive”
and start fleshing out implications that the theory of intellectual effort holds for
some classical semiotic achievements. 
We have already said that “intuition” is a key notion on which the assumed
incompatibility between Peirce and Bergson is based. A close look at iconicity,
however, shows the error of such a view. To explain Bergson’s concept of
intuition in Peircean terms: the Frenchman’s negative critique of language and
signs is directed against the reduction of thought to the logic of the symbol.
Bergson contrasts symbolic thinking with iconic thinking and, thus, with
memory. Based on enduring consciousness, memory is comprised of images,
i.e., icons. Iconic memory participates in perception and reasoning (the process
by which memory enables perception) by the mediation of the dynamic scheme,
which is an icon as well. Bergson’s famous “immediate data of consciousness”
are in fact iconic data of consciousness, which reflect the latter’s duration and
pure temporality. For Bergson, without memory there can be no perception, in
the sense of a projection of a hypothetical meaning which facts either reject or
confirm. Bergsonian intuition is not that of Descartes, no matter how surprising
this might seem (the most serious attempt to rehabilitate Bergsonian intuition is
that of Husson 1947). Bergson’s entire Introduction to Metaphysics is devoted
to the opposition between two modes of thinking: intuition and analysis. In
Peirce, intuition plays the role of abduction, and analysis is equated with
deduction. Fundamental intuitions lay the foundations of great scientific
discoveries and important philosophical theories, whereas analysis – which
Bergson calls “logical perfecting” (IM 192) and which is reducible to the
unproblematic use of language – locks consciousness into a system of pre-given
conditions. To Peirce, on the other hand, great scientific discoveries are based
on abductions (Kepler being their emblem). Abduction is “the only kind of
argument which starts a new idea”, and deduction is “the only kind of argument
which is compulsive” (CP: 2.96). In Bergsonian terms, abduction is of the order
of authentic intellectual effort, whereas deduction is more open to verbal
speculation. Peirce is no stranger to the concept of intellectual effort, and he
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even uses that term to describe iconic sign transformations from perception to
interpretation (CP 2.141). Moreover, the essay in which he promotes the
advantages of the scientific method over other cognitive practices, “The
Fixation of Belief” (CP 5.358–87), is a brilliant denouncement of the tricks that
consciousness uses to avoid the ever-new efforts demanded by reality in its
capacity as a dynamic object. Finally, for both Peirce and Bergson the common
element in the authentic cognitive act is that of creative, innovative effort.
Bergson, who is interested in philosophical discourse, calls this act intuition.
Peirce, concerned with scientific discourse, considers abduction the only way to
improve knowledge. 
II. 1. f) Semiosis and Duration 
The more we develop our comparison between the philosophy of intellectual
effort and cognitive semiotics, the more pressing it becomes to ask whether
semiosis is the same with Mind as it is without. I consider this distinction to be
much more radical than a pansemiotic view would admit. Before we discuss
Peirce’s most explicit attempt “to clear the sign of its mental associations”
(5.492), we shall introduce this issue through the problems, though later his
discoveries might reveal some insufficiency and require revision. Like Maine de
Biran in his Mémoires sur l’habitude, in Matière et mémoire Bergson, according
to the happy simile of Gouhier, becomes the Christopher Columbus of the
temporal dimension. I have tried to interpret the entire sign problem within this
dimension (Part One: II. 3. ,), and when Peirce engages with temporality, he
offers a highly relevant version of his fundamental trichotomy. As we know, the
latter refers to the logical stages of any experience: Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness. We shall not present a full description of these stages, which with all
their variations and theoretical refinements occupy a considerable part of
“Peirce the Universe”; they are introduced in 1867 in the essay, “On a New List
of Categories” (CP 1.545–59) and are discussed in almost all of his later works.
For our purposes, we need only concentrate on his hierarchy of present, past,
and future.
The doctrine of the three categories is the major theory that Peirce opposes
to intuitionism and idealism. Through these categories he determines the
fundamental sign qualities and actions of any possible cognitive interaction with
reality, as well as the derivative phenomenological aspects for the subjects of
knowledge. The three categories have epistemological valence, and, combined
with the resulting classifications of signs, they constitute a static model that
excludes from semiosis the role of living thought. The projection of the three
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categories in time, however, leads Peirce to inferences that are quite similar to
Bergson’s concept of duration as constitutive of consciousness. 
According to Peirce, Firstness is given in the pure present, “being such as it
is while utterly ignoring everything else, is positively such as it is” (5.44;
Peirce’s italics). Secondness is projected into the past, as “the previous being
determinate and fixed for the subsequent” (8.330). This is also the case with
response (ibid.), which does not participate in the drama of chance and
unpredictability. Only Thirdness can attach meaning to the former two
categories, for it completes the logical cycle of any experience, here as
perceived from the perspective of time. Thirdness introduces the future. Even
more, it introduces consciousness into experience and into the course of things
in general, since, on the one hand, “the subsequent [is] indeterminate for the
previous” (ibid.), and on the other, this indeterminacy can refer only to ideas, for
it is obvious that the world of objects follows laws that are independent of
thought. Thus, Thirdness, or the world of ideas, is an inseparable part of the
logical cycle that provides the conditions for any experience. In our analysis of
Bergson’s theory of intellectual effort (II. 3. $). we called this moment of
Thirdness the “debut of spirit” (Ronchi’s expression). For Bergson, this debut
comes with the appearance of a hesitation that takes consciousness away from
the logic of habitual response, and imports memory – as far as it bears the past
– into a projection that constitutes the present as a potentially mediated act or,
simply, as understanding. The present is endowed with the “thickness” of
duration. On Peirce’s view, Thirdness, as the future dimension, constitutes the
sign function in general. For him, “Thirdness is the triadic relation existing
between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered
as constituting the mode of being as a sign” (8.332). Although here Peirce
equates the act of interpretation with its result, i.e., with some kind of sign, on
the immediately preceding page he says the following: “If you take any ordinary
triadic relation, you will always find a mental element in it” (8.331: Peirce’s
italics). For Peirce, experience, as the perception of objects, acquires thickness
of duration to the mind only if it is involved in semiosis, i.e., only if there is an
instance that removes things from their involvement in Secondness and
introduces them into reasoning, into a theory, a World – which is precisely the
aim of intellectual effort. It is crucial for our reading of Peirce, to understand
that this instance of removal is constitutive of the triadic process of semiosis, in
contrast to those readings which regard the semiotic triad as constitutive of the
instance in question. It is crucial for our reading of Peirce, to understand that
this instance of removal is constitutive of the triadic process of semiosis, in
contrast to those readings which regard the semiotic triad as constitutive of the
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instance in question. This last attitude seems as misplaced as the view that
language “speaking” the mind instead of mind speaking the language.
II. 1. g) The Role of Mind
Thus, Mind comes to be the interpretive key to our reading of Peirce, for it
drives any semiotics to metaphysics, and any psychology to rummaging in the
“black box”. That is why any self-respecting, scientific semiotics excludes the
mind from its field of interest. Semiotics either disregards a particular discursive
practice, and satisfies itself with only a theory of the formal conditions by which
meaning would obtain, or it leans toward socially regulated interpretation and
behaviorism. The latter, recently become sophisticated through cognitive
research, equates the spirit with objectified and observable behavior – the sign.
A typical Peircean contradiction is based on this situation.
One of Peirce’s most constant claims is that mind has no power over the
world of objects; the cognitive process is merely a form of guessing or
hypothesis, not the creation of reality. Our cognitive will cannot create anything
that is not already present in the dynamic object. It can only discover and
objectify, theoretically and experimentally, that which is already there. This
view, which even a Bergsonist would hardly question, results in at least two
methodological maneuvers. Peirce’s first and most comprehensive way of
disregarding the role of mind is to identify thought with sign, as noted above. In
that way, he arrives at the essence of the cognitive process by accounting for it
in stages, i.e., the moment to moment results of thought. Yet to decompose
thought into the signs through which it passes in order to objectify it, is the same
as analyzing the motion of a body by reference to the points along its trajectory.
It is known that this approach results in paradoxes (an arrow that could not fly,
a turtle that could outrun Achilles, and so on). The other way to downplay the
role of mind is simply to reject it, as Peirce does most forcefully in his essay “A
Survey of Pragmatism” (CP 5.464–5.494). 
In our view, neither of these two maneuvers is necessary. For Peirce’s major
cognitive and epistemological point is in fact totally compatible with the
centrality of mind to semiosis. Thirdness, as authentic sign-ness, belongs to the
order of ideas and happens only inside the instance of the human mind. Most of
Peirce’s works allow for such an interpretation.
Peirce decides “to clear the sign of its mental associations” (5.492) when
discussing habit (or, the utter logical interpretant; see Eco 1979: 42–44), which
is a prime concern of all semioticians. (Bonafantini, for one, argues that this
move is totally unsound; 1980: 307–308 n18.) Peirce draws an analogy between
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habits in nature and habits of consciousness. He postulates that the unconscious
side of habits of consciousness follows the model of the unconsciousness of the
habits of plants, and even of the bed a mountain stream digs in making its
course. Thus, the objective idealism of Peirce relates to the theory of signs, in
that, through the principle of habit, he considers matter and mind as one and the
same thing – ‘if a habit be a primary property of mind, it must be equally so of
matter, as a kind of mind’ (EP 350). In Part One: II. 3. c) we saw that Bergson
introduces his theory of general ideas through similar reasoning, and a common
spiritualist background is observable for both philosophers. If, however,
Bergson’s prerequisite for all interactions of interest is the idea that matter is
neutralized consciousness, then the idea of matter being “effete mind” brings
Peirce to the reverse conclusion. 
It seems to me, though, that it is precisely the mind that produces habits.
Habits follow closely the logic of stimulus and response. The mind, as we know,
seeks steady states, which are nothing but habits or utterly logical interpretants
in the sphere of knowledge. When mental habits suffer a crisis, that is, when the
dynamic object is revealed in new aspects, then hesitation and uncertainty
disrupt the logic of stimulus and response (or, the logic of identification, as
discussed in Part One: II. 3. c). It is of no importance whether the word concerns
the orbits of planets or smoke in the kitchen. Habit fails, and we are forced into
new research, i.e., hypothesis, abduction, intellectual effort, Thirdness and so
forth. All these intellectual activities go to forming a new habit that provides
stability and orientation. Although they exist in the logic of habit, the plant and
the stream are unable to strive consciously for a new habit. The mind follows
the process of habit-research-habit', or, secondness-thirdness-secondness'. The
plant and the stream, however, follow the dyadic pattern of
habit-response-habit'. If, however, we compare the outcomes of these two types
of processes, as Peirce often does, there is no difference between these two
situations; there is no such process as habit-habit'. A man resembles a tree or an
animal when he responds through habits, but if his system of habits fails, then
he must again become a man for a while, in order to produce a new set of habits
that return him to the state of a tree or an animal! 
Eco is guided by a similar conviction in his attempts to build a cognitive
model of the world (Eco 1997: 24–30). He admits that such a model cannot be
presented without reference to a descriptive instance, that is, to mind (26). Yet
he claims that the latter need not be a human mind. To him, the world is capable
of self-interpretation “through animal or, eventually, plant organisms, or even
(and why not?) through minerals, in their silica epiphany in computers” (ibid.).
But is it appropriate to speak of interpretative processes in animals, plants, and
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computers? In order to simplify his model and to rid it of metaphysical
implications, Eco reduces the process of interpretation to “a mind which, facing
a set of 10 small lamps, would like to explain all possible combinations between
them” (ibid). 
Here we must make an extremely important distinction between
interpretation and identification. Is not interpretation everything that is not
identification? Do we not have to interpret something when we fail to identify
it automatically? If I hear a word, I will first identify it logically, on the basis of
its difference from all other words within the system, and only then (in logical,
not chronological terms) will I understand it in context or interpret it. What
interpretive abilities can a computer have, whose function is to identify digits
reduced to “0 or 1"? When I shake hands with 50 or 60 people one after the
other, one might say that we communicate and that the corresponding processes
of semiosis and interpretation are involved in our interaction. But in fact,
handshaking is a subconscious response within a preexisting social convention.
I do not interpret, but subconsciously identify the normality of the behavioral
model which I am programmed to follow. If someone gives me something other
than his hand to shake, the model will fail, identification will cease, and I shall
have to start interpreting the new gesture. At that moment I stop being a tree or
a robot, and the intellectual processes of abduction, effort, and interpretation
come into play. If, as a consequence of interpretation and investigation, I find
out that people now shake feet instead of hands, the repetition of this new
gesture will eventually form a new habit in me, and I will again shift to the
automatic identification mode that fits such cases. 
In II.3.c) of Part One we saw that the entire linguistic issue can be regarded
from this standpoint. We also saw that language as a system (Saussure’s langue)
operates on a reflexive, dyadic level of identification. This is the only level on
which we have an accomplished objectivity, a place where the shadow of
interpretation does not obscure the signs. Interpretation comes when, on the
basis of established signs, we produce speech that refers to new states of the
world. The identification of a cliché is of the same order as the identification of
a word, whereas to interpret is to accomplish something new. In order to start
interpreting, we must be situated in a linguistic environment, or Umwelt. But, as
we have said, only a hesitation in reproducing the established articulation of an
environment, only an interpretative distance from the automatic logic of
identification – in a word, only intellectual effort takes man out of Umwelt and
gives him access to Welt.
Paradoxically, the scientific objectivity of which Peirce dreams was more
nearly attained by Saussure, though he never set out to do that. Only when the
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sign / theory has acquired the status of a Saussurean sign, a part of langue, can
we say that objectivity is achieved. To make scholars recognize a theory is
merely an initial stage of objectivity. Full objectivity occurs when the sign /
theory becomes part of the vocabulary, a pure reflex that automatically furthers
the investigation of the dynamic object. Such objectivity was achieved, for
example, at a certain stage in the development of science, by the sign / theory of
the atom. Used by all scientists, this theory passed entirely into the logic of
identification, i.e., of langue. It was not until the splitting of the atom took place
that changes occurred in this habit of usage and an element of hypothesis and
interpretability crept into the scientific community’s subsequent uses of the sign
/ theory of the “atom”. Only the human mind can deal with a sign system that is
not completely determined by units of identification (habits, reflexes) but that
demands the constitutive interpretability of Thirdness in order to represent the
sense of those units as well. The world can be portrayed and responded to, and
it can even be digitally mimicked in the habits of animals, plants, and
computers, but only the human mind can interpret it.
II.2. Lazy Machines and a New Triangle
To conceptualize a semiotics of intellectual effort, we need a semiotic triad that
includes the role of living thought more explicitly than Peirce’s does. For this
purpose, it is appropriate to recall Eco’s metaphor of a work of art. He calls a
work of art a lazy machine, which needs a reader to make it produce meaning.
We could say that the world as a whole is a lazy machine of the same kind, and
we could hardly imagine it if we were to ignore the linguistic work of the
community of its interpreters (the human race). Rorty sums up this situation
concisely: “The world does not speak, only we do [...] Only other human beings
can do that” (Rorty 1989: 6). 
Western culture has the perennial tendency to try to settle the matter of the
speaking of being, which is the World itself. There has always existed an
interpretation that purports to be the final one and that at last gives people the
interpretive peace they yearn for. Of course, certain positivists still argue that
what we call “world” does not depend on speaking. But even some views that
grant speaking the central role it deserves leave creative intellectual effort out of
consideration. Even if we agree that being is that which is said in various ways,
we often still defer to the community as being ultimately responsible for a
certain state of affairs. The sign thus acquires its most important function as an
inter-subjective mediator between people and things. Eco calls this situation
“contractual realism” (1997: XII). 
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A semiotics of intellectual effort would emphasize the inseparability of the
sign from the instances of speaking that use it in an interpretive way. Such a
semiotics would not reduce the world to a set of signs and rules that are
statistically confirmed to the point of requiring no interpretation. Rather, a
semiotics of intellectual effort takes culture as an established, already articulated
environment, which is the condition for possible realization of the interpretative
nature of being. The constitutive principle here is that of indeterminacy, which
every mind should “bear” as an a priori form of hypotheticalness that
transforms the environment (Umwelt) into a World (Welt). The chief actor in
this semiotic triad is the individual mind, and only it can initiate
communication. No collective instance can initiate communication or renew
discourse. It is hard to imagine a community that would spontaneously and
unanimously produce reasoning or a creative act for which no one person could
take individual responsibility. Even in a crowd that rushes in the same direction,
it is still possible to distinguish individual initiatives. The group (community)
performs a purely sanctioning function. And the latter is unthinkable without the
subject of this sanction, which is individual signifying activity. If there is no
creative individuality, then there is no need of a sanctioning community. The
minds that reproduce what is already acknowledged go unnoticed and are not
subjected to sanctions. The disciplined scientific mind, so favored by Peirce,
does not need the sanction of the scientific community, precisely because it
embarks on the adventures of abduction, hypothesis, and creativity. If we take
reality to be a pragmatic consensus that is culturally based on what the
community has contractually agreed upon, then we cannot deny that the
relationship between social sanction and the dynamic object depends on
individual research initiatives and on the activities of mind. Without such
initiatives, there would be nothing to sanction. Mind itself has no power over the
object. Mind can guess at and reveal the object, but it cannot exercise its will on
it. The mind is also dependent on the scientific community by virtue of the fact
that, in order to guess the secrets of the object, it needs a linguistic environment,
a science, a starting place that is a socially-accepted convention, which will help
it not only to see the object, but also to place itself within a world of which the
inquiry itself is a part. Thus, in the following triangle the dynamic reality is
given to the mind as an immediate reality, as a function of community: 
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Like Peirce's, the semiotic triangle above is based on the interdependency of
its elements. Neither mind, nor community, nor the dynamic reality make any
sense when considered separately. If we disregard the role of mind in this
process, then we are left with the model of a mechanical reality that is set in
motion by regular and ever-identical principles that are reflected in a closed
system of habits which enables its inhabitants to respond in an established
manner. This would almost correspond to a perfectly complete encyclopaedia of
the behaviorist type. But as soon as we define the encyclopaedia as a process of
never-ending interpretation, and not as an established totality, we automatically
bring the minds that inhabit it into play, for they are the only ones capable of
self-improvement and innovation. In that case, the world we live in starts to
appear as a dynamic dialogue that operates by means of the continuously
interpretative, abductive, and creative actions on all levels of the social life of
the minds that comprise it. Intellectual effort is the engine that powers the lazy
machine and turns it into a World. To embrace this model of triadic semiosis
allows us to think about the boundaries of the world we inhabit. Obviously, they
do not coincide completely with the boundaries of the language through which
we started uttering the world. The issue of the “resistance of being” against
random discursivation is a bit more complex than Eco presents it (op. cit.:
37–41). According to him, being, as it is, resists the attempts of people to utter
it as they like. However, interpreting minds and the community together form a
common instance: that of human discourse. Following the above model, we can
pose the problem from a different point of view, and contrast it with the
interpretive mind and the general sanction of its efforts. This sanction is
imposed by both the distrustful community and the “disobedient” dynamic
object. From this standpoint, and assuming that the community has achieved or
is in the process of achieving satisfactory interaction with its environment
thanks to the interpretive initiative of minds, it can be said that to identify some
things as absolutely unspeakable by being, means to be certain about the limits
Community;
Transcendental Sanctioner;
Carrier of 'Langue'
Dynamic realityMind, thought;
Interpreter;
Instance of effort & abduction
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of the abilities of all future minds. The examples given by Eco refer mainly to
the “objective existence of species” and to acts of nature, such as the rising and
setting of the sun (38). All of these are so deeply encoded in our world-views
that common sense would not dare question them. But even if it is beyond my
own powers, I insist on the right of some uncommon, extraordinary mind to
question these things in the future, to fight on its own behalf with both the
dynamic object and the transcendental sanctioner. That is to say, on the one
hand I do not question the resistant nature of being, which does not leave itself
at the mercy of just any discourse. But on the other hand, I cannot imagine that
this resistance constrains reality in such a way as to keep me from dealing with
things that have nothing to do with my actuality in the here and now. If that is
the case, then I must deny the possibility of future Copernican revolutions (for
example, someone discovers that the human race is an experiment produced by
alien civilizations). In fact, I could not admit that anything happens beyond my
own powers of imagination. All this should lead us to adopt a world-view
according to which intellectual effort is a constitutive part of the world, as the
result of three inseparable elements – one of them being the interpretive
initiative of mind – and as an individual attitude. Such a world-view both
accords with the ever-unpredictable nature of being and requires a continuous
ontological commitment to it.
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III. Hermeneutics of
Intellectual Effort and
Linguistic Work
It is now time to outline the basic features of a hermeneutics of intellectual effort.
We shall do this by placing what was earlier presented as “a theory of intellectual
effort” in the context of various attempts to systematize the philosophies of
authors that are representative of hermeneutics. The conclusions we reached at
the end of the previous chapter, derived from our interpretation of Peirce and
synthesized in the figure of the triangle, provide the basis on which to outline a
hermeneutics of intellectual effort, in as much as those conclusions combine the
view of the interpretative nature of being with realism and human subjectivity. In
our discussion of linguistic work (Part Two: Chapter I), we situated the main
topic of our research within a theoretical context that is unusually rich in
implications. That context further determines the possibilities for the
hermeneutics to follow.
III.1. Intellectual Effort and Strong Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics, or the theory of interpretation, is noted for being very watchful
over the status of its own discourse. As one of the most powerful critical
approaches of modernity, hermeneutics casts suspicion on all existing discourses,
and hermeneutic authors pay much attention to mutual criticism. Two large
groups are distinguishable among hermeneutic philosophers. One group take it as
their main task to outline a hermeneutic ontology; consequently, their criticism of
other authors derives from this undertaking. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Taylor and
Habermas (as far as he can be considered a hermeneuticist) all belong to this
type. The second large group of hermeneutic writers attempt to delegitimize
important authors and discourses, and eventually what in the eyes of their
followers could seem as a hermeneutic ontology is just derivative of their initial
care. To this group belong Rorty, Derrida, Vattimo, Lyotard, and John Caputo,
among others. It should be clear that the present study has more affinity with the
first group of authors, whose philosophical effort is constructive, as contrasted to
the second group, where the accent is on deconstruction. 
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Another attempt at classification appears in Nicholas Smith's book, Strong
Hermeneutics (1997), though Smith takes “self-identity” as the main notion by
which to classify hermeneutic authors. More important for our theory of
intellectual effort is the distinction Smith makes between Strong and Weak
hermeneutics. This distinction addresses the constitutive role of the culturally
determined identity for the cognitive process and introduces us to a particular
view of subjectivity. This view risks dissolving subjectivity into a set of pure
contingencies, if we ignore the obligatory interpretative coherence of the self and
intellectual effort as a condition for World (II. 3. c). Let us see how the two types
of hermeneutics are opposed.
The starting point and common denominator of Strong and Weak
hermeneutics is their mutual opposition to the powerful philosophical movement
that Smith calls, borrowing an expression from Gelner, “Enlightenment
fundamentalism”. As we know, this disposition of thought originates in a
remarkably optimistic epoch of Western culture, when Reason is credited with
the emancipation of man, the consolidation of the scientific method, and
determining the nature (or essence) of the human being. The Enlightenment
insists on purity of knowledge, and it opposes “culture dependent, reason
deficient, subjective identity to culture transcendent, rationally replete, objective
cognition” (Smith 1997: 15). Such objectives are interpreted by hermeneutic and
post-modern authors as attempts to hyper-legitimize Enlightenment discourse.
The latter, infinitely strengthened by the scientific-technological aspect of the
contemporary world, firmly holds the monopoly on Truth, thus stifling the
possibility of many other alternative discourses.
Hence, the delegitimization of Enlightenment fundamentalism becomes the
common task of many philosophical undertakings of our century, and especially
those of hermeneutics. Strong and Weak hermeneutics, according to Smith,
represent two different degrees of radicalness in this general process of
delegitimization. A common goal for both is to rehabilitate the cognitive
functions of interpretation, which Enlightenment thinkers long considered a
faulty means of attaining real, objective knowledge (16). In contemporary
discourse, however, interpretation is the only way to gain knowledge, and after
the phenomenological turn in hermeneutics, it is the main means of
demonstrating the impossibility of a culturally transcendent discourse (17). In
this way, interpretation comes into direct confrontation with the most significant
product of Enlightenment fundamentalism: scientific knowledge. Weak
hermeneutics gives no priority to this kind of knowledge, but considers it one of
many possibilities for describing the world. Because it is based on the idea of
radical contingency (15), Weak hermeneutics cannot privilege any particular
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discourse, including its own. The vocabularies that we find in the world and with
which we are “condemned” to interact are contingent, as are the forces that
constitute the identity of the self. Weak hermeneutics extends Nietzschean
perspectivism to the point of reducing existence to an endless and goal-less
process of self-creation and self-transformation (15). Smith, adapting an
expression of Derrida, describes this process as an “intensification of the play of
difference” (18). Gianni Vattimo sees it as the nihilistic fate of post-modernity.
Smith stresses two other aspects of Weak hermeneutics, which he in turn uses
to define the “strong” branch of this discipline. To stake one's position on radical
contingency undermines the possibility of anything being considered real,
because to do so would “privilege the claimant's own perspective and exclude
others” (16). According to Weak hermeneutics, this is how the metaphysics of
Truth takes possession of discourse and gives it an extra-discursive foundation.
Smith's other observation derives from this point: “Weak hermeneutics is `weak'
in virtue of its radical withdrawal from ontological commitment” (15; my italics).
Contingency, which characterizes all of our interactions with the world, excludes
the possibility of any predetermined responsibility and of engagement with
reality. Strong hermeneutics, by contrast, is based on the ontological commitment
of subjectivity to reality. Smith uses Ricoeur's expression “ontological
vehemence” to describe the quality of this commitment. This view of the human
condition represents the central distinction between the two types of
hermeneutics, which, as we have said, are almost identical in other aspects. This
difference is central to our study, as should be obvious from my earlier use of
Ricoeur's expression in defining intellectual effort (Part One: I.8 and II. 3. e).
Smith adds another way of distinguishing between the two types of
hermeneutics. From the point of view of Strong hermeneutics, “human beings are
inescapably beings for whom things matter” (24). This view, which Weak
hermeneutics would not accept, means that despite the contingency of the world
into which we are thrown, of the community we belong to, and of the language
we speak, our subjectivity is possible by virtue of our non-contingent position
among all those contingencies. This position is not based on culture-transcendent
suppositions but, rather, results from ceaseless activities of understanding and
effort. This unceasing activity is the source of the historicity of human
persistence in the world. From such a standpoint, contingency not only not denies
but even predetermines the necessity of this perpetually renewed interpretative
effort, because, as we have seen in Part One: II.3. b), our persistence in time is
characterized by a pragmatic projection that is not contingent for the subject, a
position which melts future and past in the duration of consciousness. As Smith
puts it, “for strong hermeneutics, interpretation is the living house of reason, not
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its tomb” (19). In other words, although we cannot appeal to extra-discursive
grounds for truth in our unceasing interpretative interaction with the world, we
cannot ignore the ground of our interpretative activity, which is always searching
for consensus. Our involvement in this form of describing the world constitutes
our self-identity, and that identity is not an expression of contingency, although
the circumstances that make it necessary for us to cope with them could well be
contingent. “Strong hermeneutics takes its points of departure not from the
epistemological fragility of foundational truth claims, but from the conditions of
possibility of actual interpretative practices” (22; author's italics).
In this same line of thought, Smith outlines the attitude of Strong
hermeneutics towards reality and science. This attitude coincides more or less
with the Peircian model, which we saw in the previous chapter. The basic notion
is that of the resistance which reality shows to our cognitive intentions.
According to Strong hermeneutics, there is a criterion for progress in the dialectic
of scientific hypotheses, although it is incompatible with the idea of discovered
truth. Strong hermeneutics “encourages us to think of truth as the disclosure
made manifest by a perspicuous articulation, rather than as a relation of
correspondence between an object and some external means of representation”
(ibid.). Here, as in Peirce, the relation between nature and the interpreting mind
is dynamic and requires engagement.
As we mentioned before, much of Smith's book is dedicated to defending the
centrality of identity for the cognitive processes, which are reduced to the logic
of contingency by “weak” authors. He makes his defense by examining topics
like self-identity, moral and practical reason, discursive ethics, emancipation, and
ecological politics. To Smith's efforts, we can add the theory of intellectual
effort, which also opens a problematic that further confirms the inconsistency of
radicalizing the contingency of being. The best way to clarify this inconsistency
is to examine the position of Rorty – the paragon of weak hermeneutics,
according to Smith -regarding the contingency of those aspects of interaction
with reality that concern our own study.
III. 2. Intelligence and Contingency
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty offers an argument that
spares philosophy from having to discover any kind of truth, i.e., from reflecting
the nature of things. In that book he deals mostly with analytical and positivist
philosophy, as well as with science itself. In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity
(1989), Rorty continues the same line of thought, but now used to critique
“discovery” intentions concerning the inner nature of man. Rorty shows that
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moral conceptions are both historically naive and useless, when understood as
human essences of the deepest level (e.g., Plato's Good, Kant's “categorical
imperative”). Rorty does not offer alternative moral conceptions, because doing
so would force him to commit the same error. He instead offers a new thesis on
the inconsistency involved in making moral prescriptions to mankind. This
inconsistency arises from the fundamental contingency of the human condition
and from the inability of anyone to overcome it. Rorty applies his thesis on
contingency to three different, yet interrelated, domains: language, the self, and
the community. His descriptions of the problems of language agree completely
with our own. When, however, Rorty applies his conclusions to descriptions of
the self and of the community, some conspicuous discrepancies appear which I
intend to focus on.
In discussing the contingency of language, Rorty rehearses the contemporary
conception of the centrality of linguistic experience for human persistence in
world, opposing it to those views which appeal to extra-linguistic substances. He
accentuates the fact that truth is a matter of sentences, not of the things
themselves (6). In contrast to Galileo, Rorty thinks that nature speaks no
language, not even the language of mathematics. Languages are an entirely
human affair and are therefore subject to historicity and to the finitude of man.
Thus, Rorty concentrates on the dynamics of the vocabularies with which we
describe the world. He attributes a central role to the ability of language to
function in a metaphorical way, and thus to be always renewing itself and
overcoming the limits of its own system. This characteristic of Language, in the
large, is not determined by any goal towards which each new particular language
brings us closer. Rather, it is the ideal environment in which “conversation goes
on”. And that conversation is guided by the interests and exigencies of the
community, which exercises its choice in a strictly pragmatic way. 
On that basis Rorty considers the fate of the self, which to him is as
contingent as our “choice” of the moment and the linguistic community in which
we are born. According to Rorty, fundamental contingency motivates the
individual authors of redescriptions, for which language is the necessary
condition. In his utopian liberal community, the “hero” is the “strong” poet (54).
The latter is that ironic individual who understands the contingency of being and
is able to re-create himself through metaphors, yet without being able to envision
the result of his efforts. According to Rorty, 
“[...] the person who uses words as they have never before been used, is best able to
appreciate her own contingency. For she can see, more clearly than the
continuity-seeking historian, critic or philosopher, that her language is as contingent
as her parents or as her historical epoch. She can appreciate the force of the claim that
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`truth is a mobile army of metaphors' because, by her own sheer strength, she has
broken out of one perspective, one metaphoric into another.” (28; author's italics) 
The same human beings of which Rorty speaks are also the heroes of
intellectual effort, whom I called at the beginning of this study (Part One: I.9.),
using Foucault's expression, “founders of discoursivity”. I also placed the
metaphorical faculty at the base of the problem, but where Rorty sees
contingency, I see intellectual effort. In terms of Niels Bohr's famous aphorism,
I should preserve the proportion that genius is 99% labor and 1% fortune,
whereas the Rorty of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity would not hesitate to
give 100% to fortune (contingency) and 0% to labor. By mediating the difference
of opinion between Rorty and Bohr, the theory of intellectual effort can
contribute to the cause of Strong hermeneutics.
I chose Rorty, and not some other authority of Weak hermeneutics, because,
unlike the others, the American pragmatist speaks directly about the individual
faculty for metaphor, and even gives some explanations of it. For most authors of
Weak hermeneutics, conclusions about the character of language are vaguely
identified with the constitution of the self through the formula “the limits of the
language are the limits of the world”. In contrast, Rorty makes the analogy very
explicit. He compares the natural and contingent way in which different forms of
life appear with the birth of metaphors:
“Analogously, for all we know, or should care, Aristotle's metaphorical use of ousia,
Saint Paul's metaphorical use of agape, and Newton's metaphorical use of gravitas,
were the results of cosmic rays scrambling the fine structure of some crucial neurons
in their respective brains. Or, more plausibly, they were the result of some odd
episodes in infancy – some obsessional kinks, left in these brains by idiosyncratic
traumata. It hardly matters how the trick was done. The results were marvelous. There
had never been such a thing before.” (17; author's italics)
This is the worst passage of the whole book. Its naïveté – which is not
dispelled by the author's declaration of irony – reveals one of the unsolved
problems of Weak hermeneutics. A thorough redescription of the order of things
was needed in order to reveal the horizons of post-modern thought, and it was
done by exceptionally penetrating authors like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault,
Derrida, Rorty, Lyotard, Deleuze, Vattimo and others, all of whom exercised
extraordinary argumentative ability. All of them have contributed to the overturn
of the Western metaphysical tradition by means of their important and profound
discourses, which, however, aim to delegitimize the importance and profundity
of any discourse. This contradiction in Rorty is expressed by the naïve move to
reduce the whole contribution of an author to the metaphorical use of a single
word, or a single metaphor at most! This seems a little strange, to say the least,
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because a few pages earlier Rorty is in a similar situation, but there he finds the
opposite solution. When he needs to defend the constructed character of truth, he
states that, on the level of a single sentence, this is hard to demonstrate, but if we
take a look at the “vocabularies as wholes” (5) then it is easy to see that we can
hardly attribute more truthfulness to one epoch than to another. It seems to me
that the contributions of Aristotle, St. Paul, and Newton cannot be captured by a
single metaphor, but rather concern entirely new worlds and new forms of
discursivity. To realize these worlds a permanent effort is necessary, as was the
research, struggle, preaching, and sacrifice of the authors. Contingency might
have thrown them into their respective life-situations, but contingency ends there.
Then comes the 99% work required to create and “maintain” the worlds which
they have opened up and which millions of other people have entered. The
ontological commitment of those founders of discoursivity demands similar
commitment from their followers. In the same way, contemporary post-modern
authors spark in their followers an ontological commitment to the current
situation, no matter how much they deny ontologies!
To summarize: human interaction with the world is not mediated exclusively
by language, which is utterly contingent. Our actions are determined as well by
the linguistic practice of people who set the example of persisting in a linguistic
world. This state of affairs is not a result of contingency, but of the
purposefulness and burden of the unending necessity to cope with and understand
whatever situation in which we find ourselves.
III.3. Ontological Commitment as Intelligence
Until now we have spoken mostly about geniuses and founders of discursivity,
but intellectual effort concerns all levels of society. In Rorty's utopian liberal
community the hero is the revolutionary poet who understands better than others
do the contingency of being. I should say that this very hero is invested with
ontological commitment to reality, and that his/her comprehension of the
contingency “by her own sheer strength” (28) derives from that intense
ontological commitment, and not vice versa. What triggers this process is the
ontological vehemence to say the world in new ways, and not the intuitions of a
few after that new world has been realized. Thus ontological vehemence is a
regime of intellectual effort that involves a variety of people. It is not clear why
ontological vehemence is more contingent in certain people than in others, but
we can say definitely that, as a result, some people gather more followers than
others do. These people can be great thinkers and statesmen, but they can also be
creators of fashion or local opinion leaders. In one way or another, the
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communicative worlds such leaders open both welcome and shelter their
followers. And what maintains these worlds is effort and creation, not
contingency. This is the exact opposite of what Rorty thinks; for him, our choice
of hero is merely contingent (81).
Our thesis on ontological commitment runs the great risk of being interpreted
as a way of ranking people according to their “good” traits. At first glance we
seem to repeat the gesture of proponents of the IQ test (see Bankov 1999), which,
as we know, is one of the most controversial themes in psychology and
philosophy. IQ tests have provided “scientific” grounds for the logo- and
egocentrism of Western culture in such a degree that, with good reason, all
significant contemporary currents of thought are infinitely suspicious of them.
This is especially true of all hermeneutics that, by pointing to negative
consequences, critically denounce the naturalization and universalization of
Western metaphysics. The history of the so-called Intelligence Quotient, for its
part, is the history of the discovery of irrefutable “scientific” proofs that support
probably the most daring pretension of Western man – that he is superior to the
other races.
Given these circumstances, in the remaining pages I shall try to outline the
hermeneutic valence of ontological commitment to reality in a way that will
distinguish it completely from the IQ controversy. At the same time, we shall not
do so by accepting the radical contingency of the self. In fact, Rorty's chapter on
the contingency of the self could be interpreted precisely as a delegitimization of
the claim that there are substantial differences between human beings. Rorty's
main ally for that purpose is Freud. Rorty sides with Philip Rieff, who claims that
Freud “democratized genius by giving everyone the creative unconscious” (36).
In the quoted passage by Rorty, on the metaphorical use of words, we saw one
version of this statement. It is completed by the generalization which Rorty
makes about the whole metaphysical disposition towards the Other:
“To abjure the notion of the `truly human' is to abjure the attempt to divinize the self
as a replacement for a divinized world [...] It is to get rid of the last citadel of
necessity, the last attempt to see us as all confronting the same imperatives, the same
unconditional claims” (35).
The democratization of genius, and of the human faculties in general, which
Rorty accomplishes with the introduction of contingency, could be seen more
realistically from the point of view of effort and labor. (Bohr's aphorism is a
perfect example of such democratization, though at first glance it might seem
laden with Western values.) In other words, if we must explain the obvious fact
that there are always persons whose example we want to follow, be they
philosophers, moralists, or plain professionals, i.e., people whose world is rich
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and large enough to open existential horizons for us which we could never reach
on our own, and if we avoid expressions such as “God's elect”, then we have two
possibilities: either we imagine them as people who dedicate their life to
maintaining their world, or as fortuitous combinations of metaphors that win us
as followers in a purely contingent way.
To avoid contingency, and at the same time not label people as “more real”
and “less real” human beings, we need to accept that ontological commitment is
not something which one possesses, for instance, somewhere in his brain. This
mistake is as evident in those who explain intelligence by genetic predisposition
(the basis of scientific racism) as it is in those with exactly the opposite intention,
but who, like Rorty, reduce the problem to convolutions (17) that appear
contingently.
Stephen Jay Gould's book, The Mismeasure of Man (1981), provides great
support for our defense of ontological commitment. It is an exhaustive account of
attempts in the last two centuries to measure human intelligence. The very title
signals Gould's intent. If Rorty's polemic for the “democratization of the human
faculties” is directed against Plato and Kant, who did nothing bad in their lives,
Gould polemicizes against the reification of the worst of that tradition of thought
to whom both thinkers belong. The Mismeasure of Man gives an account of the
very deep prejudice that propounds a natural hierarchy among human races. Such
prejudice has predetermined the results of scientific attempts to create an
objective system for measuring human faculties, and, bolstered by Enlightenment
fundamentalism, it has become a part of contemporary thought. Without being
explicitly philosophical, Gould's inquiry resembles phenomenological
investigation, not of someone's abstract thoughts, but of theories that have
influenced such important institutions as the US Congress, Army, and Supreme
Court. The earnestness, scientific rigor, and moral charge of Gould's
investigation of prejudice make his work anathema to all those views which we
called Weak hermeneutics.
For present purposes, the most important part of the book is where Gould
argues his conception of human intelligence and its dialectic with external reality.
The whole book is based on the idea that there is a dimension of man which can
be called intelligence. This dimension is the most distinctive feature of the
human species. As an evolutionist, Gould connects this feature with the necessity
of living organisms, like us, to adapt themselves to the environment (Bergson
calls this principle Primum vivere). But his thesis differs from that of orthodox
Darwinists, and even more from that of the Lamarkians, because of the role he
attributes to genetic heritage. Without resorting to the concept of contingency,
Gould opposes the idea that man is completely predetermined biologically. For
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Gould, intelligence encompasses such a large range of elements of existence that
any attempt to measure and reduce it to a simple number is a doomed exercise in
oversimplification. He casts the matter in a different light: “The quest for
underlying generating rules expresses a concept of biological potentiality” (1981:
330). This potentiality is something which can be assumed by, but cannot be
separated from, the elements that accomplish it. Hence, it is more important to
accomplish this potential than to assume it. And the accomplishment has
something to do with learning. “Humans are learning animals” (333). The
learning aspect of intelligence shows it to be a product of effort and work.
Indeed, IQ tests were initially conceived by their inventor Binet to help identify
children with learning-difficulties. Paradoxically, the people responsible for
implementing the tests on a broad scale, especially in the United States, have
interpreted and imposed those tests as a system of labeling and, consequently, of
limiting the opportunities of the children and adults who take them (152). For
Binet, intelligence is what the individual achieves when he is placed in an equal
starting position with the others. It is a function of education and work, and the
tests serve only to detect those cases where help is needed in order for this
process to begin normally. As we have seen, ontological commitment and
linguistic work are part of the learning process and of the growth of the world we
live in.
Gould introduces creativity into the picture of intelligence, a move which
brings him closer to the purposes of this study: “What is intelligence, if not the
ability to face problems in an unprogrammed (or, as we often say, creative)
manner?” (331). The whole conception of Gould about evolution is in this sense:
“in neoteny, rates of development slow down and juvenile stages of ancestors
become the adult features of descendants.... We retain not only the anatomical
stamp of childhood, but its mental flexibility as well” (333). In Part One, II. 3. c)
we took mental flexibility to make the difference between inhabiting a World
(Welt) and living in an Environment (Umwelt).
Now I can more clearly define my version of ontological commitment. Like
intelligence, as defined by Gould, it is the prerequisite for a World. At the same
time, ontological commitment requires us to throw ourselves into and try to carry
out some vital project, and not just react mechanistically to stimuli.
Autonomy, understanding, care, interpretative effort, education, memory – all
these characteristics of human existence are at the same time the World in which
we live and the purposeful work of enriching it by the disclosure and adoption of
new horizons. This dynamic process, which constitutes the ontological
commitment to reality, contains much more than pure contingency.
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IV. Conclusions
IV. 1. Intellectual Effort and Truth
To conclude this study I would like to make some remarks on the limits of my
interpretation of the Bergsonian idea of intellectual effort. We have to consider
the hermeneutic circle in which anyone is caught who wants to build a theory of
interpretation. On the one hand, we identified intellectual effort with “the debut
of the human spirit” as an escape from the permanent present, into time and the
duration of consciousness. On the other hand, many precautions were taken to
stress the partiality of our discourse, that it belongs to a private perspective only.
From a logical-deductive point of view this contradiction renders the whole
study completely senseless. Yet I would like to defend the idea that the
hermeneutic circle is not a “vicious” one; it is useful to those who travel it,
though it may not bring them to any particular destination. In contrast to Weak
hermeneutics (Part Two: III.1.) and to any form of nihilism and relativism, in
the theory of intellectual effort man's search for truth starts when he begins to
think, i.e., when he interrupts his mechanical reproduction of socially coded
forms of behavior and communication. Man always journies toward somewhere,
although in the last century he has realized that he cannot reach the “Promised
Land”. In my view, every specific truth exists until the contrary is proved, in the
same way in which “things matter” (Smith 1997: 24) for the man of Strong
hermeneutics. For the theory of intellectual effort this “proof of the contrary” is
of greater interest than is the defense of the reigning truth. In this balance lies
the core of the question: in my view, disagreement with an accepted truth is not
a reason to deny truth at all, but is a stimulus for producing (inventing)
something more adequate. In this way the value of truth is increased and not
decreased. Contemporary hermeneutic discourse concerns the underlying
difficulty of dealing with truth; it does not proclaim that it is senseless to
presuppose truth. With Gadamer, I say that truth does not endure in time, but
that it has to be produced again and again, although always from the same
“material”, which he calls tradition. Truth perishes as snowballs do: they melt,
but only after they have hit the target. Something like that takes place in the
movement around the hermeneutic circle: if only in passing, something “makes
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sense”.
Truth, says Rorty, is inherent to sentences, not to things themselves. There
is no truth in things; truth is a matter of language. I should add that truth is also
inherent to speech, to interpretative effort, to language in action, and these
require a mind. Truth is made up of language, but language alone is not enough.
Someone must make an effort to make language speak. Moreover, this act of
speech is not a single case. Temporality does not permit identical speech acts.
The mechanical repetition of a speech act produces different results each time
because the hermeneutic (dialogic) situation never repeats itself exactly. Given
these circumstances, the function of mind is to produce identical results, which
guarantee language-use adequate to the occasion.
Although borne by language, mind is something more. It is Language(s) +
Rules for its use + Adequacy. If we take for granted that time is always change,
and that its course leaves a trace, then the component of adequacy takes on a
decisive role. In order to produce sensible communication, in order to
understand, the mind needs, besides language and the rules for its use, the
certainty that in the just-born, unique situation the chosen signs and their use are
optimal. There are no rules for determining the certainty of this choice. If it
were possible to establish new rules for the proper use of existing rules, then the
problem would arise again with the lack of certainty for the choice of new rules.
Even Kant knew this (1881: 245).
The faculty to struggle with time, to respond adequately to its constitutive
novelty, I have called ontological commitment to reality. This ontological
commitment constrains man to exist in a regime of intellectual effort.
Ontological commitment calls for the permanent doubt that maybe things are
not what inertia and routine have conditioned us to identify as always the same.
Ontological commitment is the ongoing intellectual work by which we apply
our world – as sense and meaning – to our determined social functions, to which
we are all condemned in one way or another.
Social functions, as interactions between people, call for a transfer of our
ontological commitment to reality. From the point of view of the theory of
intellectual effort, social communications cannot be reduced to the exchange of
signs and knowledge. Rather, we are looking for authorities, from whom we get
not so much knowledge or know-how, but the discursive horizons on which to
focus our interpretative existence. Authority gives us a world to dispose of and
relieves us partially from ontological commitment. It is something more than the
author of a definite number of ready-made truths. This authority gives meaning
to being and discloses the horizons within which our interpretative effort and
understanding achieve truth.
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This kind of interaction is evident in the case of moral and religious
authorities. In these cases the follower is limited to a single leader. But my view
is that this kind of transfer of ontological commitment concerns all levels of
society. In philosophy, in science, in arts and in crafts, intellectual growth
always goes hand in hand with the use of authority. This authority is more than
one, and it continuously changes in composition. Nevertheless it is authority and
not simply encyclopaedic knowledge. The following anecdote about Hegel is
instructive here: after some hours of listening to the philosopher explain truth,
one student got up and asked: “And yet, what is truth?” To which Hegel replied,
“I am the truth!” (Denkov et al. 1991: 277). Truth, according to my version of
Strong hermeneutics, is given to us by those whom we choose for authorities,
but with the condition that we make the effort to reproduce it every time. The
difference between us and Hegel is that it barely crossed his mind that his truth
was worthy only for those who had chosen him as an authority, and not for all
human beings.
IV. 2. Intellectual Effort and Otherness
The hermeneutics of intellectual effort directly relates to the ethics of Otherness.
This ethics does not pertain to the egoistic ontological vehemence that searches
for new existential horizons in authorities. Rather, this ethics concerns the
permeability of our world, the readiness to accept the Other in it, with all the
inconveniences this may bring us. As we saw in Part Two: Chapter I, our world
is not just a verbally articulated picture of what surrounds us. Rather, our world
is the result of considerable linguistic work to absorb the surrounding culture,
and the effective and up-to-date use of that work constitutes our role in
providing for needs of the community. The acceptance of Otherness stands in
contradiction to all “economical” principles of thought. Otherness might
question everything that linguistic work has achieved. The pragmatic efficiency
of our cognitive picture of the world is based on the facility with which we are
able to identify what we perceive as the “same”. To accept Otherness is to
renounce this pragmatic comfort. The acceptance of Otherness is a way of
“administering” our personal world in a way that threatens our cognitive
certainty. The acceptance of Otherness is openness and care; it is ontological
commitment in action. Otherness and the necessity of intellectual effort are one
and the same thing.
I have spoken about the Otherness of the future (Part One II. 3. b) and the
Otherness of material reality (Part One II. 1. 0), II. 2.). In both cases, Otherness
was the distinctive feature of two intellectual regimes. The first one is that of
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identification, deduction, and stimulus-response, whose goal is the achievement
of sameness. The second regime is that of interpretation, effort, and risk, whose
ideal is openness towards the Other. We conceived the Otherness of the future
in accordance with Bergson's concept of the duration of time as “the continuous
creation of unforeseeable novelty” (CM 91). The Otherness of material reality
was outlined on the basis of Peirce's concept of the dynamic object. It remains
for us to say some words about Otherness par excellence: the Otherness of the
other person. 
The most important difference between this and the other two types of
Otherness lies in the consequences of disregarding them. If man remains a
stranger to the Otherness of the future, in the worst case his life will be
uninteresting. The future will always be a repetition that confirms his conviction
that things are the way they are. The consequences of ignoring the Otherness of
the dynamic object are similar: man anchors himself to a single perspective,
which guarantees him confidence and control at the expense of what Rorty calls
irony and contingency. In both cases, the consequences are pragmatic. In
contrast, when the Otherness of the other person is ignored, the consequences
are ethical and moral. This means that when we identify the other person we
project on him a type which either underestimates or overestimates him. In
either case, effort, understanding, and interpretation are suspended. But this is
also the biggest challenge. Though the Otherness of the other man may negate
intellectual capacities, we owe it to him to make contact with the Otherness of
his material-pragmatic interaction with the world. And we also should make
contact with the Otherness of the enduring time in which his existence unfolds.
The Otherness of the other person is something like the product of the other two
types of Otherness; hence the great temptation to relieve ourselves from it
through the use of labels and stereotypes. A particularly indicative example of
man's necessity to label and catalogue others is the story of the IQ, which we
saw in the previous chapter. Racism, xenophobia, chauvinism, and such are
practices of stereotyping that absolve us from the effort we owe to the Other,
and that spare us from the shock of confronting and accepting a world whose
boundaries are infinite.
On the other hand, to care for everyone equally is obviously impossible. This
is only an ideal. In reality, people accept being labeled and catalogued, and the
impressive thing is that this is the norm of behavior when it opens possibilities
instead of closing them. Sometimes being overestimated stimulates us to further
effort, so as not to disappoint expectations.
IV. 3. The Society of Consumption 
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and the Twilight of Efforts
Self-identification follows the same strategy by which the identification of the
Other as a predetermined type relieves us of effort. Self-identification is also
aided by conventional typologies, when it becomes necessary to overcome an
unfavorable situation for the self. Ready-made types, once chosen by the self,
relieve it from the duty of constantly having to make choices – the duty which
I call ontological commitment. A thorough investigation of the strategies which
the self uses to escape risk and effort can be found in Erich Fromm's Escape
from Freedom (1941). In the present context we might speak of an “escape from
Otherness”, which represents the same problem, but from the point of view of
the ethics of intellectual effort.
Escape from Freedom was written in the context of the disastrous totalitarian
regimes in Europe that brought on World War II. The proper context for the
ethics of intellectual effort is that of advanced consumer societies. It seems to
me that this latest phase of Western culture, or as Vattimo calls it, “realized
metaphysics”, is not so much characterized by the dominant role of positivist
science and technology as it is by marketing and consumerism. If the great
scientific discoveries of the last century found their outlet in industrialization,
then we are definitely in a new phase now. Three different types of interaction
may be observed between production and the market. In the earliest phases, the
industrial product was so superior in quality and price to that of the craftsman,
that the only problem was to manufacture those products in sufficient quantity.
Scientific progress and the improvement of technologies soon solved this
problem, and then the accent went to logistics and sales. Both of these phases
were based on the efficiency of machines and the scale of production, although
in the second case they resulted in new problems. Both phases sought to
transform technologies into capital. But if positivist science is considered to be
the prime accomplishment of Western metaphysics, and society based on mass
use of technology as its final phase, then this picture leaves out the current role
of market thinking. Of course, technology still engenders capital. But the
difference today is in the logic by which technology reaches the consumer. If
earlier the variables were efficiency of production and marketing logistics, now
the unknown is the consumer and his needs. This is the current phase of
marketing thought: the entire strategy of production is based on thorough
research of consumer needs. In this phase, technology is “officially” subservient
to the needs of the consumer. But what reveals the real scale of importance of
that logic does not concern only the material production. Already, marketing
orientation has become the winning model of the whole social space. The
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corporate definition of marketing is quite revealing. As defined by the American
Marketing Association in 1985, “Marketing is the process of planning and
executing the conception, pricing, promotion and distribution of ideas, goods,
and services to create exchange that satisfy individual and organizational
objectives”. Many institutions that have nothing to do with the implementation
of technology follow the logic of marketing. These are not only non-political
and non-governmental organizations, but also entire state apparatuses and even
some free-thinkers. Scientific institutes, which have become more and more
autonomous in recent times, are also constrained to find funds in a purely
marketing way, which, of course, influences the content of research. Nowadays
even the myth of science has to advertise and promote itself if it wants to
survive!
Marketing has been transformed into a kind of social sensibility, for which
there are more and more formulae and theories today. Illustrative of my point is
the so-called “dematerialization” of demand. This process makes the value of
goods more symbolic and communicative and less aimed at satisfying the
material needs. The consumer pays for the brand, the sign, not so much for the
product itself. This situation is possible because of the new “culture of
consumption”, as it has been called in recent decades.
The metaphysics in force today is this very culture of consumption, more so
than the technological web that surrounds us. From my “Western” point of view
there is something truly universal in the logic of satisfying needs. It is as if the
“universal” goal is to live without effort. And marketing promises to do away
with the need for effort. Consumption not only resolves our pragmatic problems
in everyday life, guaranteeing a kind of comfort in the face of the future, but its
communicative code gives the self many possibilities, such as the use of the
consumer portfolio to identify both the Other and ourselves. The move to do
away with efforts is all-encompassing. The marketing of services has become so
pervasive that now with enough money we can avoid the effort of performing
many “existential” activities. Agencies find us husbands and wives. Companies
create the identities of clients by developing their “images”. Some businesses
help their clients to graduate from academic programs without making any
(intellectual) effort. Other companies provide wars to their clients, even wars of
national liberation! The limits of the supply of services are the limits of the
imagination of those who provide them. 
In this model there is something truly universal. While we philosophers
discuss how people in different cultures live in different worlds, even the most
remote places on the planet are becoming markets for Western goods.
Representatives of all the different cultures are seduced by the outward
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attractiveness of this model. In the most literal sense, people of all ethnic origins
are “selling their souls” and their dignity to gain access to the culture of
consumption, which is the myth of a life without effort. The symbolic value of
goods is universally understood better than any work of art or political idea. Yet
for total commercial globalization to take place, the resistance of different
cultures to perceived homogenization must be overcome. And what has more
“universal” appeal to consumers everywhere than the guarantee of having to do
nothing at all? We may well be witnessing the twilight of all efforts –
intellectual ones included.
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